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Thermite will definitely do, checkout http://hackaday.com/2008/09/16/how-to-thermite-based-hard-drive- anti-forensic-destruction/ and of course a .50 APIT round will do as well: http://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/diskcrypt /index.html. elazar On Tue, 25 May 2010 16:08:45 -0400 [email protected] wrote: >On Wed, 26 May 2010 01:25:25 +0545, Bipin Gautam said: > >Rest of article actually looks good at first glance, but this >jumped out at me: > >> > -Software disk Wiping: >> > Wipe KEY, header of your encrypted storage volume (first few >mb, ref >> > specific manual) Ref using Peter Gutmann standard of data >wipeing (35 >> > wipes) >> > And wipe entire storage using U.S. DoD 5200.28-STD (7 wipes) > >There is zero evidence that anybody is able to recover data after >even a >single overwrite of /dev/zero on a disk drive made this century. >Even in >the MFM days, Gutmann's recovery technique was difficult - today's >densities >render it essentially impossible. Even if it's possible, if your >threat model >includes the sort of organizations that could theoretically do it, >maybe you >should be considering thermite rather than software wipes. >Especially if >they're pounding on your door. ;) > >I'm more than open to hear of any *confirmed* cases of data >recovered after >even a single overwrite anytime after 1995. To date, I have not >seen one. >Prove me wrong, guys. ;) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Charset: UTF8 Note: This signature can be verified at https://www.hushtools.com/verify Version: Hush 3.0 wpwEAQECAAYFAkv8qM0ACgkQi04xwClgpZhNWgP+Jg91G1IJm5+L64QZSiKfQA7pllvt SU9eYGPfbSB3hav5FWio4R0OSl1ivSox5X3FSgQRxYup6+BqZD3PtmeD38CykutOPAdy /5CG8L+RpoetFKXx4guT3hAGQO/arMfnbgD9wKY6cPxX7hXEtViciU8pvyHgXLIVYyEE 0dmsm5c= =pSkX -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
