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GLOBAL FUTURES BULLETIN #85
---01 June, 1999--- ISSN
1328-5157
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Institute for Global Futures Research (IGFR).
P.O. Box 263E, Earlville, QLD 4870, Australia.
E-mail: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>.
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This bulletin is for the use of IGFR members and GFB subscribers
only and is not to be re-posted.
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INDEX
. Overconsumption, Realpolitik and peace
. Prospect of war over resources
. Citizen Inspection of NATO
. Ukraine reversal on nuclear weapons
. Calendar
*
*
OVERCONSUMPTION, REALPOLITIK AND PEACE
Ted Trainer [1]
The recent article 'Realpolitik versus the IJC' [2] expressed the hope
of getting to the time when Realpolitik is not characteristic of
international relations, but no reference was made to what can be
regarded as the most fundamental source of international conflict.
Until this is acknowledged and addressed we are hardly likely to
arrive at viable solutions.
Much international conflict is basically due to the fact that nations
are not content to live within their means. They want more resources
than they have. Virtually all nations have at the top of their agendas
acquiring greater wealth and power. Most individuals on earth want
to get richer and to possess and use more things. Perhaps 10% of the
world's people now consume some 75% of world resource production.
In 1998, the top 20% of the world's people living in the highest-
income countries accounted for 86% of total private consumption
expenditures while the poorest 20% accounted for only 1.3% [3].
Nevertheless, the top priority of the wealthy countries is to get richer
all the time at a rate of at least 3%/an. If the expected world
population of approx 10 billion [4] in 2070 were all to have the living
standards OECD nations will expect by 2070 given 3%/an economic
growth, world resource demand would be more than 100 times as
great as it is today.
Given this situation, how can anyone expect other than escalating
conflict on the planet? My advice to the rich countries is that they
had better remain heavily armed. They will need all the aircraft
carriers and Rapid Deployment Forces, cruise missiles and Stealth
bombers they can muster if they are determined to go on grabbing far
more than their fair share of the world's resources and making sure
Third World regimes run their mines and oil fields and plantations
for their benefit while depriving most of the world's people.
There is no possibility of peace on this planet until there is justice,
and that is not possible until rich countries accept transition to ways
that enable all to have a high quality of life, on a small fraction of
their present per capita resource consumption.
Many mistakenly discuss Realpolitik as if it is were a doctrine we
could choose to give up and replace with a more democratic and just
regime without fundamental change in lifestyles and the scrapping of
economism and the current economic system.
*
[1] Ted Trainer is professor at the University of New South Wales.
[2] 'Realpolitik versus the ICJ' Global Futures Bulletin #83, 01 May
1999
[3] Human Development Report 1998 UNDP. Note, this figure is
based on country averages. If we based it on per capita consumption
rates irrespective of country, the difference between the wealthiest
20% and the poorest 20% would be far higher.
[4] UN middle projections (Population Division) 1994 estimates
~10.5b for 2070 while the US Bureau of the Census 1998 estimates
~9.8b for 2070. The UN 1998 Population Data Sheet describes a
middle scenario with world population leveling off at approx 11
billion sometime in the 22nd C. see 'Population and development'
Global Futures Bulletin #63 01 July 1998.
*
*
COMMENT
Ted Trainer describes a most important link between sustainable
development and peace and disarmament. Although the link between
development and environment was officially recognised at the
UNCED conference (Rio 1992), peace and disarmament continues to
be seen as a separate set of issues by most governments and even by
most NGOs. The connection, when it is made, is usually in terms of
the waste of resources that military spending diverts from basic
development. (For example, of the US$13.6b in US foreign aid
activity in FY1997, almost half was military in nature [1] ).
However, the competition for physical resources may be a more
significant link, and increasingly so.
The discussion of Realpolitik versus a regime of International Law
and Justice [2] stemmed from the illegal use of force by NATO on
Serbia/Kosovo. Despite drivers such as oil fields in the north of
Kosovo, attempts by Western capital (eg German, US) to control
emerging markets in the former Yugoslavia [3], and the strategic
importance of Serbia/Kosovo as a corridor ('Corridor VIII') for oil
and gas from Central Asia [4], the most significant driver - Serbian
nationalism and perceived threats to Serbian sovereignty - is not
about competition for increasingly scarce physical resources.
Trainer's projection of a factor 100 increase in world resource
consumption is based on two premises which need to be questioned:
- total equity
- rate of economic growth equals rate of growth in resource
consumption.
Equity
Just as few would expect total or complete equity within a country,
few would expect total equity between nations (at least prior to 2100).
The issue is to establish acceptable levels of equity. Provided basic
needs are met and absolute poverty is eradicated, the prospect that
some countries may continue to consume higher levels of resources
per capita than others is not unreasonable. It is reasonable, for
example, to expect the population of Iceland to consume more energy
per capita than, say, the population of Costa Rica, with its more
temperate climate. But equity ratios might come down from factor 81
between the wealthiest 20% and the poorest 20% [5] to factor 30
(equity levels in 1966), or even factor 10.
The following table measures per capita GDP (expressed in
Purchasing Power Parity, or PPP) between OECD countries and
developing countries with two scenarios - Business-as-Usual (b/u),
and Policy Reform (p/r).
1995 2050 b/u 2050 p/r
OECD population 913m 998m 998m
developing* population 4,382m 7,985m 7,985m
OECD GDP US$trillion 18.5t 57.5t 36.5t
developing* GDP 13.1t 83.2t 100.8t
per capita GDP ratio 6.8 5.5 2.9
OECD / developing*
* 'developing' implies Third World.
In the Policy Reform scenario, per capita income in OECD countries
would increase from US$20,262 to US$36,573, and in developing
countries from US$2,990 to US$12,623 (1995-2050).
If we implemented the Policy Reform scenario, perhaps the we could
expect the ratio of OECD per capita GDP (PPP) to developing world
per capita GDP (PPP) to drop from the projected 2.9 in 2050 to 2.0 by
2070.
(Note - we are ignoring here 392m people in transitional economies.
Also, we are ignoring inequity both within developing countries and
between developing countries. The difference in income of the
world's wealthiest 20% compared to world's poorest 20%,
irrespective of country, may be a factor of several hundred. The
difference in income of world's wealthiest 1% and poorest 1%,
irrespective of country, may be in the order of several hundred
thousand times ! · The world's 225 wealthiest individual now have a
combined wealth of US$1 trillion - equal to the combined annual
income of the world's 2.5 billion poorest people [6].· The wealth of
the three richest individuals now exceeds the combined GDP of the
48 Least Developed Countries (LLDCs) [7] ).
With this in mind, the ratio of per capita GDP of OECD nations to
developing nations can still be a useful guide [8].
The issue of tolerated levels of inequity also raises the issue of
opportunity for people to live and work in countries of different levels
of wealth, as well as the question of fixed versus floating currency
exchange rates and controls on foreign ownership. Again, it must be
emphasised that inequity must also be addressed within countries,
and special attention must be paid to the poorest or Least Developed
Countries (LLDCs).
Economic growth and resources consumption
Increased reuse and recycling, as well as dematerialisation/de-
energisation resulting from new technologies, will mean a lower than
1:1 ratio between economic growth and resource consumption.
Another factor is resource substitution, where relatively abundant
materials can be substituted for less abundant materials.
Per capita energy consumption in developed countries is still
increasing, but not as rapidly as economic growth [9]. Energy
intensity per unit value added is decreasing at about 2%/an in many
countries [10].
Material consumption (expressed in kilograms) per unit value added
is declining for steel (which peaked in 1918), cement (1926), paper
(1972), aluminium (1976), chlorine (1971), and ammonia (1980).
Consumption of petrochemicals, carbon fibre and silicon, on the
other hand, is increasing in terms of kgs/unit value added [11].
However, even after factoring in a certain level of inequity into the
equation, and a certain level of recycling, dematerialisation /
materials substitution, and de-energisation, we can still imagine
strong aspirations for an expansion of the consumption of physical
resources.
By one estimate, World GDP has been projected to grow by a factor
of 4.5 (1990-2050) from (1990 US$) US$21.23 trillion to US$94.282
trillion [12].
In a couple of recent scenarios Raskin et al project World GDP at
US$142-145 trillion by 2050, a factor 7 increase over 1990 World
GDP, and a factor 5 increase over 1995 World GDP (US$33.4 trillion
PPP, US$28 trillion MER) [13]. Taking a World GDP growth rate of
1.8% 2050-2070 we arrive at a World GDP of US$207 trillion for
2070, a factor 6 - 7.4 increase over 1995 World GDP.
If we allow for a factor 8 increase in the World GDP 1995-2070 (av
2.8% growth rate), the growth in physical resources might be
increased by factor 3 - 5 in the same period - nowhere near the factor
100 suggested by Trainer. However, a factor 3 - 5 is still high
enough to warrant great concern, given the strains already placed on
the environment with current resource use.
*
[1] Whelan, Joan 'Foreign Aid and the Arms Trade: A Look at the
Numbers' Council for a Livable World Education Fund July 1998
http://atdb.cdi.org/viewmem.idc?base=184
[2] 'Realpolitik versus the ICJ' Global Futures Bulletin #83, 01 May
1999
[3] see 'Prime drivers of the Serbia/Kosovo crisis' Global Futures
Bulletin #82, 15 Apr 1999
[4] see 'Corridor VIII' Global Futures Bulletin #83, 01 May 1999
[5] calculated on a country average basis
[6] Human Development Report 1998, United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP)
[7] Human Development Report 1998 op cit.
[8] derived from 'World economy projections' Global Futures
Bulletin #77 01 Feb 1999 citing Raskin P, Gallopin G, et al
'Bending the Curve Toward Global Sustainability - Report to the
Global Scenario Group' (1998) p A3 - mid range scenario UN 1997.
http://www.gsg.org
[9] see 'Energy consumption per capita' Global Futures Bulletin #65
01 Aug 1998. and 'Economic Growth in the Pacific Rim' Global
Futures Bulletin #15 01 July 1996
[10] 'Dematerialisation and decarbonisation' Global Futures Bulletin
#17 01 Aug 1996, see also Nakicenovic (IIASA) Technological
Forecasting and Social Change vol 51, Jan 96, p1.
[11] 'Dematerialisation and decarbonisation' op cit
[12] 'Water' Global Futures Bulletin #30 - 15 Feb 1997 citing World
Meteorological Organisation 1992 IPCC Supplement 1992.
[13] 'World economy projections' Global Futures Bulletin #77 01
Feb 1999 citing Raskin P, Gallopin G, et al 'Bending the Curve
Toward Global Sustainability' op cit p A-5 Note: estimates of the
world economy in 1995 is US$33.4 trillion when expressed as
purchasing power parity (PPP), but US$28.2 trillion when expressed
as market exchange rate (MER).
*
{23. global parameters, scenarios, new dimensions; 2. peace and
conflict resolution}
*
*
*
PROSPECT OF WAR OVER RESOURCES
What are the prospects of increased armed conflict caused primarily
by the unrestrained quest for economic growth and increasing
scarcity of many types resources ?
Oil
Given the projected peaking of world oil supply around 2010,
competition over oil resources could become a driver of armed
conflict. In 1997 we witnessed the intense jockeying by oil
companies for access to one of the last significant oil deposits to be
exploited - in Kazakhstan and the Caspian Sea [1].
Many argue that the Gulf War was less about defending the principle
of national sovereignty than defending oil interests in Kuwait.
The UK and later the US had poured substantial resources into
gaining political influence in Iran under the Shah. Tensions between
the US and Iran after the Islamic revolution could at least partly be
attributed to Iran's oil wealth. Oil deposits can also be seen as minor
components of the Malvinas/Falklands war, as well as the question of
independence for East Timor. Border skirmishes between Ecuador
and Peru have been triggered by disputes over oil deposits in the
Amazon basin. Violence and repression in Nigerian delta region
have undoubtedly been motivated by oil profits. Oil is also a
component in the disputed Spratley Islands where China, Philippines,
Vietnam and Malaysia all stake a claim.
Water
Control over water resources has also been cited as a possible
flashpoint despite the successful negotiation of a number of
international agreements on sharing water resources in recent years
(eg Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty of 1994, and agreement over Ganges-
Brahmaputra Rivers).
Fresh water withdrawal [2]
1900 1950 1990
Population 1.6b 2.5b 5.3b
Water /cap/an 360 540 570 (cu m)
Water total/an 600 1400 3000 (cu km)
According to Raskin et al, annual global water withdrawal is about
8% of total runoff [3]. This contrasts with the UN Commission for
Human Settlement which claims that by 2000, world water demand is
likely to claim almost half the total global runoff water annually [4].
Raskin et al estimate that 1990-2050 freshwater requirements will
increase only by a factor of 1.5, from 3000 cu km (1990) to 4300 cu
km (2050) due to more efficient use of water and shift to less water
intensive economic activity [5].
Globally, water resources are consumed [6]:
household 5%
industry 10%
agriculture 85%
One could argue that mega-hydro projects are a source of violence
and repression illustrated by the Narmada project in India, the Three
Gorges Dam in China, and upcoming plans for the Mekong Delta,
giving rise to the relocation of hundreds of thousands of people -
many against their will. The Narmada project will see the relocation
of up to 610,00 people [7]. Some villagers have vowed to remain and
drown. The Three Gorges Dam will see the relocation of 1.3 million
people ! However, increasing opposition to mega-hydro projects from
local groups, international NGOs and even international financial
institutions such as the World Bank which pulled out of the Narmada
and Three Gorges projects, could see them become less politically
viable in coming decades.
Fish
World marine fish catch was said to have peaked at around 78m
tonnes/an in 1995, due to over-harvesting and dwindling fish stocks
[8], but is actually still growing at slightly less than 1%/an [9].
While a peak is highly likely within a decade, aquaculture has been
growing at an average of 10%/an since 1984 to 27m tonnes in 1998.
Recent confrontations include [10]:
- Russian ship shoots at two Japanese trawlers off disputed Kuril
Islands. One ship damaged, several fishermen injured.
- Scottish fishermen attack Russian trawler and destroy $380,000
cod.
- Argentine gunboat sinks Taiwanese trawler in Patagonia.
- US fishermen turn over cars to protest new limits on New England
fishery.
- Indian traditional fishermen accused of burning commercial
trawlers and nation-wide protest denounces joint-venture fishing
agreements.
- Icelandic ship and Norwegian patrol boat exchange shots as patrol
boat cuts nets of three trawlers.
- French fisherman is shot as Spanish ships blockade several ports in
a recurring battle between French, Spanish and British fishermen.
- Philippine patrol boats arrest 62 Chinese fishermen off disputed
Spratley Islands.
- Canadian Coast Guard goes outside 200 mile limit to fire on
Spanish trawler, arrest crew and impound ship.
Annual world demand could be expected to grow to over 150-200m
tonnes/an by 2070. However, the risk of major armed conflict as a
result of scarcity is perhaps not significant due to the possibility of
substitution (other forms of meat protein), rising supply from
aquaculture, and the prospect of sea-farming.
Gas
Natural gas will increasingly become a favored substitute for
diminishing oil supplies, though supply may peak only two or three
decades after oil. Unfortunately 34% of the world's natural gas fields
are concentrated in Russia while a further 15% are in Iran which
makes gas prone to monopolistic practices and thus raise the stakes in
geopolitical maneouvering [11].
Other factors such as the success of coal gassification technology will
influence the relative scarcity of gas and thus competition of supplies.
The degree of success in energy conservation and substitution for
renewables will also have an important bearing.
Metals and minerals
Prices (as an indication of relative scarcity) of many metals and
minerals have fallen in real terms, disproving the projections of many
forecasters in the 1960s and 70s. Gold, copper and iron are amongst
these. New materials have created requirements for abundant
materials such as silicon for optical fibre, and carbon for carbon fibre.
However, the trends to date do not necessarily tell us anything about
trends over the next seven decades. The energy input for extraction
of most metals/minerals has increased, but has not affected prices due
to the drop of energy costs in the 1980s and 90s. If energy prices
increase significantly, we could expect metal/mineral prices to also
rise, perhaps faster due to rising energy input for extraction.
Plastics have been an important substitute for metals. Derived from
petrochemicals, it is uncertain whether increased prices for oil would
have a significant impact on the price of plastics.
While the likelihood of major armed conflict between countries is yet
to be demonstrated, a more likely scenario involves increased
violence and repression against minorities who have claims to land
rich in minerals. This violence and repression is already apparent,
particularly amongst indigenous peoples from Australia to Melanesia,
North America, to South and Central America, and Africa.
Farmland and soil
Though increases in yields of rice, wheat and maize have dropped to
~1%/an (down from 3-4% 1973-83) [12], it is estimated that
increased food production to meet the needs of 10 billion people in
2070 (and 11.2 billion in 2150) is possible without expanding
farmland and without resorting to the development of genetically
modified organisms (GMOs), but rather through increasing
agricultural intensity, improved sustainable agricultural management
and technologies, and soil conservation practices.
John Bongaats suggests that by 2050, food demand will be 300% food
demand for 1989 in developing countries due to both population
increase and increased per capita consumption (eg meat).
Theoretically this demand could be met if, overall, crop yields were
doubled, farmland and cropping frequency both increased 20%, and
food imports increased 5%. The desirable mix would vary for each
country [13].
If biofuels (eg from cane, and willow, acacia, eucalypt forests) prove
significantly economically viable (in a CO2 reduction regime), this
may compete for limited areas of farmland and habitat.
While global production capacity could meet global demand,
domestic production in high density countries such as Bangladesh
might have difficulty meeting domestic demand.
Famine has so far resulted in internal displacement of people, and
some increase in tension, but not significantly in international
refugees to date. It is usually armed conflict (eg in Biafra, Ethiopia
and Sudan) which have contributed to famine rather than vice versa.
Tentative summary
In terms of major armed conflict, it can be argued that ideological
struggles, independence and secessionist struggles, competition
between national elite factions, and ethnic conflict, are likely to
remain the prime direct causes of armed conflict over the next few
decades, especially in developing countries, and particularly in
Africa, the Middle East, and Central and South Asia.
Given a factor 8 increase in World GDP 1995-2070, we might
suggest a factor 3 - 5 increase in resource consumption. A significant
amount of these resources will be substituted for relatively abundant
resources (silicon, carbon, hydrogen, softwood). The likelihood of
major armed conflict directly arising from scarcity of resources may
not be significant.
However, seven factors need to be considered:
1. the above scenario assumes a slowing down of economic growth in
OECD countries to 0.7%/an 2025-2050 [14]. However, such an
economic growth rate is considered a 'stalled economy' and is
currently politically unacceptable.
2. the current international economic regime may undermine the
efforts of developing countries to expand their economies at the
suggested rate of 2.9% - 4.5%. The notion that economic growth will
inevitably flow to the countries with the lowest wages (comparative
advantage) may be simplistic and ill-founded. Even the star
performers of SE Asia and Latin America appear to be slowing
prematurely, while the US and Australia are steaming ahead of
predictions.
3. others materials may become strategically important, such as
certain metals / elements used in computer and communications
technology, of in the manufacture of photovoltaic cells or batteries, or
as key catalysts in important chemical processes etc where
substitution is not possible. Thus a relative scarcity may develop
which may lead to armed conflict over control of supplies.
4. relative scarcity of resources may not be a major *direct* cause of
armed conflict, but we need a more comprehensive structural analysis
to understand how the interests of global capital support and promote
a military-industrial complex, that global capital is sustained by a
globalised consumer culture, and that the increasing concentration
and power of transnational corporations (TNCs) is likely to
undermine democratic processes. Increasing competition for markets
on the one hand, and resources on the other, could cause
governments to support policies of armed aggression and armed
resistance to secure markets and resources.
Even with significant resource substitution, a factor 3 - 4 increase in
resource consumption is bound to rub hard up against environmental
limits beyond those that we are currently experiencing (ozone layer
depletion, CO2/GHG emissions, marine fisheries, habitat/species
loss, aquifer depletion, soil loss, hardwood supplies, waste dump sites
etc).
5. with high levels of inequity within nations, the focus may be on
conflict between civil society and government which turns
increasingly militant - where government elites are further 'captured'
by increasingly powerful TNCs. The violence may not manifest so
much in terms of conventional military engagement (bombing
campaigns, ground war and sea battles), but in terms of a heightened
police state, terrorist action, general repression, loss of civil liberties
and democratic rights, and increased human rights abuses. Such
schism in civil society could further escalate into civil wars and then
to international wars.
6. if multiple vectors of environmental stress result in a multiplier
effect (positive feedback), causing significant degradation in
ecological systems, ecological instability, and disruption to the
natural capital base, we can expect this to cause significant economic,
social and political disruption, which will increase the probability of
major armed conflict.
It is possible, for example, that by 2050, CO2 atmospheric
concentration could have risen to 500ppm (compared to current
365ppm, and preindustrial 280ppm). We could already be witnessing
widespread damage and disruption due to intense cyclones, flooding
and drought. One scenario estimates up to 400 million
environmental refugees resulting from global warming alone [15].
This is quite credible given that in 1998, an estimated 300m people
were driven from their homes due to storms and floods. Damage
costs are estimated at US$92b, (~0.3% World GDP) compared to the
highest previous record in 1996 of US$60b [16]. Even so, the
contribution of environmental and climate disruption to armed
conflict, so far at least, could be said to be negligible.
7. Paradoxically, a slowing down of economic growth (whether due to
environmental limits or other factors), rather than continued
economic growth of, say 3%, could intensify highly competitive
survival-mode behaviour amongst TNC conglomerates and alliances,
and between trading blocs of nation states, and thereby also
contribute to armed conflict. For example, reduced domestic military
spending in the US has contributed to a concentration of the US arms
industry, an intensification of direct lobbying and contributions to
election campaign funds, and a more concerted focus on arms
exports.
This final point highlights the necessity of achieving a high level of
understanding and consensus in the polity concerning the need to
stabilise resource consumption, and even reduce consumption in
OECD countries in the case of some resources. Emphasis could shift
from economic growth per se, to maximising economic growth (value
added) within the framework of stable resource consumption and
sustainable management, and to maximising quality of life according
to a wide range of well publicised indicators.
A counter-argument to this final point is that unless there is a radical
cultural sea-change regarding material desires and consumer mores,
there will not be the political will to adhere to the strict parameters
necessary to create a truly environmentally sustainable society and
economy, and repression and conflict will be amongst the inevitable
outcomes.
*
[1] 'Peaking of world oil supply' Global Futures Bulletin #45 01
Oct 1997.
[2] 'Water' Global Futures Bulletin #30 15 Feb 1997, citing
Shiklomanov I, in Gleick P,(Ed) 'Fresh Water in Crisis' OUP, 1993;
1990 estimate, WRI, World Resources 1994-95 OUP, 1994.
[3] 'Water' Global Futures Bulletin #30 15 Feb 1997 citing Raskin
P, Hansen, Margolis, Natural Resources Forum, Vol 20 No 1 p1,
1996.
[4] 'Water' Global Futures Bulletin #30 - 15 Feb 1997 citing UNHCS
press release 01 June 96
[5] 'Water' Global Futures Bulletin #30 15 Feb 1997 citing Raskin
P, Hansen, Margolis, Natural Resources Forum, Vol 20 No1 p9,
1996.
[6] 'Urban water shortage' Global Futures Bulletin #15, 01 July 1996
[7] 'Evictions' Global Futures Bulletin #14 15 June, 1996. Estimates
vary considerably from 250,000 (AidWatch
http://www.toysatellite.com.au/aidwatch/news/08/07.htm) to 1million
for the entire project (Alvares C, Billorey R 'Damming the Narmada'
Third World Network).
[8] 'Crises loom over declining global fish stocks' Global Futures
Bulletin #2 15 Dec 1995
[9] Vital Signs 1999, Worldwatch Institute 1999.
[10] 'Crises loom over declining global fish stocks' GFB #2 op cit.
[11] 'Energy statistics discrepancy' Global Futures Bulletin #33 01
Apr 97
[12] 'World Food Summit review' Global Futures Bulletin #33 01
Apr 1997.
[13] 'Population and development' Global Futures Bulletin #63 01
July 1998, citing Bongaarts, J Population and Development Review
22(3) pp483-503 (1996).
[14] 'World economy projections' op cit.
[15] 'Global warming and energy' Global Futures Bulletin # 3 01
Jan 1996, citing New Internationalist No. 269.
[16] Vital Signs 1999 op cit, citing study by W. Alton Jones
Foundation and the UN Population Fund.
*
{23. global parameters, scenarios, new dimensions; 2. peace and
conflict resolution}
*
*
*
CITIZEN'S INSPECTION OF NATO
Over 260 peace activists were arrested at NATO headquarters in
Brussels when they attempted to carry out a Citizens' Inspection to
gather evidence on the possession of illegal nuclear weapons.
The Mayor of Brussels has placed a ban on demonstrations in the
city.
Peace activist David Mackenzie [a] stated 'Milosovic is being
pursued, and rightly, for his war crimes. Yet, in the city that houses
the HQ of NATO, which claims to be acting for democracy and
freedom, straightforward dissent is banned. NATO itself refuses to
be accountable to its people and to be open to the process of
international law.'
Critics of the peace movement argue that NATO is having difficulty
bringing Milosevic to justice even with the use of force, and it would
be virtually be impossible without force.
*
[1] David Mackenzie is a campaigner for the Trident Ploughshares
2000 campaign. http://www.gn.apc.org/tp2000/
*
{2. peace and conflict resolution}
*
*
*
UKRAINE REVERSAL ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Ukraine was the first and only country in the world to renounce
nuclear weapons and unilaterally disarm. However, following the
NATO bombing campaign, the Ukraine Parliament voted
unanimously to revert to its former nuclear status, citing the failure of
the US to follow through on its promise of a norm-based and
inclusive security system.
Meanwhile on April 30, the National Security Council in Russia
approved the modernisation of its tactical and strategic nuclear
weapons (ie development of new nuclear weapons). The Defense
Ministry has also authorised changes to its nuclear doctrine so that
'First Use' is no longer excluded [1]. China has also reversed its
'No First Use' nuclear doctrine.
It should be noted that the Serbian Parliament had passed a resolution
supporting the idea of UN forces (not NATO forces) in Kosovo to
monitor a withdrawal of Serbian forces in Kosovo, and a political
settlement, prior to NATO bombing [2].
*
[1] The Guardian (London) May 26 1999.
[2] New York Times Apr 08 1999.
*
{2. peace and conflict resolution}
*
*
*
CALENDAR
23 - 26 Aug 99 Second PGA conference - 'People's Global Action
Against 'Free' Trade and the World Trade Organisation' Bangalore,
India www.agp.org; e-mail: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>.
13-15 June 2000 - Call for Papers for conference 'The Quest for the
Futures: An Argumentative Methodology Seminar in Futures Studies'
Turku, Finland, Finland Futures Research Centre and World Futures
Studies Federation (WFSF). www.tukkk.fi/tutu/seminar2000.htm
*
*
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The Global Futures Bulletin is produced by the Institute for Global
Futures Research (IGFR) twice monthly. Readers are welcome to
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information. Indicate whether you would like your name attached to
the submitted material. All communications should be directed to the
Editor, e-mail <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>. Copyright (c) 1998 Institute for
Global Futures Research (IGFR). All rights reserved.
________________________________________________________
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PUBLICATIONS OF THE MONTH.- (Order form is included below)
********************************************************
'Futures for the Third Millennium: Enabling the Forward View'
Richard A. Slaughter (1999) 381 pages
The world of the early 21st C presents humankind with an
unprecedented 'civilisational challenge': How can it find ways
forward to more sustaining, and sustainable, ways of life? How can it
move beyond the disastrous conceits and power fantasies of
industrialism, and the nihilism of post-modernism? What are the
outlines of a livable future?
Part One looks at the shift from short-, to long-term thinking, and the
development of a Knowledge Base for Futures Studies (KBFS),
which, arguably, brings new definition and capability to the field.
Part Two considers contextual factors - the origins of defects in the
industrial worldview, and some of the ways these have played out in
the arena of images and imaging processes during the 20th C. Part
Three takes up the theme of futures in education and explores some
of the ways in which the forward view offers new options and new
strategies to practitioners and the over-stressed systems in which they
work. The re-framing of education toward the future is, perhaps, the
single most important shift it can undertake.
Implementation in a wider sense is the subject of Part Four. It looks
at the ways that foresight can be embedded in a whole series of
organisational and social practices. These are pivotal chapters
because, if the powerful symbolic resources of futures work cannot be
transformed into practical applications, they will remain merely
academic, and, in the end, be marginalised. Part Five presents six
chapters on various critical futures methodologies. They serve to
critique and supplement the dominant American empirical tradition
that has long held sway in Futures Studies.
The book is written from the point of view that 'hard' and 'soft'
approaches should be seen as mutually necessary, but applicable to
different domains of the world .
Part Six offers a structural approach to the growth and application of
foresight work in social contexts. The goal is to create societies that
no longer blunder into a dimly-perceived 'unknown future', but,
rather, plot their course with intelligence and skill, understanding
something, at least, of what is at stake. It then considers nuclear
weapons as a kind of 'test case' to enquire if the attempt to draw on
wider frameworks, other 'ways of knowing', might provide a way out
of this self-imposed technological nightmare. Finally, it employs the
work of one outstanding transpersonal synthesist to turn the focus of
attention back onto Futures Studies itself in an attempt to discern new
ways forward for this young discipline.
Richard A. Slaughter is foundation Professor of Foresight at
Swinburne University of Technology, Melbourne, Australia.
AUD$45 inc post, US$38 inc post, UKPnd 24 inc post.
Add US$3 for post for orders outside Australia, US/Canada or UK.
********************************************************
'Guide to Sustainable Community Indicators' (2nd Ed)
Maureen Hart (1999) 202 pages
What is a sustainability indicator? How do I know if my community
is making progress towards becoming a sustainable community? Is
there a right indicator for my community? How do I know if an
indicator is really measuring sustainability? What is a sustainable
community anyway ?
This book is particularly relevant to people working on community
economic development, grassroots activists, municipal and state
agency staff, nonprofit organizations, and local businesses. The
intent of the guide is to explain both sustainability and indicators,
and to encourage the reader to begin to use indicators or improve
indicators already in use.
This revised 2nd Edition includes
- explanation of concepts such as community capital and pressure-
state-response indicators
- expanded information on the key issues of carrying capacity,
consumption, and population,
- indicators for topics including business, production, recreation, land
use, and transportation,
- detailed examples of good sustainability indicators,
- explains how to identify good sustainability indicators for your
community,
- an updated list of almost 700 indicators being used by communities
of all sizes
AUD$42 inc post, US$23 inc post, UKPnd 18 inc post.
Add US$3 for post for orders outside Australia, US/Canada or UK.
*******************************************************
'Vital Signs 1999: The Environmental Trends That Are Shaping Our
Future'
Lester R. Brown, Michael Renner, Brian Halweil (1999)
Graphs key global trends. particularly significant trends that are
overlooked by mainstream media, world leaders and economic
planners.
Trends include data associated with climate change, global economy,
armed conflict, renewable energy, food production, expansion of the
Net (cyberspace) and communications technology, world health, and
population, amongst other areas of inquiry.
AUD$35 inc post, US$19 inc post, UKPnd 15 inc post.
Add US$3 for post for orders outside Australia, US/Canada or UK.
********************************************************
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Global Futures Bulletin #85
Institute for Global Futures Research (IGFR) Mon, 12 Jul 1999 22:18:50 -0700
