Okay; all good. Thanks for replying Eric.
Other Eric > On Apr 1, 2026, at 15:56, Eric Charles <[email protected]> wrote: > > EricS... what Frank said is the issue :- ) > > I'm not sure how to parse all the options you provided, but you were trying > to articulate something you were admittedly confused about, which is > inherently a rough task. Luckily, Frank's comment simplified things. > > Fitness = How well the organism fits the environment (or, it's niche within > the larger environment). For example, a Macaw fit's well an environment in > which rich nutrients are often stuck within nuts and seeds protected by hard > shells, which themselves are dispersed over long distances in high canopies. > They can readily fly from tree to tree, and crack open said nuts and berries > with their extremely powerful beaks. One assesses fitness by the comparative > method and by the engineering method. The comparative method takes the > species in question and compares it to related species in different niches > (e.g., the brown hooded parrot and the caique), as well as less-related > species in similar niches (e.g., acorn woodpeckers, Clark's nutcrackers). The > engineering method assesses fitness by creating models of a given function, > and comparing the "ideal" model with the species in question (i.e., modeling > the jaw/beak of a bird to apply nut-cracking pressure). Traditionally, of > course, the comparative method has been dominant, but with the emergence of > computers, there is now a lot of very fun work using the engineering method. > > It might not be immediately obvious, for further example, that the Geospiza > magnirostris is a finch. But once that becomes obvious, a field biologist > would be immediately tempted to compare it to other finches, and to other > birds (such as the various parrots) that similarly eat nuts and seeds > protected by hard shells. That species's adaptations to said environment are > not nearly as exaggerated as the Macaw, but are on par with small parrots, > and are quite distinct from mainland finches. They seem more specialized for > nut-cracking than lovebirds, for example, which have a similar weight. We can > observe all of that before we have spent any effort toward studying which > individuals within the species are reproducing more or less successfully than > other ones. > > Reproductive success is more straightforward, we can get at it by counting > offspring. > > The theory of evolution by means of natural selection contained many > components, but the most noteworthy component was the hypothesis that you > could explain the phylogeny seen in the fossil record, as well as the > dispersal of animals around the globe in present day, via a historic process > by which those-organisms-better-designed-to-fit-their-niche had more > offspring than their conspecifics, creating sustained change over time. We > can quibble about the vocabulary in many ways, and the dislike for "design" > is particularly understandable, given historic arguments over the term. But > what we should not do, is allow that quibbling to erase crucial aspects of > the theory. Much is lost if, for example, we reduce Darwin's theory to "the > things that reproduced are the things that reproduced", which is something we > risk doing when we mathematize the environment out of the picture. > > That is: We expect fitness to predict survival (to reproductive age) and > reproductive success, but there is no guarantee that it does in any > particular case, and we would not be at all surprised if occasional examples > were found where it does not. However, if we follow a particular model of > formalization in which we interdefine all of our terms (mathematically or > otherwise), then we cannot go out in the field and discover that fit and > reproductive success relate, and we cannot discover occasional exceptions, > because we removed all potential empirical implication from the system of > terms, and rendered all (well-constructed) claims in the system true by > definition (ala the model of Euclidean Geometry), rather than allowing them > to be true (or not true) based on the results of scientific investigation. > > <mailto:[email protected]> > > On Wed, Apr 1, 2026 at 11:51 AM Frank Wimberly <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> I thought fitness was a measure of the likelihood of survival in a given >> environment. Hence fitness together with the capacity and drive to >> reproduce would determine the continuation of a species. But I'm no >> biologist. >> >> Frank >> --- >> Frank C. Wimberly >> 140 Calle Ojo Feliz, >> Santa Fe, NM 87505 >> >> 505 670-9918 >> Santa Fe, NM >> >> On Wed, Apr 1, 2026, 5:15 AM Santafe <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> Can I ask one last question? after which I promise I really will shut up: >>> >>> The content of EricC’s note below (about the key in a lock), reflecting >>> back on things Nick said in the early posts about selection’s being a >>> tautology, which got me started digging a hole, have bothered me through >>> the night, and made me wonder if I can understand how I have been missing >>> both-of-y’all’s point. Was it something like the following:? >>> >>> — for me, “fitness” is a name given to (something like) the units (or >>> dimension) in which reproductive success is measured, or quantified. Not >>> sure “units” is quite the right term, but the point is that it’s about >>> defining a quantification program for observed outcomes, or the model >>> variables that we try to fit to them. I had taken the state of modern work >>> to show that this is the only actual meaning the term was ever given. >>> >>> — are you two claiming otherwise; that my supposition is not at all the >>> case? That there are biologists for whom there is some other meaning, >>> instead of or in addition to the one I gave above, about being a >>> measurement unit? Something like: “fitness” is a name for “the cause of >>> reproductive success”. As if to say: Well, there’s this thing with the >>> form of a name, so there must be something it names, that is a kind of >>> causal force responsible for generating what we witness as reproductive >>> success. And since there is one name, there must be some one kind of >>> causal force it names. >>> >>> — to me, an interpretation like that is so bizarre, it would never have >>> occurred to me to that there is anyone making it. It seems very similar to >>> taking an expression like “elan vital”, and saying that, since it has the >>> shape of a name, there must be something it names. To me, those are >>> strings of words that satisfy rules of syntax and that don’t have any >>> semantic referents at all. They may as well be Chomsky’s “colorless green >>> dreams” or something. I would not have imagined that there was anything >>> anyone expected, beyond the working out of the mechanics of lots of cases >>> of how-lifecycles-play-out-in-contexts, which can fill out some vast >>> taxonomy that has no singular “essence” underneath it. That could well be >>> my lack of empathy for how many other people think, like my lack of empathy >>> for their thoughts about God (along with my ignorance about who is in the >>> world). >>> >>> — I guess, since there are people who continue to talk about Strong >>> Emergence, and Philosophical Zombies, and who sound to me much like people >>> who talk about God today, and maybe like people who would have talked about >>> Elan Vital some generations ago, I should have right away imagined this >>> reading of what you were writing. >>> >>> If the above is what you were claiming, it would explain why my long Emily >>> Litella-like replies seemed like a tiresome recital of what population >>> geneticists already do (Nick’s point that “all that would be left is >>> EricS’s 2a and 2b”), which everybody already knows anyway, and which isn’t >>> interesting and wasn’t to your point. >>> >>> So, were you claiming that there are biologists operating that way? >>> >>> And are there really biologists operating that way? >>> >>> As always, I appreciate whatever patience or indulgence, >>> >>> Eric >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> On Mar 31, 2026, at 15:47, Eric Charles <[email protected] >>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>> >>>> I'm a bit confused here... >>>> The initial dog pile on Nick seemed (to me) to have as one of its main >>>> points something like "Look, old man, once you formalize something >>>> mathematically we don't need to care what any of the words might mean or >>>> imply in any other context, it is just math, stop thinking that the words >>>> matter!" >>>> >>>> And now there have been several posts by EricS, at least one by Glen, and >>>> I think Marcus and Frank are in there somewhere as well, claiming that the >>>> words are crucially important and we need to take them much more >>>> seriously. >>>> >>>> So.... where does that leave us? Is everyone now onboard with the >>>> metaphors mattering quite a bit? >>>> >>>> I'll also note that "function" can't do the work on its own to explain >>>> evolution. We still need to know why some functions are favored by >>>> selection and others are not. EricS seemed to indicate that we assess >>>> "fit" by determining if animals are "happy".... but the metaphor of "fit" >>>> is like a key in a lock. To explain evolution you need the matching of >>>> form-and-function-to-a-particular-environment. That matching *sometimes* >>>> increases reproductive success, and *sometimes* the traits in question are >>>> hereditary. >>>> >>>> Population genetics combined with field research can be very powerful >>>> along those lines, but the math of population genetics on its own, >>>> floating out in the ether, can't do it at all. >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> Eric >>>> >>>> >>>> <mailto:[email protected]> >>>> >>>> On Tue, Mar 31, 2026 at 6:10 AM Santafe <[email protected] >>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>>> Hi Nick, >>>>> >>>>> Two smaller replies to what have become two sub-threads: >>>>> >>>>> > On Mar 30, 2026, at 15:42, Nicholas Thompson <[email protected] >>>>> > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>>> > >>>>> > DES, EPC, FW >>>>> > >>>>> > So far as I understand, the argument flowing from Fisher makes no >>>>> > claims about the kind of trait that produces reproductive success other >>>>> > than that it is the kind that produces reproductive success. FW, if >>>>> > that's not a tautology, it's a pretty tight circle. >>>>> >>>>> As usual, let’s decamp to more neutral ground in the hope of having an >>>>> ordinary negotiation. >>>>> >>>>> Suppose that, in your overweening pursuit of the study of metaphor, you >>>>> never noticed that there is a once/4-year gathering called The Olympics. >>>>> Also never learned what any of its so-called “events” are, what they are >>>>> about, how they work, and how one differs from another. My hypothetical >>>>> here is meant to define a condition of having “very little prior >>>>> information” about some phenomenon that we can, nonetheless, still >>>>> reasonably unambiguously circumscribe. >>>>> >>>>> But a quick inspection shows that a subset of the participants (who all >>>>> together seem to be called “athletes”) are given metal disks and stand on >>>>> some kind of 3-tiered podium, while other athletes do not. Being a >>>>> statistician — a skill so helpful in the study of metaphor that it was >>>>> worth taking the time out to learn — you immediately recognize that this >>>>> is a kind of marking that can be used to partition the athletes. Taking >>>>> notice, for the first time, of some of the conversation in the society >>>>> around you, who seem not nearly so devoted to metaphor and thus have time >>>>> to do other things, you gather that these marked people seem to be called >>>>> “winners” (or better, “medalists”, this “winning” thing is a finer >>>>> sub-partition; I’ll mis-use “winner” to label the most salient marking >>>>> for this little parable). It’s handy to have such a term, for use in >>>>> later sentences, so they become less tedious than the ones I have been >>>>> typing so far. >>>>> >>>>> You also note that while there is only one 3-tiered podium and metal-disk >>>>> set per one “event”, there seem to be many such distinct “events”, so >>>>> some kind of event name gives you a second kind of marking you can put on >>>>> the athletes. Moreover, interestingly, the “event” label is again a >>>>> proper partition (or at least seems to be; this one is less cut-and-dried >>>>> than the observation that everyone carrying a metal disk is not someone >>>>> not-carrying a metal disk, so we are wary; the event label seems to be a >>>>> bit more abstract): every athlete is in some “event” set, and it appears >>>>> that no athlete is in more than one of them. As with the “winners” >>>>> label, you learn that there are conventionalized names for the events, >>>>> and you can find a look-up table if you need one or another of them. >>>>> >>>>> Now, I can make a list of statements that seem to be of two different >>>>> kinds (scare quotes here indicate my statisticians’ attribute labels; in >>>>> my condition of very little prior knowledge, I don’t claim I have any >>>>> more semantics for them than I listed above): >>>>> >>>>> 1. Every “winner" is someone marked as having won something. >>>>> >>>>> 2a. Every winner in the “gymnastics” event is shorter than the average >>>>> over all the participants; >>>>> >>>>> 2b. Every winner in the “high jump” event is taller than the average >>>>> over all the participants; >>>>> >>>>> … (we could presumably look for other such summary statistics that seem >>>>> to be unusually regular and to carry different values in different >>>>> “events”). >>>>> >>>>> I would say sentence 1 is “a tautology”, or close enough to it for the >>>>> purpose of this negotiation. Maybe I should use EricC’s good, and >>>>> slighly more flexible term, “truism”. >>>>> >>>>> Now you may write a protest email: But the sentences 2a, 2b, have not >>>>> told me what constitutes “competition” in these “events”: “gymnastics” >>>>> and “high jump”, and given me the rule book for scoring them. Okay. And >>>>> they didn’t cook your dinner and do the dishes afterward either. Life is >>>>> hard. And more a propos (breaking my little 4th wall here), the path to >>>>> a fully-adequate “causal” theory through statistical inference is like >>>>> the Road to Heaven: narrow, tortuous, and inadequate to many things one >>>>> can rightly want to know. That’s what other sciences are then for. >>>>> >>>>> But if you claim: The sentences 2a and 2b didn’t give me _any >>>>> information_ about these “events”, and couldn’t have, because they are >>>>> tautologies, I would say you made an error. Of course, the real Nick >>>>> would not say that, so we are all safe. >>>>> >>>>> The above parable is, of course, about selection. I didn’t say anything >>>>> about heredity. But if I had happened to note that height is a fairly >>>>> heritable trait, I could have spun out a much longer story, and defined >>>>> some Bayesian-posterior conditional probabilities, which would be shown >>>>> to have properties such as: the posterior probability, under various >>>>> ceteris paribus conditions, for a child of a high-jump winner to turn out >>>>> another high-jump winner is higher than for that child to turn out a >>>>> gymnastics winner, and so forth. The amalgamation of both of those >>>>> stories would go in the direction of Fisher’s fundamental theorem. It >>>>> would leave out all the stuff that Fisher left out of emphasis in his mad >>>>> pursuit of his covariance term as an analog to the thermodynamic 2nd law >>>>> (a non-valid analogy, as it turns out to be easy to show), and that Price >>>>> included didactically (and here, to EricC’s answer): that I didn’t even >>>>> mention that the tall people might get drafted into wars and put into an >>>>> infantry to fire rifles over tall dijks, while the short people might be >>>>> drafted into Special Forces and sent on missions to attack through >>>>> underground tunnels, and so the number of survivors could depend on many >>>>> factors about which war their country had started, in what theater, and >>>>> against what opposition, etc. These are the world of everything-else >>>>> that Fisher lumped together into “deterioration of the environment”, as >>>>> Steve Frank (and I think also Price) lays out. They are probably not >>>>> well-analogized to “mutation”, but in genetics, mutation also goes into >>>>> the same bin in the Price equation — _outside_ the term of Fisher’s >>>>> fundamental theorem — as the “deterioration” effects. The accounting >>>>> identity is flexible enough that we don’t need analogies to use it; we >>>>> can formulate a version for whatever statistics our >>>>> phenomenon-of-interest supplies. >>>>> >>>>> Anyway; at issue: Seriously, do we have a problem in scientific work, of >>>>> people being unable to gain partial knowledge about phenomena through >>>>> sentences of the kinds 2a, 2b, because they can’t tell the difference >>>>> between those and sentence 1? In the world where I live, I don’t see >>>>> evidence for this mistake. >>>>> >>>>> Eric >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> .- .-.. .-.. / ..-. --- --- - . .-. ... / .- .-. . / .-- .-. --- -. --. / >>>>> ... --- -- . / .- .-. . / ..- ... . ..-. ..- .-.. >>>>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >>>>> Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom >>>>> https://bit.ly/virtualfriam >>>>> <https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fbit.ly%2fvirtualfriam&c=E,1,GvQhgG8mgl44zu_Tqszk_wQFcC3LBswQyBsmnoa7umwcI4cM2jGPGmAYotJwNMri0nXMbYayX6uZw5iDa5Mn0zM5Lzi9_LPGwP2Q6dG2zkm1Zw,,&typo=1> >>>>> to (un)subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >>>>> <https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=http%3a%2f%2fredfish.com%2fmailman%2flistinfo%2ffriam_redfish.com&c=E,1,23DEBEu6zm1j58j5JsswXw4R4hnyuhIceP4fdD1lMWDKru8V9CE3qD4-RYjtV5Jy9hfTf9uHOrhrlBi_RdYMT7jsteJtGiX2nEMNJisxFedZstuD_29M3FA,&typo=1> >>>>> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ >>>>> <https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=http%3a%2f%2ffriam-comic.blogspot.com%2f&c=E,1,Ec4s1UwqPKENLyqkHX4Ib_R7EzxFYgc2j7jZdKdzIhORPykt1347aKvaSNnoCQ4Arvb6m2_GLwAwKSl29d-U5DrlMczDc4AHiyyrX-KaGBCrMK9RdKapkw,,&typo=1> >>>>> archives: 5/2017 thru present >>>>> https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/ >>>>> <https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fredfish.com%2fpipermail%2ffriam_redfish.com%2f&c=E,1,wWOjZ0Q8WKeZG4U9_UBc_a11JtFDvedQPCTS8FL1Usmbm4F-EJO5IWv_Ignpmf4vTC3CO23cIKVFR_FtMZC8DWD4hyxlN0c7hdOfez8KEw,,&typo=1> >>>>> 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/ >>>> .- .-.. .-.. / ..-. --- --- - 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