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This could be subtitled Hazardous Duty. More historical comparisons from a rumored presidential candidate. Or why you cannot compare post-war
Japan to a post-war Iraq. - KWC Excerpts:
OCCUPATION: No Model for This One
By Wesley
K. Clark, Sunday, March 23, 2003 @ http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A8221-2003Mar21.html 1…No wonder many are
searching for the
next MacArthur,
someone to deal with the problems of postwar Iraq. As a model for regime
change, it is neater and nobler than the untidy task of sorting out bickering
Iraqi factions or relying on Iraqis with obscure or dubious intentions for
themselves and their country. And for an administration run by corporate
executives, there must be appeal in seeking a latter-day MacArthur to act as
Iraq's chief operating officer. Already last week retired Army Lt. Gen. Jay Garner, the military's director of postwar planning, arrived at a
Kuwaiti beachside resort with a large team from the Pentagon's newly created Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance. But the circumstances
of Japan and its transformation bear so little resemblance to those of
present-day Iraq that both the analogy and the pursuit of a new MacArthur are
off the mark. Almost nothing from the lessons of postwar Japan can be applied
directly to Iraq, and consequently, neither the approach nor the character of a
MacArthur are appropriate for the mission in Iraq. Just consider the facts. 2…But Japan was not at
odds with itself.
It possessed the raw
material for postwar reconstruction: an educated, industrious population; some
surviving infrastructure; and modern industrial experience. Imperial Japan was also largely free of the problems of
large, restive minorities. Twelve years of severe military indoctrination had
united the entire population behind the "holy war." Defeat, when it came, was palpable, complete and
unquestioned.
As a string of
islands, Japan had a strategic buffer from its neighbors. Disputes about
Okinawa and the Kuriles weren't enough to foment the kind of territorial
struggles so common elsewhere. Literacy was high, and the culture valued hard
work and discipline. 3…When it came time
for rebuilding, most of the work, from design through laying the final level of
concrete, was done by the Japanese themselves, using Japanese resources
mobilized under a new government, a new currency and a new economic structure.
Japan eventually formed new armed services specifically equipped for and
constitutionally devoted to self-defense only. Almost none of those conditions will be
present in post-Saddam Iraq.
The country may have
been diminished by years of sanctions and low-level conflict, and will have
suffered military defeat, but strong groups appear ready to contest authority
with the American force. This country has never had a unified national identity
-- even under the Ottomans it was three distinct provinces. Ethnic and
religious animosities have been fueled by the mechanics of Saddam Hussein's
repression. Important regional cultures, wealth to be divided, and the need to
resist or appease meddlesome neighbors threaten to tear Iraq apart. Iraq's long borders
also present challenges. Its Islamic neighbors are anxious to compete for Iraqi
loyalties. The Saudis and the Iranians will each be pulling separately, to say
nothing of independent charities, some dedicated to fostering the kind of
militant fundamentalism that is the source of America's troubles in the region.
And while neither Saudi oil money nor Iranian fundamentalism are quite the
forces that they were a decade ago, the international network of terror and
mobile bands of experienced, hardened fighters are more challenging to the
conventional tools of statecraft and peacekeeping than anything MacArthur
faced. Iraq has no emperor to lend authority and
cover for an American regent, who could be trapped in contradictions of our own
making. Espousing self-determination for the
Iraqi people, he will have to make decisions, order actions and implement
changes himself. Each step will bring new winners and new losers. By
establishing the institutions of democracy, such as a free press, he will be
criticized as an infidel outsider. The American commander will preach the
virtues of freedom of religion, while making sure that the mosques do not
become 4…Meanwhile, in the
United States, there will always be the impatience of the public, the intensive
scrutiny of the international media and the parsimony imposed by competing
budget and political requirements. The
administration talks of a two-year transition to Iraqi rule. MacArthur spent
51/2 years in Japan. Finally, there is no
five-star MacArthur today -- and maybe that's for the best. We have many highly
capable, well-educated generals -- and Jay Garner is one of the best -- but
none of them alone can "do a MacArthur" and shouldn't try. The search
for such a figure is escapism, a desire to turn over responsibilities to
someone, give him a title -- and few resources -- and hope the problems go
away. Isn't this the height of wishful thinking? It would be far better
to recognize, as many are belatedly doing, that victory in Iraq will come not
from fighting alone but rather from what happens afterward. And for this we must gather legitimacy from institutions such
as the United Nations and NATO. We will need a substantial international military presence
there for years. We need resources to rebuild the state structures of Iraq with
new faces and skills. And we must exercise the patience to allow democracy to
emerge slowly.
Above all, we must not
use our presence in Iraq as a launching pad for self-glorification, imperial
pretenses or further expeditions but as an opportunity to strengthen the
international institutions that we have spent more than 50 years developing and
nourishing. Retired Army Gen.
Wesley Clark served as commander in chief, U.S. Southern Command and later as
supreme allied commander in Europe during the war in Kosovo. |
