Inline.
Russ Housley wrote:
Tom:
...
Substantive comments:
1. Section 1.2 Design Considerations, second sentence. This sentence
is talking about a possible alternative design approach to protect the
data being sent. A concern over inappropriate dissemination is
expressed in the Security Considerations section of the draft.
The proposal in the Security Considerations section that the client
use discretion in sending the information is a half-hearted look at
the issue, since an attacker can view the SupplementalData in transit.
The authors may need to make up their minds whether exposure is an
issue or not.
I do not agree. The solution is not described will in
draft-santesson-tls-supp-00.txt, but the double handshake is the
solution. I have written a description of it in the security
considerations of draft-housley-tls-authz-extns-03.txt. I'm please to
include that text in this document if you believe it will help.
[PTT] Perhaps the second sentence of section 1.2 could be modified to
refer to the double handshake solution?
2. The protocol requires assignment of an extension type number to the
user_mapping extension. Similarly, a supplemental data type number
needs to be assigned to user_mapping_data. I suppose this can be left
to IANA to assign the next available number, since the numbering
sequence doesn't seem to have any protocol significance.
Leaving the number assignment to IANA is the usual practice.
[PTT] I see that has been added to the IANA Considerations section in
-05. I didn't realize -05 had come out, BTW -- must have misread some of
the messages that went by.
3. A literal reading of 2246bis section 4.3 suggests, based on the
upper bounds of the various data structures in section 3 of the
present document, that the user_mapping_data_list doesn't provide
enough space to hold even one instance of UserMappingData. Is such a
cavalier use of upper bounds normal TLS specification usage?
I think of these values as maximum buffer sizes. Take a look at
2246bis, and you will see many cases like this.
[PTT] OK
4. Is there any relationship between the value of user_principal_name
and the value of domain_name, if they are both present in the same
UpnDomainHint instance?
Text was added in draft-santesson-tls-ume-05.txt to address a similar
Last Call comment. It has already had many eyes look at it, so I hope
you are also satisfied.
[PTT] OK, I found it -- not quite where I expected, but it works.
5. In section 4, after the user_mapping extension has been negotiated,
the sending of the SupplementalData message is only a MAY. Is this the
intended strength?
Text was added in draft-santesson-tls-ume-05.txt to address a similar
Last Call comment. It has already had many eyes look at it, so I hope
you are also satisfied,
[PTT] I'll have to take your word for it -- I see no change.
6. In section 5, Security Considerations, there are two SHOULD bullets
for client behaviour. The first one raises a question in my mind that
may need additional text in draft-santesson-tls-supp-00.txt. The
question is: what is the behaviour expected of a server that receives
supplemental data of a type that has not been negotiated as an extension?
Good point. I suggest:
OLD:
If present, the SupplementalData handshake message MUST contain a
non-empty SupplementalDataEntry structure carrying data associated
with at least one defined SupplementalDataType. An explicit
agreement that governs presence of any supplemental data MUST be
concluded between client and server for each SupplementalDataType
using the TLS extensions in the client and server hello messages.
NEW:
If present, the SupplementalData handshake message MUST contain a
non-empty SupplementalDataEntry structure carrying data associated
with at least one defined SupplementalDataType. An explicit
agreement that governs presence of any supplemental data MUST be
concluded between client and server for each SupplementalDataType
using the TLS extensions in the client and server hello messages.
Receiving an unexpected SupplementalData handshake message
results in a fatal error, and the receiver MUST close the connection
with a fatal unexpected_message alert.
[PTT] Looks good.
7. Same bullets: any time a SHOULD is specified, the document should
also describe the exceptional case. When would a client send
supplemental data it has not negotiated? Isn't this a protocol
violation? What exception do you see for the second bullet?
Is this handled by the above text too?
[PTT] Still not sure why the first bullet is a SHOULD, given that the
above text implies a MUST.
Russ
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