On the failure of liberal democracy and the rise of China’s way

Eric Li

https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2021/12/08/eric-li-on-the-failure-of-liberal-democracy-and-the-rise-of-chinas-way

ALARM BELLS are ringing about the state of democracy. Freedom House proclaims 
the “global decline in democracy has accelerated” and that even in America it 
has “declined significantly”. Much of the weakening is happening in countries 
that are aligned with America, according to research by the V-Dem Institute in 
Sweden. Larry Diamond, a political sociologist, argues that the “democratic 
recession” has reached a “crisis”, intensified by the pandemic. There are many 
diagnoses. Francis Fukuyama, a political scientist, believes the American 
government is captured by elites and the public is divided by cultural 
identities. And then there are those who always reach for the easy answer, 
blaming China and Russia. 



On the other side of the spectrum, democracy’s sceptics are enjoying a moment 
of Schadenfreude. Russia’s foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, recently criticised 
the West’s failed attempts to “enforce democracy” on other countries whose 
cultures were ill fitted for such political systems and called on them to stop. 
Kishore Mahbubani, a Singaporean diplomat and scholar, believes America has in 
some ways “all the attributes of a failed state.” A decade ago even I weighed 
in, arguing that China’s model is superior to the West—a smug way of saying 
democracy is doomed.

Yet these pronouncements miss the mark because they share a flawed definition 
of democracy. To be more precise, they mistakenly equate liberalism with 
democracy, thereby rendering liberal democracy the only form of democratic 
governance. This is wrong.

In 1992, at the end of the cold war and beginning of a golden era for liberal 
democracy’s universalisation, Lord Bhikhu Parekh, a political theorist, wrote 
in an essay, “The Cultural Particularity of Liberal Democracy”, that “liberal 
democracy is liberalised democracy: that is, democracy defined and structured 
within the limits set by liberalism.” This combination, he noted, was 
crystallised around the 18th century in Europe and was widely championed in 
practice by the West only after the second world war as a way of opposing the 
Soviet Union. Democracy itself, in its earliest Western incarnation in ancient 
Greece, long preceded liberalism. 



Moreover, in combination, liberalism was the dominant partner and democracy was 
subjugated. In fact, liberalism was hostile to democracy. The development of 
liberal institutions over the past two to three centuries has in many ways 
consisted of attempts at limiting the power of democracy. If we are to be 
historically accurate and intellectually honest, we need to recognise that 
liberal democracy is but one kind of democracy. 

During the European Enlightenment, liberal thinkers such as Locke, Montesquieu 
and Mill proposed revolutionary ideas about how human societies should be 
governed based on the tenets of liberalism, such as the individual as the 
fundamental unit of society, the sanctity of private property and the primacy 
of procedural rule of law. Most modern liberal political institutions were 
developed with these ideas—representative government based on elections, 
separation of powers, freedom of the press, an independent judiciary and so on. 
They are fundamental to America’s constitution and to most other liberal 
societies. 

But at the same time, many liberal forefathers also recognised that the goal of 
liberal institutions is to deliver happiness to the people. If that outcome is 
not met, procedures must be changed. According to Mill, even access to voting 
could be curtailed, say, if a citizen were illiterate.

Liberal democracy had enormous successes, notably in the second half of the 
20th century. During that period, liberal democratic countries delivered 
unprecedented prosperity to their people—so much so that many countries, 
including China, sought to emulate many of the West’s practices, such as market 
economics. However when groups like Freedom House and V-Dem rank countries on 
their levels of democracy, it in essence measures countries on how closely they 
follow liberal institutional procedures. When people say democracy is receding 
in many countries, they really mean liberalism is in trouble. 

Why is liberalism in bad shape? The reason is that in many places it seems to 
be failing its junior partner—democracy. Liberal democracy is in crisis mode 
because so many of these countries face severe problems: persistent inequality, 
political corruption, collapse of social cohesion, lack of trust in government 
and elite institutions, and incompetent government. In short, liberalism has 
been failing to deliver democratic outcomes. 

In the Soviet Union there was a popular joke: “We pretend to work, they pretend 
to pay us.” In many liberal societies, people can turn that around: “We pretend 
to vote, they pretend to govern.” At this rate, the word “liberal” may soon no 
longer deserve to be followed by “democracy”.



A broader view of governance

The world needs a better and more inclusive way of evaluating democracy. 
Defining and measuring democracy by liberal procedures is way too 
narrow—historically, conceptually and under contemporary conditions. In ancient 
Greece, when democracy was first practised in the West, democratic politics was 
rather illiberal. There was no concept of individual or minority rights. That 
was why Plato and Aristotle—no democrats, both—criticised its majoritarian 
nature. Elections were not the only way of selecting leaders. 
Sortition—choosing leaders by lottery—was widely practised and fit Aristotle’s 
definition of democracy.

In the contemporary West, populist movements from the right and socialist 
activism on the left seem to be, at least in part, attempts to hold liberalism 
accountable for not delivering on outcomes. Looking at democracy anew is no 
easy task and will no doubt take a lot of work and debate. But I venture to 
propose a common-sense idea: let’s measure democracy not by procedures but by 
outcomes.

Democracy’s normative goal must be to deliver satisfaction to a vast majority 
of people over a long period. What good are elections if they keep producing 
poor leaders with the public stuck in perpetual cycles of “elect and regret”? 
What good is an independent judiciary if it only protects the rich? What good 
is separation of powers if it is captured by special interests to block 
necessary reforms? What good is freedom of the press, or freedom of speech for 
that matter, if it corrodes societies with division and dysfunction? What good 
are individual rights if they result in millions of avoidable deaths, as has 
happened in many liberal democracies during the pandemic?

In its attempt to challenge a rising China, America’s president, Joe Biden, 
frames this competition as a starkly ideological dichotomy of democracy versus 
autocracy. With that in mind, the administration is hosting a gathering of 
democracies on December 9th and 10th, to which some 110 countries or regions 
invited. A review shows that these 111 places (with the US included) consist of 
around 56% of the world’s population but had cumulative covid-19 deaths of 
4.2m, which is 82% of the world’s total. More glaringly, the three countries 
with the highest deaths are the host country (780,000), which boasts of being 
the oldest democracy, Brazil (615,000) and India (470,000), which relishes 
being the largest democracy.

As for the seeming target of the gathering, China, it has 1.4bn people and just 
5,697 deaths from covid-19.

Some may object that this was because China restricted freedoms more than 
“democracies”. But what kind of democracy would sacrifice millions of lives for 
some individuals’ freedom not to wear masks? It is precisely in this way that 
liberal democracy is failing its citizens.

Perhaps it is possible to develop a set of measurements that show which 
countries are generating more democratic outcomes. How satisfied are most 
people with their countries’ leadership and directions? How cohesive is 
society? Are people living better than before? Are people optimistic about 
their future? Is society as a whole investing enough to ensure the well-being 
of future generations? Beyond the narrow and procedural-centric liberal 
definition of democracy, outcomes must be taken into consideration when we 
define and evaluate democracies.

I would suggest that when it comes to outcomes, China doesn’t score so badly. 
The country has its problems—inequality, corruption and environmental 
degradation to name a few. But the government has been tackling them 
aggressively. 

This is probably why a vast majority of Chinese people tell pollsters that they 
are generally satisfied with how the country is being governed. Can we at least 
now entertain the idea that China is generating more productive and democratic 
outcomes for its people and, measured by these concrete results, its political 
system is more democratic than that of the United States, albeit different, at 
the moment?

Abraham Lincoln characterised democracy in the most eloquent layman’s term: 
government of the people, by the people, for the people. I dare say that the 
current Chinese government outperforms America on all three. Chinese people 
overwhelmingly believe their government belongs to them and they live in a 
democracy; and it is a fact that a vast majority of China’s political leaders 
come from ordinary backgrounds. Quite to the contrary, many Americans seem to 
believe that their government is captured by monied interests and formed by an 
elite oligarchy. As for the last part, “for the people”, China is way ahead on 
outcomes.

The world needs greater diversity in the concept of democracy that is both 
historically truer (because democracy was not always liberal) and practically 
more beneficial. Many developing countries have seen their economic growth 
stagnate. They need to be unshackled from the ideological rigidity of the 
liberal doctrine and to experiment with their own ways of realising their 
democratic potential. New perspectives and measurements might help liberal 
societies as well. 

Decoupling liberal democracy

For too long, liberalism has monopolised the concept of democracy and liberals 
have taken their democratic credentials for granted. This may be one cause for 
why many liberal governments are failing to deliver democratic outcomes for 
their people. Being measured not on procedures but on actual performance may be 
just the spur for liberal countries to implement much-needed reforms. If 
liberal governments could again deliver more democratic outcomes, so much the 
better for the world. 

This perspective, on the need to judge democracy by its outcomes, is rarely 
discussed in global debates over governance. Liberal societies champion 
diversity in just about everything except for diversity in models of democracy, 
even at a conceptual level. But the reality is that the history of democratic 
aspirations and practices has been immensely rich and diverse. Besides Athenian 
democracy being decidedly not liberal, there were centuries of democratic 
ideals and institutional practices in China’s Confucian tradition—also not 
liberal. At this point in time, the world is certainly in need of more 
democratic experiments. 



I am not attempting to advocate any particular form of democracy, and certainly 
am not making a case for majoritarian or direct democracy—which China is 
definitely not. Rather, I am proposing to broaden and pluralise both the 
definition and measurements of democracy. China’s current socialist democracy 
is surely a model worthy of study given the country’s obvious successes.

The American foreign-policy thinker Anne-Marie Slaughter recently argued that 
the United States should “accept at least the possibility that other forms of 
government could be better.” She further suggested, as a new measure of 
governance, that people evaluate which countries are doing a good job at 
achieving the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals. 

It is a great idea. And the broader point needs to be amplified: end 
liberalism’s monopoly on democracy—and let more forms of democracy flourish.

-- 
Anda menerima pesan ini karena Anda berlangganan grup "GELORA45" dari Google 
Grup.
Untuk berhenti berlangganan dan berhenti menerima email dari grup ini, kirim 
email ke [email protected].
Untuk melihat diskusi ini di web, kunjungi 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/gelora1945/0D0EF8164BEF45CAB5CA9BE33325B9F5%40A10Live.

Reply via email to