Valdis, you're wrong. Give me another century and I'll prove it to you.
:-) On Tue, May 25, 2010 at 10:08 PM, <[email protected]> wrote: > On Wed, 26 May 2010 01:25:25 +0545, Bipin Gautam said: > > Rest of article actually looks good at first glance, but this jumped out at > me: > > > > -Software disk Wiping: > > > Wipe KEY, header of your encrypted storage volume (first few mb, ref > > > specific manual) Ref using Peter Gutmann standard of data wipeing (35 > > > wipes) > > > And wipe entire storage using U.S. DoD 5200.28-STD (7 wipes) > > There is zero evidence that anybody is able to recover data after even a > single overwrite of /dev/zero on a disk drive made this century. Even in > the MFM days, Gutmann's recovery technique was difficult - today's > densities > render it essentially impossible. Even if it's possible, if your threat > model > includes the sort of organizations that could theoretically do it, maybe > you > should be considering thermite rather than software wipes. Especially if > they're pounding on your door. ;) > > I'm more than open to hear of any *confirmed* cases of data recovered after > even a single overwrite anytime after 1995. To date, I have not seen one. > Prove me wrong, guys. ;) > > > _______________________________________________ > Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. > Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html > Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ >
_______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
