---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Tue, 8 Sep 1998 00:14:32 -0500 (CDT) From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Weekly Analysis -- September 8, 1998 __________________________________ Sanitizer: The only comprehensive, secure data disposal solution on the market. http://www.sanitizer.com/ __________________________________ Global Intelligence Update Red Alert September 8, 1998 European Forecast: The Re-emergence of the German Problem We'd like to spend the next few Weekly Alerts focusing on the next world. We are not trying to be metaphysical. The next world is the international system that will emerge from the collapse of the New World Order, which we wrote about last week. We began writing about the Asian and Russian economic crises in 1995, and have been tracing their emergence over time. Now that these crises have arrived, it is time to leave them to the mass media. We try not to deal with anything that is on the front page of every newspaper. It is time to start discussing what will be on the front page of newspapers in the year 2000 and beyond. Because we regard the collapse of the Russian government as both a given and a definitive event in contemporary history, we would like to devote the next few Weekly Alerts to the more important and less immediate question of what the world will look like in the first part of the twenty-first century. Our intention is a series of regional analyses, beginning with today's analysis of Europe, culminating in an analysis of the global system as a whole. These analyses are not about things likely to happen next week or next year. They are about long-term trends that are now being set in motion. That said, let's begin with Europe. * The History of the German Question At the heart of any understanding of Europe is the German question. This has been true since Roman times, but it has become a particularly burning issue ever since German unification in 1871. A unified Germany always tends to destabilize Europe. This is not something the Germans intend. Rather, it is an unintended consequence driven by geopolitics. Britain is an island, secure from all land attack. France is secure on all fronts save the eastern. Italy is a peninsula protected in the north by the Alps. Russia is vast, and able to absorb an attack through its sheer size. All of these countries are vulnerable, and all can be defeated. But most great European powers can use geography to limit their exposure. Germany is in a very different position. Other great powers face danger on one front, if at all. Germany always faces threats on two fronts. Apart from the terrible danger of a two-front war, Germany also lacks strategic depth. The Rhine, its industrial heartland, is on the front line. Berlin, its true capital, is a short drive from its eastern borders. Germany cannot absorb the first attack, fall back, regroup, and counter-attack. Retreat gives up indispensable assets. Because Germany cannot retreat, a two-front war initiated by its neighbors almost inevitably spells defeat. Thus, Germany is forced into a strategy in which it must manipulate its neighbors diplomatically to forestall an anti-German alliance. Should such an alliance emerge, Germany cannot wait for its neighbors to begin a war. Germany must take preemptive action, striking at one neighbor in the hope of a rapid victory, and then either deterring conflict with the other or fighting a war with the second on Germany's own terms. This strategy worked in 1871. It failed in 1914, when Germany could not destroy the French army on the Marne. It worked in 1940 in France, allowing Germany to turn on Russia. It leaves us to wonder what history would have held if the British had not refused Hitler's peace treaty. The point here is not to rehash history, but to point out that Germany, once unified, becomes an unavoidable, potentially dangerous presence to its neighbors. Regardless of German intentions, German capability inevitably frightens its neighbors. Its sheer size, industrious population, and the fact that unification suddenly thrust Germany's power in its neighbors' faces caused Europe to shudder at German unification. Shuddering neighbors caused Germany to feel, with good reason, insecure, less at its neighbors' intentions than at its neighbors' capabilities. German capability encountered its neighbors' capabilities. The result was an unstable and insecure Europe. After World War II it became apparent that the problem was not German ideology. Hitler's ideology lent a vicious edge to a nasty geopolitical problem. Nevertheless, his foreign policy was not in principle different from Bismarck's or Wilhelm II's. Indeed, even Weimar with its Rappallo treaty with Russia followed the same principle. The problem was geography. A united Germany disrupts the regional balance of power by its sheer existence. A divided Germany tends to be absorbed in its own affairs and is much less threatening to its neighbors. Therefore, the consequence of World War II, a re-divided Germany, defused the German problem, or at least redefined it. Germany, occupied and divided, became the arena for the U.S.-Soviet confrontation, again by the accident of geography. However, Germany itself, except for its location, posed no threat to its neighbors. * The Post-Cold War Reunification of Germany The collapse of communism led to the reunification of Germany. This caused no immediate problems in Europe. There were three reasons for this. First, the task of reabsorbing eastern Germany soaked up German energies. Second, western Germany, as a key part of the European Union, was much more concerned with its economic well-being than its physical security, and reunification did not immediately shift the German mindset. Finally, the collapse of the Soviet Union, its withdrawal from Poland and Czechoslovakia, and the separation of Russia from the Baltics, Belorussia, and Ukraine, created an unprecedented buffer zone for Germany. Allied with France to the west and without an enemy to the east, Germany was more secure than at any time since unification. Germany was not compelled to increase its military forces. Indeed, it could reduce them. As a result, Germany did not alarm France or any of its other neighbors. Thus, reunification did not change the European equation. Undergirding this stability was the United States. As the ultimate guarantor of European security, the U.S. made it unnecessary for any European nation to take a leading role on questions such as Bosnia. Because the U.S. was willing to undertake the burden of leadership, Germany did not have to, in spite of the fact that it was the most economically and politically exposed power. The continuing American presence has further allayed concerns over German power. Europe's understanding of itself has therefore not shifted materially since the collapse of communism. Germany is understood to be a nation with an unpleasant past, but its future is seen as indistinguishable from that of any other European nation. Germany's future, like that of the rest of Europe, is being shaped by the Brussels bureaucracy. Geopolitics appears to be irrelevant. Only economics matters. * The Inadequacy of an Economic-Based "Order" Thus, Germans, like other Europeans, have come to regard politico-military affairs as irrelevant. Their fundamental interests are social and economic. The goal is an integrated Europe that does not infringe on the national cultures of the constituent nation-states. A major inter-European war is unthinkable. Policing Europe's wild and wooly outskirts, like the former Yugoslavia, might be necessary, but the U.S. will organize that. The European concern is with the political arrangements that will have to underlie the emergence of the Euro and the genuinely integrated European economy. And, regardless of how heated the debate over economic matters might become, it is understood that no issue, not even the wealth of nations, could bring European states to take military action in defense of their interests. Here is the core problem of Europe. Because every European country has a different social order in addition to a different culture, and because the differences between some are profound, how can a single economic policy possibly satisfy the needs of each nation? Put more broadly, how can a single economic policy, built around a single monetary policy, focused on a single currency, possibly serve the needs of all of the members, from the Czech Republic to Belgium to Portugal? Given the lack of a central power capable of compelling compliance, what is to keep Europe together when economic policies inevitably benefit some countries more than others? The standard European answer has been that the overall economic benefits of membership will more than outweigh the transitory discomforts of policies that benefit one group of countries over another. When the North American union faced this problem in 1861, it took General Sherman to settle the debate. Europe, as currently configured, has neither a constitution that can be construed as compulsory, nor a force to back it up. Short-run economic pain tends to topple governments. Governments don't like to be toppled. The promise of long-term benefits is unlikely to contain the short-term political forces that will rise to challenge Brussels' dictates. Who will determine Europe's economic policies, and what will happen if interests diverge? These questions are extensively discussed and carefully evaded by Europeanists. The real question, of course, is not only economic. What will happen if some European states develop political or military objectives that are incompatible with established economic policy? More to the point, can the European Union remain a purely economic relationship when some nations are forced into politico-military undertakings? Can nations cooperate economically while competing politically? The Europeanist solution is to insist that these matters need never come up. Whether the issues arise is, of course, not up to Brussels. It is not up to anyone. It will be determined by the situation in which Germany finds itself in the coming years. Because the rest of Europe lives in relatively stable geopolitical circumstances, the great European variable is Germany. The German question turns on the eastern question. What happens along Germany's eastern frontiers must define Germany's general political and military position. At this moment, Germany's eastern frontier is more secure than it has been since unification in the nineteenth century. But it appears to us that this moment is passing, and that the German frontier is about to become substantially less secure than before. * The Catalytic Role of Russia The agent of change here is, of course, Russia. Regardless of personalities, the liberalism of the last six years has played itself out. The Communists and nationalists control the Duma. Yeltsin cannot govern without their support. Their position is that Russia cannot expect meaningful financial help from the West. Indeed, they argue that it was the liberal Westernizers who led Russia to the brink of disaster. In exchange for nothing, Russia has paid with its empire. It has become both impoverished and insecure. This is unacceptable. Therefore, there will be a great rectification. That rectification will take place in stages. The first stage will be the reclamation of the administrative organs of the Russian government and the return of state control to the economy. The second stage will be the reclamation of the former Soviet Union. To reclaim the Soviet empire, Russia must start at the core: Russia, Belorussia, and Ukraine. Belorussia is already effectively linked to Russia. The Ukrainian question is now the most pressing issue. Ukrainians value their independence. On the other hand, their economy is inextricably linked to Russia's. Russia can easily squeeze Ukraine economically. For one thing, Russia controls Ukraine's energy supply. In spite of the IMF's recent attempt to shore up Ukraine, Ukraine cannot resist Russian pressure. Unless, of course, Ukraine was admitted to NATO. Except for direct Western intervention, the core elements of the former Soviet Union, Russia, Belorussia, and Ukraine, will be effectively reunited in the next couple of years. This new entity will provide an irresistible gravitational pull on the other parts of the CIS. Western intervention at that point will become both dangerous and futile. Thus, we are now at a critical juncture. Having lost Moscow, the West can still choose to adopt a forward strategy. This strategy would be built around using former members of the Soviet Union to contain Russia. In effect, it would re-institute the Cold War containment policy, boxing Russia into a much smaller, tighter space than the Soviet Union. In this policy, the Baltic states, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the Central Asian republics would be made part of a comprehensive alliance system designed to block Russian expansion within the CIS. * The Problems of Forward Containment of Russia While good in theory, this strategy suffers from several defects. First, while it may have been viable in 1992, at that time Western policy makers were obsessed with nuclear weapons and were unable to take the non-Russian republics seriously. They therefore established a policy of working cooperatively with Moscow while pressuring other CIS members to abandon nuclear weapons. It was the explicit intent of the U.S. that only Russia could continue to have nuclear weapons. Indeed, to a great extent, the only policy that the U.S. had toward the non-Russian nations was to pressure them to give up nuclear weapons. In addition, the U.S. didn't want to do anything that would cause the Russians to back away from reforms. It therefore didn't want to appear to be encouraging anti-Russian sentiment within the CIS. In pursuit of this policy, the U.S. alienated many of these regional powers and actually undermined their independence in the name of nuclear stability and Russian reform. The second weakness of the forward containment strategy is the scope of forces required. The forces needed to secure Ukraine or Uzbekistan boggle the mind. The U.S. does not have the necessary forces. All of the U.S.'s allies don't have the necessary forces. Even if the U.S. converted regional powers (such as Iran) into allies, there still wouldn't be enough forces. The closer the West moves toward Russia's borders, the greater the forces required to carry out a mission. The forces required to encircle Russia on a line running from the Baltics, through Poland, Ukraine, the Caucasus, and Central Asia are beyond calculation. The very best that can be done is to make re-absorption as difficult as possible by supporting nationalist movements and providing economic inducement for resistance. This strategy has its benefits, so long it recalls the dictum: never irritate a bear if you can't kill him. *Russia's Re-Absorption of its Former Empire Thus, the first phase of Russian strategy, the re-absorption of Ukraine, is, in our view, a foregone conclusion. The next phase, the re-absorption of Central Asia, is a more complex and time-consuming matter, particularly as it involves both Islamic nationalism and vast Western investments in energy production and pipelines. There are many opportunities for mischief here. However, as complex as the matter might be, it should be remembered that in this region the Russian withdrawal has been more apparent than real. Russian troops still patrol many borders, and former Communist Party officials and KGB agents run the governments. Re-absorption will happen in Central Asia, although it will take longer, face well-financed resistance, and be bloody. But the dependencies are such that the process cannot, in the end, be stopped. This will leave the third phase, the marginal regions like Moldova and the Baltic states. The Baltics in particular pose complex security issues for the Russians, as well as challenges to Poland and Germany. The outcome here is less predictable. Nevertheless, we feel it is safe to forecast that Russian forces will return to the old borders of the Soviet Union. This will happen in a few years if not sooner. It may or may not include every inch of the former Soviet Union, but it will contain the essential parts. * The Greater Russian Borders and the Question of NATO Expansion This then gives rise to an interesting geopolitical situation. Russia will run south along the Polish border to the Carpathian mountains, then along the Romanian border to the Black Sea. Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania will be the new frontier. Russia and Serbia will border Romania, with the Russian fleet dominating the Black Sea. Hungary, part of NATO, will be sandwiched between Romania and Slovakia, neither part of NATO. Poland will be facing Russia and will be flanked on the south by Slovakia. In other words, the irrationality of NATO's expansion policy will become both manifest and probably unmanageable. NATO is a military alliance. Its purpose is to fight wars, particularly against the Soviets. When the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact collapsed, NATO was retained, its mission unclear. It was seen as a police force in Europe, dealing with issues like Bosnia. Its most important purpose was to serve as a fraternity, to be joined by the right sort of nation. The Czechs were very much the right sort, as were the Poles and Hungarians. The Slovaks and the Romanians were not the right sort, not really "one of us," you know. The Balts were the right sort, but they lived in a bad part of town, so they weren't let in. NATO membership was based on commitment to democracy rather than on the integrity of lines of supply and communications. >From a military standpoint, NATO's new borders are insane. Please take a map and consider NATO's borders. In the south, there is Hungary. The eastern part of Hungary, east of the Danube, is a vast, flat plain. If you stand on Hungary's eastern border, the Carpathian Mountains tower on three sides, in three countries (Slovakia, Romania, and Ukraine), none of which are in NATO. The Hungarian plain cannot be defended. The first line of defense is the Danube, running north-south through Budapest. So, the first line of defense runs through a NATO member's capital city. Worse, Hungary does not share a border with any other NATO country. Logistics must come from Italy, but the only path from Italy is through Slovenia, which is definitely the right sort, but again in the wrong neighborhood: the former Yugoslavia. So, Slovenia is not part of NATO and Hungary is isolated. NATO has made a commitment to defend a country that is essentially indefensible. Then there is Poland to the north. Poland is a vast plain as well, through which German and Russian troops regularly rampage. The Germans took Poland in six weeks. The Soviets took it in a few months in 1944, including a long political pause outside Warsaw. Poland's river lines can be defended, but that takes massive resources. Its natural borders, such as they are, have been absorbed inside of Belorussia. The Baltics provide another avenue of attack as well as possibilities for amphibious operations along Poland's Baltic coast. Defending Poland, unlike Hungary, is possible, so long as strong fortifications are built along its eastern frontier. We now confront the true insanity of NATO expansion: what was not included. First, and most important, there is Slovakia. If you don't know much about Slovakia, don't worry, you will. You will, because it will become the European flash point after Russia reclaims its empire. Slovakia was excluded from NATO because its Prime Minister, a fellow called Meciar, is no lover of democracy. In fact, Slovakia does not have much of a tradition of democracy, unlike its Czech brethren, who do. So, Slovakia was kept out of NATO. The problem is that Slovakia occupies some of the most strategic real estate in the new Europe. Slovakia is a 300-mile-long bayonet, jabbed into the heart of NATO. If allied with Russia, it makes the defense of Poland impossible, and any pretense of defending Hungary ludicrous, with or without Slovenia. Slovakia would permit Russian forces to move down to the rear of Budapest. An attack north through the Dukla pass turns Poland's southern flank behind any fortifications to the east, rendering Poland indefensible. To make a bad matter worse, Slovakia is a half-hour's drive from Vienna and borders the Czech Republic. Moreover, attacking Slovakia is a very tough problem. It is mountainous in the north and east and it is fighting on interior lines along the Hungarian border. * NATO's Hopeless Situation and the Re-emergence of German Military Power NATO's current expansion process has left it in a militarily indefensible state. It is now in the worst of all worlds. It creates obligations that cannot be carried out. It is not that NATO expansion is a bad idea. It is probably a good one. The problem is that neither Madeleine Albright nor Strobe Talbot seem to understand that NATO may one day be called on to fight a war. The decisions they have made makes fighting that war impossible. Personalities aside, the defense of the North German Plain strains U.S. military resources tremendously. The U.S. is potentially able to wage a high intensity conflict in eastern Poland and Hungary. However, this would require a commitment of forces orders of magnitude greater than any the U.S. is currently imagining. Moreover, the standard American strategy of absorbing the first attack, mobilizing, and then striking back would not be feasible given the isolation of the battlefields from American naval power and logistical support. Which brings us back to Germany. For the U.S., the defense of Europe is a luxury. It involves important American interests, but it does not involve the very survival of the U.S. For Germany, the evolution of events to its east and southeast are matters of national survival. If the U.S. is not in a position to define a strategic policy, and lacks the resources to implement the policy it has, then the Germans have no choice, as a matter of national survival, but to step into the vacuum. The irrationality of NATO expansion leaves the U.S. in an awkward position. It could leave Germany in a desperate position. As the U.S. continues to reduce its exposure in Europe, either by design or by its relative impotence, Germany will necessarily increase its presence. It will fall to Germany to rectify the irrationality of NATO's current structure. That process will have dramatic political consequences. The first German response, of course, would be to attempt to create a European force to protect its Polish buffer. It is very unlikely that the French or the British would be prepared to mobilize sufficient force to genuinely secure the Polish plain. The defense of Poland would require a multi-divisional standing force, backed by a reserve force of dozens of divisions. Only Germany has the resources and inclination to create such a force. It would have no choice. Now the thought of a multi-divisional German force on Polish soil is not likely to thrill Polish nationalists. The thought of a massive German forward deployment is not likely to please Germany's western neighbors either. And you can bet that the Russians are not going to be pleased. They will make every effort to neutralize Poland politically and they may well succeed, particularly if Slovakia remains isolated from NATO. A neutral Poland is a good idea, save that Polish neutrality is something that usually does not last very long. More precisely, it lasts only as long as it takes Germany or Russia to decide to violate it. This means that, whatever the fate of Poland, German military forces will be increased dramatically over the coming years. As Russia returns to its borders, German military forces will increase. The more irrational NATO's structure, the less defensible it is. The less other NATO partners are prepared to participate in the defense of the indefensible, the larger German forces will become. * The Cost of German Rearmament and the Stability of the European Union Thus, we will see massive increases in German defense expenditures. Now, if the Germans are increasing their defense expenditures to the 6-8 percent of GDP level (U.S. levels during the Cold War), then the German economy, already under pressure from its obligations to eastern Germany, will be strained severely. This means that its competitiveness in the European Union will decline. German pressure on the rest of Europe to share the burden and to create fiscal and monetary policies that will relieve the strain on the German economy will increase. The rest of Europe will resist Germany's attempt to reshape the EU's economic policies to support its politico-military commitments. Germany will try to use the EU as a framework for integrating anti-Russian allies into an advantageous economic system. As the Germans seek to bring Croatians and Bulgarians into the EU, the rest of the EU, particularly France, will resist. France will have the most to lose economically and strategically, as Germany reshapes Europe. German resentment at the rest of Europe will rise. European unease at German intentions will increase. Russia will seek to exploit these tensions. Russia will shift from a pro- French to a pro-German policy and back again. Germany will respond and the great game will be under way. * A Far-Fetched Argument, or an Inevitability? If you regard this scenario as far-fetched, then please remember how far- fetched the collapse of communism was in 1988. Then consider how unlikely the return of communism to Russia was in 1994. If a communist/nationalist government takes over in Russia, then the return of the Russian empire is inevitable. If the Russian empire returns, then it will inevitably collide with the expanded NATO. If the U.S. does not take control of the situation, which it cannot, then Germany must. If Germany must take control, then we are back to where we were in the period 1871-1945. Germany, united, is insecure. An insecure Germany must be proactive in creating a secure situation. Its proactive behavior inevitably leave its neighbors uneasy and then frightened. Their fear causes them to react. Germany reacts, and so on. The abstract question we raised of the ability of Europe to create an integrated, constitutional government through voluntary association intersects with the geopolitical realities of Europe. These geopolitical realities were suspended by the Cold War, when the overarching geopolitics of containment superceded the regional geopolitics of Europe. Geopolitical realities were again suspended after the Cold War, when Russia retreated not only from Central Europe but also from the borders of its own empire. Absent Russian pressure, the dynamics of European geopolitics were not actualized. We expect Russia to return to the borders of the Soviet Union. Therefore, we expect Russian pressure to be exerted on Central Europe. Whatever Russia's intentions might be, the mere presence of Russian power on the Polish plain and in the Carpathians will condition the politics of the adjoining region. This shift will actualize the traditional geopolitics of Europe, driven, once again, by the German question. The first manifestation of this will be the German response to Russian default. Germany has invested far more money in Russia than anyone else. Germany stands far more exposed than anyone else. It will try to organize stabilization programs that the rest of Europe and the U.S. will not be particularly interested in, especially since German banks will be the major beneficiaries. Germany will then face the choice of abandoning its banks to the consequences of Russian default, or of organizing a Russian policy on its own. This will be a defining moment in German and European history. The bailout will fail. The experience of acting alone will redefine German foreign policy and will represent the real end of World War II. ___________________________________________________ To receive free daily Global Intelligence Updates or Computer Security Alerts, sign up on the web at http://www.stratfor.com/mail/, or send your name, organization, position, mailing address, phone number, and e-mail address to [EMAIL PROTECTED] ___________________________________________________ STRATFOR Systems, Inc. 504 Lavaca, Suite 1100 Austin, TX 78701 Phone: 512-583-5000 Fax: 512-583-5025 Internet: http://www.stratfor.com/ Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
