Putting
Cards on the Table in Iraq
By George Friedman
The clouds couldn't have been darker last week. Everyone was talking about
civil war in Iraq. Smart and informed people were talking about the real
possibility of an American airstrike against Iran's nuclear capabilities. The
Iranians were hurling defiance in every direction on the compass. U.S.
President George W. Bush seemed to be politically on the ropes, unable to
control his own party. And then seemingly out of nowhere, the Iranians offered
to hold talks with the Americans on Iraq, and only Iraq. With the kind of
lightning speed not seen from the White House for a while, the United States
accepted. Suddenly, the two countries with the greatest stake in Iraq -- and
the deepest hostility toward each other -- had agreed publicly to negotiate on
Iraq.
To understand this development, we must understand that Iran and the United
States have been holding quiet, secret, back-channel and off-the-record
discussions for years -- but the discussions were no less important for all of
that. The Iran-Contra affair, for example, could not have taken place had the
Reagan administration not been talking to the Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini's
representatives. There is nothing new about Americans and Iranians talking;
they have been doing it for years. Each side, for their own domestic reasons,
has tried to hide the talks from public view, even when they were quite public,
such as the Geneva discussions over Afghanistan prior to the Sept. 11 attacks.
What is dramatically new is the public nature of these talks now, and the
subject matter: Iraq.
Not to put too fine a point on it, but the real players in Iraq are now going
to sit down and see if they can reach some decisions about the country's
future. They are going to do this over the heads of their various clients.
Obviously, the needs of those clients will have to be satisfied, but in the
end, the Iraq war is at least partly about U.S.-Iranian relations, and it is
clear that both sides have now decided that it is time to explore a deal -- not
in a quiet Georgetown restaurant, but in full view of the world. In other
words, it is time to get serious.
The offer of public talks actually was not made by Iran. The first public proposal
for talks came from U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad, who several
months ago reported that he had been authorized by Bush to open two lines of
discussion: One was with the non-jihadist Sunni leadership in Iraq; the other
was with Iran. Interestingly, Khalilzad had emphasized that he was authorized
to speak with the Iranians only about Iraq and not about other subjects. In
other words, discussion of Iran's nuclear program was not going to take place.
What happened last week was that the Iranians finally gave Khalilzad an answer:
yes.
Iran's Slow Play
As we have discussed many times, Iraq has been Iran's obsession. It is an
obsession rooted in ancient history; the Bible speaks of the struggle between
Babylon and Persia for regional hegemony. It has some of its roots in more
recent history as well: Iran lost about 300,000 people, with about 1 million
more wounded and captured, in its 1980-88 war with Iraq. That would be the
equivalent of more than 1 million dead Americans and an additional 4 million
wounded and captured. It is a staggering number. Nothing can be understood
about Iran until the impact of this war is understood. The Iranians, then, came
out of the war with two things: an utter hatred of Saddam Hussein and his
regime, and determination that this sort of devastation should never happen
again.
After the United States decided, in Desert Storm, not to move on to Baghdad and
overthrow the Hussein regime -- and after the catastrophic failure of the
Shiite rising in southern Iraq -- the Iranians established a program of covert
operations that was designed to increase their control of the Shiite population
in the south. The Iranians were unable to wage war against Hussein but were
content, after Desert Storm, that he could not attack Iran. So they focused on
increasing their influence in the south and bided their time. They could not
take out Hussein, but they still wanted someone to do so. That someone was the
Americans.
Iran responded to the 9/11 attacks in a predictable manner. First, Iran was as
concerned by al Qaeda as the United States was. The Iranians saw themselves as
the vanguard of revolutionary Islam, and they did not want to see their place
usurped by Wahhabis, whom they viewed as the tool of another regional rival,
Saudi Arabia. Thus, Tehran immediately offered U.S. forces the right to land,
at Iranian airbases, aircraft that were damaged during operations in
Afghanistan. Far more important, the Iranians used their substantial influence
in western and northern Afghanistan to secure allies for the United States.
They wanted the Taliban gone. This is not to say that some al Qaeda operatives,
having paid or otherwise induced regional Iranian commanders, didn't receive
some sanctuary in Iran; the Iranians would have given sanctuary to Osama bin
Laden if that would have neutralized him. But Tehran's policy was to oppose al
Qaeda and the Taliban, and to quietly support the United States in its war
against them. This was no stranger, really, than the Americans giving anti-tank
missiles to Khomeini in the 1980s.
But the main chance that Iran saw was getting the Americans to invade Iraq and
depose their true enemy, Saddam Hussein. The United States was not led to
invade Iraq by the Iranians -- that would be too simple a model. However, the Iranians,
with their excellent intelligence network in Iraq, helped to smooth the way for
the American decision. Apart from providing useful tactical information, the
Iranians led the Americans to believe three things:
1. That Iraq did have weapons of mass destruction programs.
2. That the Iraqis would not resist U.S. operations and would greet the
Americans as liberators.
3. By omission, that there would be no post-war resistance in Iraq.
Again, this was not decisive, but it formed an important part of the analytical
framework through which the Americans viewed Iraq.
The Iranians wanted the United States to defeat Hussein. They wanted the United
States to bear the burden of pacifying the Sunni regions of Iraq. They wanted
U.S. forces to bog down in Iraq so that, in due course, the Americans would
withdraw -- but only after the Sunnis were broken -- leaving behind a Shiite
government that would be heavily influenced by Iran. The Iranians did
everything they could to encourage the initial engagement and then stood by as
the United States fought the Sunnis. They were getting what they wanted.
Counterplays and Timing
What they did not count on was American flexibility. >From the first battle
of Al Fallujah onward, the United States engaged in negotiations with the Sunni
leadership. The United States had two goals: one, to use the Sunni presence in
a new Iraqi government to block Iranian ambitions; and two, to split the Sunnis
from the jihadists. It was the very success of this strategy, evident in the
December 2005 elections, that caused Iraqi Shia to move away from the Iranians
a bit, and, more important, caused the jihadists to launch an anti-Shiite
rampage. The jihadists' goal was to force a civil war in Iraq and drive the
Sunnis back into an unbreakable alliance with them.
In other words, the war was not going in favor of either the United States or
Iran. The Americans were bogged down in a war that could not be won with
available manpower, if by "victory" we mean breaking the
Sunni-jihadist will to resist. The Iranians envisioned the re-emergence of
their former Baathist enemies. Not altogether certain of the political
commitments or even the political savvy of their Shiite allies in Iraq, they
could now picture their worst nightmare: a coalition government in which the
Sunnis, maneuvering with the Kurds and Americans, would dominate an Iraqi
government. They saw Tehran's own years of maneuvering as being in jeopardy.
Neither side could any longer be certain of the outcome.
In response, each side attempted, first, to rattle the other. Iran's nuclear
maneuver was designed to render the Americans more forthcoming; the assumption
was that a nuclear Iran would be more frightening, from the American point of
view, than a Shiite Iraq. The Americans held off responding and then, a few
weeks ago, began letting it be known that not only were airstrikes against Iran
possible, but that in fact they were being seriously considered and that
deadlines were being drawn up.
This wasn't about nuclear weapons but about Iraq, as both sides made clear when
the talks were announced. Both players now have all their cards on the table.
Iran bluffed nukes, the United States called the bluff and seemed about to
raise. Khalilzad's request for talks was still on the table. The Iranians took
it. This was not really done in order to forestall airstrikes -- the Iranians
were worried about that only on the margins. What Iran had was a deep concern
and an interesting opportunity.
The concern was that the situation in Iraq was spinning out of its control. The
United States was no longer predictable, the Sunnis were no longer predictable,
and even the Iranians' Shiite allies were not playing their proper role. The
Iranians were playing for huge stakes in Iraq and there were suddenly too many
moving pieces, too many things that could go wrong.
The Iranians also saw an opportunity. Bush's political position in the United
States had deteriorated dramatically. As it deteriorated, his room for maneuver
declined. The British had made it clear that they were planning to leave Iraq.
Bush had really not been isolated before, as his critics always charged, but
now he was becoming
isolated -- domestically as well as internationally. Bush needed badly to
break out of the political bind he was in. The administration had resisted
pressure to withdraw troops under a timetable, but it no longer was clear
whether Congress would permit Bush to continue to resist. The president did not
want his hands tied by Congress, but it seemed to the Iranians that was exactly
what was happening.
>From the Iranian point of view, if ever a man has needed a deal, it is Bush. If
there are going to be any negotiations, they are to happen now. From Bush's
point of view, he does need a deal, but so do the Iranians -- things are
ratcheting out of control from Tehran's point of view as well. For domestic
Iraqi players, the room to maneuver is increasing, while the room to maneuver
for foreign players is decreasing. In other words, the United States and Iran
have, for the moment, the unified interest of managing Iraq, rather than seeing
a civil war or a purely domestic solution.
The Next Phase of the Game
The Iranians want at least to Finlandize Iraq. During the Cold War, the Soviets
did not turn Finland into a satellite, but they did have the right to veto
members of its government, to influence the size and composition of its
military and to require a neutral foreign policy. The Iranians wanted more, but
they will settle for keeping the worst of the Baathists out of the government
and for controls over Iraq's international behavior. The Americans want a
coalition government within the limits of a Finlandic solution. They do not
want a purely Shiite government; they want the Sunnis to deal with the
jihadists, in return for guaranteed Sunni rights in Iraq. Finally, the United
States wants the right to place a force in Iraq -- aircraft and perhaps 40,000
troops -- outside the urban areas, in the west. The Iranians do not really want
U.S. troops so close, so they will probably argue about the number and the
type. They do not want to see heavy armored units but can live with lighter
units stationed to the west.
Now obviously, in this negotiation, each side will express distrust and
indifference. The White House won the raise by expressing doubts as to Tehran's
seriousness; the implication was that the Iranians were buying time to work on
their nukes. Perhaps. But the fact is that Tehran will work on nukes as and
when it wants, and Washington will destroy the nukes as and when it wants. The
nukes are non-issues in the real negotiations.
There are three problems now with negotiations. One is Bush's ability to keep
his coalition intact while he negotiates with a member of the "axis of
evil." Another is Iran's ability to keep its coalition together while it
negotiates with the "Great Satan." And third is the ability of either
to impose their collective will on an increasingly self-reliant Iraqi polity.
The two major powers are now ready to talk. What is not clear is whether, even
together, they will be in a position to impose their will on the Iraqis. The
coalitions will probably hold, and the Iraqis will probably submit. But those
are three "probablies." Not good.
All wars end in negotiations. Clearly, the United States and Iran have been
talking quietly for a long time. They now have decided it is time to make their
talks public. That decision by itself indicates how seriously they both take
these conversations now.
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