On 04:15 Fri 23 May , Hal Rosenstock wrote: > > > but now in IBA spec knowing a valid > > SM_Key is mandatory for privileged SA clients (which need to get whole > > list of MCMemberRecord, ServiceInfo, etc.). > > It's a grey area.
I don't see this as "grey" - spec is very clear about this sort of SA restrictions. > The issue is what the privileged SA clients should be > used for. It can be used for monitoring, SA DB sync/dump, debugging, etc.. > I think this use case allows much more common knowledge of the > management keys (in this case the SA key) as it will not just be the > network administrator using it and even if it were, the user would be > looking over his shoulder. A network administrator is not a little kid :) and this option is optional. Following your logic we will need to disable root passwords typing too. > That more common knowledge allows for a > malicious user to more easily compromise the subnet. There is nothing which could prevent from a malicious user to put things in the code. > A better approach to all these trust issues IMO is to use the OpenSM > console to support these types of operations. OpenSM console is not protected even by SM_Key. And what about diagnostics when other SMs are used? Sasha _______________________________________________ general mailing list [email protected] http://lists.openfabrics.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/general To unsubscribe, please visit http://openib.org/mailman/listinfo/openib-general
