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Dear Pres. Bush: If you
are having trouble getting the Canadians
on board, maybe you should think about how and what you are saying! Below, the former Carter National Security Advisor candidly assesses
what the US should do to keep its image as Global Sheriff from becoming Global
Bully. Straight talk from a
well-respected analyst who has not been compromised by catering to private
clients with a conflict of interest, a la Kissinger. Also see ZB’s comments on PBS Monday, Jan 27 after the Blix Report at
the UN, either by video or transcript, The Road Ahead @ http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/jan-june03/brzezinski_1-27.html Summary: Brzenzinsky says
the US should Walk Softly and carry a Big Stick, not Carry a Big Stick and Scream Loudly. - Karen Watters Cole The End Game
By Zbigniew Brzezinsky in the Asian Wall Street Journal; New York, N.Y.; Dec 24, 2002; Page: A7 WASHINGTON -The negative
reaction generated by Baghdad's report to the U.N. suggests that the issue of
concealed Iraqi weapons is likely to come to a head in the next four weeks or
so. Given that, it is more
essential than ever that the U.S. does everything that it can to reinforce the
credibility of its position. That the U.S. is acting with
determination can no longer be in any doubt. The U.S. troop deployments and active preparations for an
early war speak louder than words.
At the same time, since the beginning of the crisis back in August, the
words that U.S. officials have been using have been rhetorically harsh and
belligerent. Indeed, carrying a big stick while shouting loudly has created a
widespread impression-though more abroad than at home-that the U.S. is actually
eager for a war for reasons sometimes openly stated and sometimes deliberately
obscured. As a result, there is less conviction that U.S. determination is matched by U.S. deliberation. Public opinion
polls show that in many countries America is seen as bent on war, with the Bush
administration using the issue of disarmament as a cover for its desire to
crush a regime that has been troublesome in the region and is viewed in the
U.S., in Britain, and in Israel with special hostility. Large majorities in France,
Germany, Russia, and Turkey oppose war and even opinion in Britain is
split. Americans generally support
the use of force under the U.N. but not as
a unilateral and largely solitary American expedition. The public in those
countries that like America increasingly indicate that they do not like U.S.
policies, and especially its perceived
eagerness to go to war. In these circumstances, it is urgent that in the course of the immediate future the
U.S. conducts itself in a manner that convinces much of the world that the firm American stand on
Iraq continues to deserve international support. That is so because ultimately at stake in this crisis is
neither Saddam Hussein nor even Iraq. In the final analysis, neither poses an imminent
threat to the global community nor to the U.S. itself. As U.S. President
George W. Bush correctly said on Sept.
12, "the threat is grave and
gathering," but not immediate. At stake in this crisis is the
legitimacy of American global leadership and
the evolution of an increasingly secure
international system. How Iraq is compelled to respect international rules will set precedents for dealing
effectively elsewhere, too, with the twin dangers of proliferation and
terrorism. Without a globally legitimate American leadership that generates the needed determination for collective action based on U.S. power, and without the deliberation that the exercise of such leadership requires, the world is likely to gradually degenerate into increasing
violence, similar to the law of the jungle. Much thus depends on the manner in which the Iraqi challenge
is resolved. Some outcomes to the
Iraq crisis will enhance global security.
But some will not. Three basic outcomes can be envisaged: a.. The Iraqi regime will
eventually comply, satisfying in the eyes of both the U.N. and the U.S. the
twin operative requirements imposed on it by the U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1441: no "false statements or omissions" regarding its
weapons programs, and "full cooperation" in the resolution's
implementation. b.. The Iraqi regime will not
comply to the satisfaction of the U.N. as well as the U.S. Hence, military action under the aegis
of the U.N. will ensue, and the Iraqi regime will be removed by force. c.. The U.N. and the U.S. will
reach differing conclusions, and the U.S. will then undertake military action
against Iraq largely on its own, though with some international support. Clearly, the first two outcomes
will enhance the ability of the international system to act in concert against
similar threats elsewhere. That is
particularly important because of the intensifying defiance of North Korea and its self-proclaimed
determination to acquire a growing nuclear arsenal. In some respects, that
issue is even more urgent than Iraq. The third outcome has fewer such
benefits, entails potentially higher political costs, runs the risks of
stronger anti-American reactions both in the Middle East and in Europe, and is
more likely to leave America holding the bag during the possibly painful and expensive aftermath of the
war. Last but not least, for the U.S. to punish Iraq
for its defiance of the U.N. while itself defying the U.N. could turn out to be
a historically pyrrhic victory. Those who so fervently favor the
third alternative do so because their agenda is not Iraq's disarmament but
regime change. They also discount
the long-range importance of setting a precedent for effective and collective
international action to deal with challenges to global security. Their exaggerated view of American
power leads them to confuse preponderance
with omnipotence, and their failure to recognize that distinction could set in motion dynamics that could prove dangerous to the
long-term durability of America's global leadership. It follows that if the third
outcome can be avoided, every effort should be exerted to make that
happen. During the next several weeks,
it will be formally up to Iraq to prove that it has complied. But the U.S. can also do its part in
ensuring that world public opinion in general, and the Security Council in particular, stand fast in insisting either that compliance by Iraq be genuine
or that collectively authorized use of force be decisively applied. Global consensus on behalf of a
winning formula is less likely to be forthcoming if the U.S. seems to rule out the
first of the three possible outcomes.
Belligerent and impatient rhetoric, especially if war has to come, is simply counterproductive world-wide and even at home. And a rush to war
is hard to justify. Mr. Brzezinski, national
security adviser under President Carter, is author of "The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its
Geostrategic Imperatives"
(Basic Books, 1997). |
