Hi Brian,
Thank you for your review. Sorry I have been busy on other subjects these
last few weeks and am only now getting around to replying.
--On September 21, 2009 10:34:33 AM +1200 Brian E Carpenter
<[email protected]> wrote:
Major issues:
-------------
I would have liked to see a bit more emphasis on privacy issues in the
Security Considerations. In particular, shouldn't there be a fairly
strong SHOULD obligation on clients to implement TLS and use it by
default? The way the text is written, a client running with no TLS and no
HTTP Basic authentication appears to be allowed.
There are cases where public address books (or a public address service)
can be used, and there is no absolute requirement that TLS be used in such
cases (or maybe the IESG has a requirement that no plain text whatsoever
can be sent in any protocol).
That said I would be OK with adding the following to the end of the first
paragraph in Security Considerations:
Clients SHOULD use TLS whenever possible.
Is that sufficient?
On the same lines,
Clients MAY choose to warn users when they create address data in a
public address book, copy or move address data into public address
books, or change access privileges in such a way as to expose address
data to unauthenticated users.
Why isn't that a SHOULD?
I am a little nervous about putting such a requirement on a client. First
of all, what does it really mean to "warn" a user? An alert, an icon, a
noise? Does it happen only the first time they do an action, or each time?
SHOULD seems a little strong when the nature of the warning is really going
to be implementation dependent.
That said, if there is consensus for this change, it may be necessary to
explain a little more what "warn" means.
--
Cyrus Daboo
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