</x-tad-bigger>An interesting mathematical exercise is to check the CIA World Factbook entry for Iraq (https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/iz.html). Here we find that the population of the country is 26,783,383, and the death rate is 5.37 deaths/1,000 population (5.5, according to the Lancet). Now, if we multiply the death rate by the population, we get 143826.8 deaths per year. If we then multiply this annual death toll times 4 (approximately the duration of US-Iraq hostilities to date), we get 575307.07 - quite close to the 650,000 figure that is met with such disbelief in some areas.
Now, I know that a number of different criticisms can be leveled at my fairly simplistic formula. And, I realize that it is not very precise. But, I think it lends quite a bit of credence to the 650,000 figure from the Lancet article.
On Oct 12, 2006, at 1:43 PM, Karen Watters Cole wrote:
<x-tad-bigger>In case anyone is interested, here is the full report in The Lancet, a pdf of 8 pages </x-tad-bigger><x-tad-bigger>http://www.thelancet.com/webfiles/images/journals/lancet/s0140673606694919.pdf</x-tad-bigger>
<x-tad-bigger> </x-tad-bigger>
<x-tad-bigger>with this extracted:</x-tad-bigger>
<x-tad-bigger> </x-tad-bigger>
<x-tad-bigger>The crude mortality rate in the pre-invasion period was 5·5 per 1000 people per year (95% CI 4·3–7·1) and for the overall post-invasion period was 13·3 per 1000 people per year</x-tad-bigger><x-tad-bigger> (10·9–16·1; table 3). A four-fold increase in the crude mortality rate was recorded during the study period, with a high of 19·8 per 1000 people per year (14·6–26·7) between June, 2005, and June, 2006 (figure 2 and table 3).</x-tad-bigger>
<x-tad-bigger> </x-tad-bigger>
<x-tad-bigger>Post-invasion excess mortality rates showed much the same escalating trend, rising from 2·6 per 1000 people per year (0·6–4·7) above the baseline rate in 2003 to 14·2 per 1000 people per year (8·6–21·5) in 2006 (figure 2 and table 3). Excess mortality is attributed mainly to an increase in the violent death rate; however, an increase in the non-violent death rate was noted in the later part of the post-invasion period (2005–06). The post-invasion non-violent excess mortality rate was 0·7 per 1000 people per year (–1·2 to 3·0).</x-tad-bigger>
<x-tad-bigger> </x-tad-bigger>
<x-tad-bigger>Violent deaths that were directly attributed to coalition forces or to air strikes were classified as coalition violent deaths. In many other cases the responsible party was not known, or the households were hesitant to specifically identify them. </x-tad-bigger><x-tad-bigger>Deaths attributable to the coalition accounted for 31%</x-tad-bigger><x-tad-bigger> (95% CI 26–37) </x-tad-bigger><x-tad-bigger>of post-invasion violent deaths</x-tad-bigger><x-tad-bigger>. The proportion of violent deaths attributable to the coalition was much the same across periods (p=0·058). However, the actual number of violent deaths, including those that resulted from coalition forces, increased every year after the invasion.</x-tad-bigger>
<x-tad-bigger> </x-tad-bigger>
<x-tad-bigger>Deaths in men of military age, defined as 15–44 years of age, were disproportionately high and accounted for 59% (52–65) of post-invasion violent deaths, despite this subgroup accounting for only 24·4% of the Iraqi population</x-tad-bigger><x-tad-bigger>.16 No difference in the proportion of violent deaths in men of military age was noted between deaths attributed to the coalition or other/unknown sources (p=0·168). Mortality rates by Governorate are shown in figure 3.</x-tad-bigger>
<x-tad-bigger> </x-tad-bigger>
<x-tad-bigger> </x-tad-bigger>
<x-tad-bigger> </x-tad-bigger>
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