Looks good to me.
Stefan Santesson wrote:
A few comments in line;
Stefan Santesson
Program Manager, Standards Liaison
Windows Security
-----Original Message-----
From: Tom-PT Taylor [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: den 13 april 2006 20:25
To: Russ Housley
Cc: Stefan Santesson; Ari Medvinsky; Joshua Ball; [email protected]
Subject: Re: Gen-ART review of draft-santesson-tls-ume-04.txt
Inline.
Russ Housley wrote:
Tom:
...
Substantive comments:
1. Section 1.2 Design Considerations, second sentence. This
sentence
is talking about a possible alternative design approach to protect
the
data being sent. A concern over inappropriate dissemination is
expressed in the Security Considerations section of the draft.
The proposal in the Security Considerations section that the client
use discretion in sending the information is a half-hearted look at
the issue, since an attacker can view the SupplementalData in
transit.
The authors may need to make up their minds whether exposure is an
issue or not.
I do not agree. The solution is not described will in
draft-santesson-tls-supp-00.txt, but the double handshake is the
solution. I have written a description of it in the security
considerations of draft-housley-tls-authz-extns-03.txt. I'm please
to
include that text in this document if you believe it will help.
[PTT] Perhaps the second sentence of section 1.2 could be modified to
refer to the double handshake solution?
2. The protocol requires assignment of an extension type number to
the
user_mapping extension. Similarly, a supplemental data type number
needs to be assigned to user_mapping_data. I suppose this can be
left
to IANA to assign the next available number, since the numbering
sequence doesn't seem to have any protocol significance.
Leaving the number assignment to IANA is the usual practice.
[PTT] I see that has been added to the IANA Considerations section in
-05. I didn't realize -05 had come out, BTW -- must have misread some
of
the messages that went by.
3. A literal reading of 2246bis section 4.3 suggests, based on the
upper bounds of the various data structures in section 3 of the
present document, that the user_mapping_data_list doesn't provide
enough space to hold even one instance of UserMappingData. Is such
a
cavalier use of upper bounds normal TLS specification usage?
I think of these values as maximum buffer sizes. Take a look at
2246bis, and you will see many cases like this.
[PTT] OK
4. Is there any relationship between the value of
user_principal_name
and the value of domain_name, if they are both present in the same
UpnDomainHint instance?
Text was added in draft-santesson-tls-ume-05.txt to address a
similar
Last Call comment. It has already had many eyes look at it, so I
hope
you are also satisfied.
[PTT] OK, I found it -- not quite where I expected, but it works.
5. In section 4, after the user_mapping extension has been
negotiated,
the sending of the SupplementalData message is only a MAY. Is this
the
intended strength?
Text was added in draft-santesson-tls-ume-05.txt to address a
similar
Last Call comment. It has already had many eyes look at it, so I
hope
you are also satisfied,
[PTT] I'll have to take your word for it -- I see no change.
[Stefan] There has been no new wording on this and the MAY is
intentional. E.g. If the extension exchange made it clear to the client
that none of the supplemental messages it intended to send are supported
by the server, then it may not send any.
6. In section 5, Security Considerations, there are two SHOULD
bullets
for client behaviour. The first one raises a question in my mind
that
may need additional text in draft-santesson-tls-supp-00.txt. The
question is: what is the behaviour expected of a server that
receives
supplemental data of a type that has not been negotiated as an
extension?
Good point. I suggest:
OLD:
If present, the SupplementalData handshake message MUST contain a
non-empty SupplementalDataEntry structure carrying data
associated
with at least one defined SupplementalDataType. An explicit
agreement that governs presence of any supplemental data MUST be
concluded between client and server for each SupplementalDataType
using the TLS extensions in the client and server hello messages.
NEW:
If present, the SupplementalData handshake message MUST contain a
non-empty SupplementalDataEntry structure carrying data
associated
with at least one defined SupplementalDataType. An explicit
agreement that governs presence of any supplemental data MUST be
concluded between client and server for each SupplementalDataType
using the TLS extensions in the client and server hello messages.
Receiving an unexpected SupplementalData handshake message
results in a fatal error, and the receiver MUST close the
connection
with a fatal unexpected_message alert.
[PTT] Looks good.
7. Same bullets: any time a SHOULD is specified, the document
should
also describe the exceptional case. When would a client send
supplemental data it has not negotiated? Isn't this a protocol
violation? What exception do you see for the second bullet?
Is this handled by the above text too?
[PTT] Still not sure why the first bullet is a SHOULD, given that the
above text implies a MUST.
[Stefan] You are correct. The SHOULD is an error and this is further
complicated by the fact that both bullets are sub-requirements of a
leading SHOULD statement. The first bullet is redundant as it is covered
in the protocol text as a MUST. I have made a proposal to remove it.
The proposal is:
OLD:
To avoid superfluously sending this information, two techniques
SHOULD be used to control its dissemination.
- The client SHOULD only send the UserMappingDataList in the
supplemental data message if it is agreed upon in the hello
message exchange, preventing the information from being sent
to a server that doesn't understand the User Mapping Extension.
- The client SHOULD further only send this information if the
server belongs to a domain to which the client intends to
authenticate using the UPN as identifier.
NEW:
To avoid superfluously sending this information, clients SHOULD
only send this information if the server belongs to a domain to
which the client intends to authenticate using the UPN as
identifier.
Russ
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