Paris
WHILE yesterday's explosions on London's subway and bus lines were thankfully
far less serious than those of two weeks ago, they will lead many to raise a
troubling question: has Britain (and Spain as well) been "punished" by Al Qaeda
for participating in the American-led military interventions in Iraq and
Afghanistan? While this is a reasonable line of thinking, it presupposes the
answer to a broader and more pertinent question: Are the roots of Islamic
terrorism in the Middle Eastern conflicts?
If the answer is yes, the solution is simple to formulate, although not to
achieve: leave Afghanistan and Iraq, solve the Israel-Palestine conflict. But if
the answer is no, as I suspect it is, we should look deeper into the
radicalization of young, Westernized Muslims.
Conflicts in the Middle East have a tremendous impact on Muslim public
opinion worldwide. In justifying its terrorist attacks by referring to Iraq, Al
Qaeda is looking for popularity or at least legitimacy among Muslims. But many
of the terrorist group's statements, actions and non-actions indicate that this
is largely propaganda, and that Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine are hardly the
motivating factors behind its global jihad.
First, let's consider the chronology. The Americans went to Iraq and
Afghanistan after 9/11, not before. Mohamed Atta and the other pilots were not
driven by Iraq or Afghanistan. Were they then driven by the plight of the
Palestinians? It seems unlikely. After all, the attack was plotted well before
the second intifada began in September 2000, at a time of relative optimism in
Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.
Another motivating factor, we are told, was the presence of "infidel" troops
in Islam's holy lands. Yes, Osama Bin Laden was reported to be upset when the
Saudi royal family allowed Western troops into the kingdom before the Persian
Gulf war. But Mr. bin Laden was by that time a veteran fighter committed to
global jihad.
He and the other members of the first generation of Al Qaeda left the Middle
East to fight the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980's. Except for the
smallish Egyptian faction led by Ayman al-Zawahiri, now Mr. bin Laden's chief
deputy, these militants were not involved in Middle Eastern politics. Abdullah
Azzam, Mr. bin Laden's mentor, gave up supporting the Palestinian Liberation
Organization long before his death in 1989 because he felt that to fight for a
localized political cause was to forsake the real jihad, which he felt should be
international and religious in character.
From the beginning, Al Qaeda's fighters were global jihadists, and their
favored battlegrounds have been outside the Middle East: Afghanistan, Bosnia,
Chechnya and Kashmir. For them, every conflict is simply a part of the Western
encroachment on the Muslim ummah, the worldwide community of believers.
Second, if the conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq and Palestine are at the core
of the radicalization, why are there virtually no Afghans, Iraqis or
Palestinians among the terrorists? Rather, the bombers are mostly from the
Arabian Peninsula, North Africa, Egypt and Pakistan - or they are Western-born
converts to Islam. Why would a Pakistani or a Spaniard be more angry than an
Afghan about American troops in Afghanistan? It is precisely because they do not
care about Afghanistan as such, but see the United States involvement there as
part of a global phenomenon of cultural domination.
What was true for the first generation of Al Qaeda is also relevant for the
present generation: even if these young men are from Middle Eastern or South
Asian families, they are for the most part Westernized Muslims living or even
born in Europe who turn to radical Islam. Moreover, converts are to be found in
almost every Qaeda cell: they did not turn fundamentalist because of Iraq, but
because they felt excluded from Western society (this is especially true of the
many converts from the Caribbean islands, both in Britain and France). "Born
again" or converts, they are rebels looking for a cause. They find it in the
dream of a virtual, universal ummah, the same way the ultraleftists of the
1970's (the Baader-Meinhof Gang, the Italian Red Brigades) cast their terrorist
actions in the name of the "world proletariat" and "Revolution" without really
caring about what would happen after.
It is also interesting to note that none of the Islamic terrorists captured
so far had been active in any legitimate antiwar movements or even in organized
political support for the people they claim to be fighting for. They don't
distribute leaflets or collect money for hospitals and schools. They do not have
a rational strategy to push for the interests of the Iraqi or Palestinian
people.
Even their calls for the withdrawal of the European troops from Iraq ring
false. After all, the Spanish police have foiled terrorist attempts in Madrid
even since the government withdrew its forces. Western-based radicals strike
where they are living, not where they are instructed to or where it will have
the greatest political effect on behalf of their nominal causes.
The Western-based Islamic terrorists are not the militant vanguard of the
Muslim community; they are a lost generation, unmoored from traditional
societies and cultures, frustrated by a Western society that does not meet their
expectations. And their vision of a global ummah is both a mirror of and a form
of revenge against the globalization that has made them what they
are.
Olivier Roy, a professor at the School for Advanced Studies
in the Social Sciences, is the author of "Globalized
Islam."
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