Jochen, Implicit in many of the group's discussions of free will and determinism is the premise that the world unfolds deterministically, and that the remaining question is whether something extra exists that can escape or modify that mechanism. I do not think that this setup is necessary or given. More importantly, I think it installs a false dichotomy at the center of what may be an ill-posed problem.
Locally, and for many purposes, causal accounts work extraordinarily well. We can often treat physical laws as stable, or at least as evolving according to some effective computable rule. We can model bounded domains, specify state variables, solve or approximate equations, and aim to obtain predictive control. Nothing I wish to say here denies that success. But a successful local model is not yet a warrant for the stronger metaphysical conclusion that there exists a complete global state of the universe, that this state retains every relevant distinction in a lossless way, and that its entire evolution is specified by a computable rule. Those are substantive further assumptions. My disagreement with the "aggregation of history" picture begins here. A world with finite physical resources cannot straightforwardly be assumed to be an indefinitely accumulating, lossless record of arbitrarily fine distinctions. Entropy and information bounds are often read as limits on how much information can be stored in a finite region with finite energy. At a minimum, physical history must be represented through selective persistence: some distinctions become stable records, some are dispersed into inaccessible correlations, some are erased relative to a scale of description, and some cease to be recoverable by any physically available process. So I wonder whether *the total state of the universe* is doing more metaphysical work than it has earned. If one allows that the global unfolding may involve non-computable structure, then no finite internal description can, in general, serve as a complete ledger of that unfolding. The universe cannot stand outside itself with a second, lossless copy of its own full history. I am not claiming that noncomputability establishes free will. I am asking whether the familiar determinism vs free will framing already presupposes an idealized total-state picture that may not be physically meaningful. There is a related mathematical point. Scientists understandably favor well-posed models: operators and dynamical systems with domains, regularity, stability, and convergence properties sufficient for analysis and prediction. But those are selected virtues, not neutral evidence that the space of possible physical evolutions is itself globally well behaved. Compact operators, for example, are a special class. They map bounded sets to relatively compact sets and are necessarily bounded, but they are not representative of all operators one might write down. I would like to not confuse the tractability of the mathematical objects we can successfully use with a demonstration that reality is exhausted by such objects. The same caution applies to computability. Under the ordinary Lebesgue measure on the reals, the computable reals form a countable set and therefore a set of *measure-zero*. By contrast, algorithmically random sequences are typical under the fair-coin measure. That is, Martin-Löf random sequences have *measure-one*. Of course, there is no canonical uniform distribution over *all laws* or *all operators*, so this is not a probability calculation showing that physical law is non-computable. It is an admonition against quietly assuming computability merely because computable descriptions are the ones available to us. I am imagining the drunkard under the streetlight metaphor. It is sensible to look where mathematical models offer light: computable dynamics, well-posed initial-value problems, bounded domains, compactness arguments, and stable approximations. But their usefulness does not establish that the deep structure of the universe is confined to those regions of conceptual illumination. For me, the more difficult thought is that materialism may imply not a perfectly preserved cosmic archive, but an unfolding in which persistence is selective and forgetting is real. Perhaps there is no complete *deep history* available even in principle. Instead there may only exist present structures bearing partial, transformed, scale-dependent traces of what preceded them. I am tempted to say that what leaves no trace whatsoever *never existed* in any ontologically robust sense. I suppose I am arguing for a surprisingly shallow image of history. If so, the future may be genuinely productive (immanence) rather than merely unknown to us. Not necessarily because an agent steps outside causality, but because the global boundary conditions, state description, and rule of unfolding are not available in the form demanded by classical determinism. This may make *free will* the wrong label. We may all be acting in ways that are locally causal, constrained, and intelligible while global determinism remains undefined, ungrounded, or simply irrelevant. I do not yet know what positive concept should replace it. But I do not think that uncertainty should be hidden by accepting the *determinism vs free will* dichotomy as our starting point. My two cents. Jon
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