Tulisan ini bagus, terima kasih telah mem-posting bung Djie. Memang benar kelihatan sekali para demonstran itu terlalu naive menganggap para pemimpin negara akan melihat ketulusan mereka "... harbored the illusion that their national leaders would recognize their patriotism and their high morals, talk with them, take their concerns as legitimate, and deal with the issues they were raising." Mereka terlalu naive sehingga menjadi korban sia2 dan hanya bisa bersedih akibat pembantaian yang dilakukan para pemimpin negara yang ebih memilih mempertahankan kekuasaan dgn berbagai cara apapun biarpun itu mengorbankan rakyatnya sendiri "After June 4, students and their families mourned those who had been killed or injured. They also mourned the loss of hope that a more open, moral China would emerge in the near future." ---In [email protected], <djiekh@...> wrote :
Tertarik dengan istilah bung Lin " ingusan", saya cari di bukuEzra F. Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China.Ini tulisannya di halaman 632 dan 633 :The Hothouse Generation and a postponement of Hope.The students and older intellectuals who took part in the 1989 demonstrations—like intellectuals throughout Chinese history—felt a deep sense of responsibility for the fate of their country. They were, however, a hothouse generation, with little experience outside their schools and universities. Unlike the students of the late 1940s, they had not spent years building an organization to attain power. Unlike the students of the early 1980s, they had not been tempered by political campaigns, struggles during the Cultural Revolution, or work in the countryside. They were the ablest students of their generation, but they had been tested by examinations instead of experiences—they were the sheltered beneficiaries of academic reform in the best middle schools and universities of the country. Moreover, these students had grown up at a time in Chinese history that offered no space for independent political activists to organize and test their ideas. The demonstrators were not members of political organizations, but a part of crowds with changing leaders and loosely affiliated participants. Those who rose to take high positions in the movement did so not by displaying superior judgment and strategic planning, but through their spontaneous oratory and bravado. Those who remained in the square harbored the illusion that their national leaders would recognize their patriotism and their high morals, talk with them, take their concerns as legitimate, and deal with the issues they were raising. 58 This hothouse student generation resembled Sun Yat-sen's description of China in the 1920s: like a sheet of loose sand. Zhao Ziyang's opponents blamed him for inciting the students and directing their spears at Deng. Zhao's supporters, in turn, blamed his rivals for provoking the students to embarrass Zhao. Both Zhao's supporters and his opponents may have tried to direct the student protestors, but in fact they had little ability to do so. The Chinese students marched to their own drummers. Even the students' own leaders could only incite the protesters gathered in the square, not control them. After June 4, students and their families mourned those who had been killed or injured. They also mourned the loss of hope that a more open, moral China would emerge in the near future. Student leaders, considering what to do after June 4, acknowledged to one another that they had been naïve in challenging the nation's leaders and in expecting them to give up their power. Students of this generation, as well as the following generations, took away from their tragic experience the lesson that direct confrontation with the leadership would likely cause a reaction so forceful that it was not worth the costs. The Chinese students after June 4, then, unlike their counterparts in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, stopped attacking the Communist Party. Many students came to believe that progress could only be achieved by slowly building a base, by improving the economic livelihood of more people, by improving people's understanding of public issues, and by gradually developing experience in democracy and freedom. Even some students who were not members of the Communist Party acknowledged that the leaders had been in danger of losing control over the country, and that only the party could maintain the stability necessary to promote economic growth. Many believed that despite the corrupt and self-serving officials, the Communist-led program that had brought about the reform and opening policies—and with them, the improved livelihood of the people—was preferable to any likely alternative. They hoped that after decades of stability and economic growth, a stronger base for a freer society could develop. In the meantime, the vast majority of student activists simply gave up promoting collective action and instead concentrated on pursuing their own careers.
