|
Yes, the “run-up” tactics of the neocons are
being applied against Iran, now. But where only the ignorant fell for the ‘run-up’
on Iraq, now only fools will fall for that on Iran. And, fortunately, there are
far fewer fools in the US than ignorant people. The hard way, the American
people are slowly learning.... Cheers, Lawry From:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On
Behalf Of Karen Watters Cole The war machines are
geared up again and this time we need to be more vigilance, demand accuracy and
accept no false claims. Everything
you ever wanted
to know about the Iranian nuclear program but were afraid to ask? Iran and its nuclear program are going to be a big issue this
year. So it makes sense to know something about it. Clearly, the Iranians are
engaged in a major nuclear research program. Is it for weapons? If it is, how
close are they to producing them? (Contrary to the impression you'd get from
reading a number of your more antic columnists, the US intelligence community believes that the Iranians are roughly a decade away from being able to
produce a nuclear weapon. Charles Krauthammer says it's just a matter of months. You decide who to believe.) So next week, from Monday through Thursday, we're going to have 2 arms control experts, Paul Kerr of the Arms Control Association and Dr. Jeffrey Lewis of Armscontrolwonk.com. They'll be blogging about the technical capacity of the
Iranian nuclear effort, what it's for, whether it's any near to produce a
nuclear weapon and other related topics. They also want to answer your
questions. So we've set up a thread over at TPMCafe where you can pose questions for them to
answer next week. From Josh Marshall at Talking Points Memo
(TPM), for those viewing in text only, the url is http://www.tpmcafe.com/story/2006/1/21/03741/4512 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Here is the news reporting mentioned above regarding
Iran’s disputed timeline. There are good reasons to be skeptical of both
sides - the new president of Iran seems to be claiming a divine mission for
Iran - and the now familiar political plays by Bush administration war hawks. -
KwC Iran Is Judged 10 Years
>From Nuclear Bomb By Dafna Linzer, Washington Post Staff Writer, Tuesday, August 2, 2005; A01 A major U.S. intelligence review has projected
that Iran is about a decade away from manufacturing the key ingredient for a
nuclear weapon, roughly doubling the previous estimate of five years, according
to government sources with firsthand knowledge of the new analysis. The carefully hedged assessments, which represent consensus
among U.S. intelligence agencies, contrast with forceful public statements by
the White House. Administration
officials have asserted, but have not offered proof, that Tehran is moving
determinedly toward a nuclear arsenal. The new estimate could provide more time
for diplomacy with Iran over its nuclear ambitions. President Bush has said
that he wants the crisis resolved diplomatically but that "all options are on the table." The new National
Intelligence Estimate includes what the
intelligence community views as credible indicators that Iran's military is
conducting clandestine work. But the sources said there is no information
linking those projects directly to a nuclear weapons program. What is clear is
that Iran, mostly through its energy program, is acquiring and mastering
technologies that could be diverted to bombmaking. The estimate expresses uncertainty about whether
Iran's ruling clerics have made a decision to build a nuclear arsenal, three
U.S. sources said. Still, a senior intelligence official familiar with the
findings said that "it is the judgment of
the intelligence community that, left to its own devices, Iran is determined to
build nuclear weapons." At no time in the past three years has the White House
attributed its assertions about Iran to U.S. intelligence, as it did about Iraq in the run-up to the March 2003 invasion.
Instead, it has pointed to years of Iranian concealment and questioned why a
country with as much oil as Iran would require a large-scale nuclear energy
program. The NIE addresses those assertions and offers
alternative views supporting and challenging the assumptions they are based on.
Those familiar with the new judgments, which have not been previously detailed,
would discuss only limited elements of the estimate and only on the condition
of anonymity, because the report is classified, as is some of the evidence on
which it is based. Top policymakers are scrutinizing the review,
several administration officials said, as the White House formulates the next
steps of an Iran policy long riven by infighting and competing strategies. For three years, the administration has tried, with limited
success, to increase pressure on Iran by focusing attention on its nuclear
program. Those efforts have been driven as much by international diplomacy as
by the intelligence. The NIE, ordered by the National Intelligence
Council in January, is the first major review since 2001 of what is known and
what is unknown about Iran. Additional assessments produced during Bush's first
term were narrow in scope, and some were rejected by advocates of policies that
were inconsistent with the intelligence judgments. One such paper was a 2002 review that former and
current officials said was commissioned by national security adviser Stephen J.
Hadley, who was then deputy adviser, to assess the possibility for "regime
change" in Iran. Those findings described the Islamic republic on a slow
march toward democracy and cautioned against U.S. interference in that process,
said the officials, who would describe the paper's classified findings only on
the condition of anonymity. The new estimate takes a broader approach to the
question of Iran's political future. But it is unable to answer whether the
country's ruling clerics will still be in control by the time the country is
capable of producing fissile material. The administration keeps "hoping
the mullahs will leave before Iran gets a nuclear weapons capability,"
said an official familiar with policy discussions. Intelligence estimates are designed to alert the
president of national security developments and help guide policy. The new Iran
findings were described as well documented and well written, covering such
topics as military capabilities, expected population growth and the oil
industry. The assessments of Iran's nuclear program appear in a separate annex
to the NIE known as a memorandum to holders. "It's a full look at what we know, what we
don't know and what assumptions we have," a U.S. source said. Until recently, Iran
was judged, according to February testimony by Vice Adm. Lowell E. Jacoby,
director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, to be within five years of the capability to make a nuclear weapon. Since 1995, U.S.
officials have continually estimated Iran to be "within five years"
from reaching that same capability. So far, it has not. The new estimate extends the
timeline, judging that Iran will be unlikely to produce a sufficient quantity
of highly enriched uranium, the key ingredient for an atomic weapon, before
"early to mid-next decade," according to four sources familiar with
that finding. The sources said the
shift, based on a better understanding of Iran's technical limitations, puts
the timeline closer to 2015 and in line with recently revised British and Israeli figures. The estimate is for acquisition of fissile
material, but there is no firm view expressed on whether Iran would be ready by
then with an implosion device, sources said. The timeline is portrayed as a minimum designed to reflect a program moving full speed ahead
without major technical obstacles. It
does not take into account that Iran has suspended much of its
uranium-enrichment work as part of a tenuous deal with Britain, France and
Germany. Iran announced yesterday that it intends to resume some of that work
if the European talks fall short of expectations. Sources said the new timeline also reflects a
fading of suspicions that Iran's military has been running its own separate and
covert enrichment effort. But there is evidence of
clandestine military work on missiles and centrifuge research and development that could be linked to a nuclear program, four
sources said. Last month, U.S. officials shared some data on
the missile program with U.N. nuclear inspectors, based on drawings obtained
last November. The documents include design modifications for Iran's Shahab-3
missile to make the room required for a nuclear warhead, U.S. and foreign
officials said. "If someone has a good idea for a missile
program, and he has really good connections, he'll get that program
through," said Gordon Oehler, who ran the CIA's nonproliferation center and
served as deputy director of the presidential commission on weapons of mass
destruction. "But that doesn't mean there is a master plan for a nuclear
weapon." The commission found earlier this year that U.S.
intelligence knows "disturbingly little" about Iran, and about North
Korea. Much of what is known about Tehran has been
learned through analyzing communication intercepts, satellite imagery and the
work of U.N. inspectors who have been investigating Iran for more than two
years. Inspectors uncovered facilities for uranium conversion and enrichment,
results of plutonium tests, and equipment bought illicitly from Pakistan -- all
of which raised serious concerns but could be explained by an energy program.
Inspectors have found no proof that Iran possesses a nuclear warhead design or
is conducting a nuclear weapons program. The NIE comes more than two years after the
intelligence community assessed, wrongly, in an October 2002 estimate that
then-Iraqi President Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction and was
reconstituting his nuclear program. The judgments were declassified and made
public by the Bush administration as it sought to build support for invading
Iraq five months later. At a congressional hearing last Thursday, Gen.
Michael V. Hayden, deputy director of national intelligence, said that new
rules recently were imposed for crafting NIEs and that there would be "a
higher tolerance for ambiguity," even if it meant producing estimates with
less definitive conclusions. The Iran NIE, sources said, includes creative
analysis and alternative theories that could explain some of the suspicious
activities discovered in Iran in the past three years. Iran has said its
nuclear infrastructure was built for energy production, not weapons. Assessed as plausible, but unverifiable, is
Iran's public explanation that it built the program in secret, over 18 years,
because it feared attack by the United States or Israel if the work was
exposed. In January, before
the review, Vice President Cheney
suggested Iranian nuclear
advances were so pressing that Israel may be forced to attack facilities, as it
had done 23 years earlier in Iraq. In an April 2004 speech, John R. Bolton - then the
administration's point man on weapons of mass destruction and now Bush's
temporarily appointed U.N. ambassador -- said: "If we permit Iran's
deception to go on much longer, it will be too late. Iran will have nuclear
weapons." But the level of certainty, influenced by
diplomacy and intelligence, appears to have shifted. Asked in June, after
the NIE was done, whether Iran had a nuclear effort underway,
Bolton's successor, Robert G. Joseph, undersecretary of state for arms control, said: "I don't
know quite how to answer that because we don't have perfect information or
perfect understanding. But the Iranian record, plus what the Iranian leaders
have said . . . lead us to conclude that we have to be highly skeptical." http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/01/AR2005080101453.html |
_______________________________________________ Futurework mailing list [email protected] http://fes.uwaterloo.ca/mailman/listinfo/futurework
