On 24 October 2014 11:17, Dearlove, Christopher (UK) <[email protected]> wrote: > I am also not aware of a solution that overcomes this problem without > introducing different limitations, so it is a question of tradeoffs. This is > one point in that tradeoff space. If anyone has a clearly superior solution > that both avoids the need to trust an authority, and without introducing > other limitations, then there are many of us in the ad hoc network community > (and elsewhere, as just one example, to improve on 6507) who would like to > see it. Note that all of the previously specified options (in RFC 7182) rely > on keys shared by all participants, which is clearly weaker in some regards > (but acceptable to many, hence also a valid option).
It's fairly obvious that any entity that is trusted to assert identity can arbitrarily impersonate. But PKIX doesn't require that end entities share private keying material with certification authorities. I'm not 100% clear on the architecture here, but I've inferred that participating nodes receive a private key from the trusted authority and a set of public keys for other trusted nodes. This could work equally well if the nodes were able to instead distribute their own public key to the authority. I'm OK with making revocation out of scope, but it's not particularly prominent, and that decision is a major constraint on the operational approach you need when deploying something like this. _______________________________________________ Gen-art mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/gen-art
