On Sunday 16 July 2006 10:07, Josh Saddler wrote: >Daniel Drake wrote: >> Hi, >> >> The local root exploit-of-the-week would have been unable to run if our >> users systems had /proc mounted with nosuid and/or noexec >> >> It would be worthwhile considering making this a default. What are >> people's thoughts? >> >> Additional testing of this change would be appreciated (just ensure that >> nothing breaks). To do it as a one off: >> >> # mount -o remount,nosuid,noexec /proc >> >> To make it more permanent, /etc/fstab has: >> >> proc /proc proc defaults 0 0 >> >> Change to: >> >> proc /proc proc nosuid,noexec 0 0 > >Is there an open bug or security advisory for this exploit I missed? I tried > the CLI solution; works just fine here. No wild behavior so far. Any > suggestions on what to look for, or how to really hammer /proc? :)
There is bug #140444. -- Christian Heim <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Gentoo Linux Developer You're friendly kernel/vserver/openvz monkey
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