On Wed, Mar 25, 2020 at 1:19 PM Rich Freeman <[email protected]> wrote: >
> > Web tabs are fairly highly sandboxed in most browsers. Suffice it to > say something running in a web tab isn't going to be spying on your > process list/etc. > OK, fair enough. I would prefer a browser-only interface anyway, if possible (BTW: to your knowledge, does that apply to chrome (not chromium)? > An application can basically do absolutely anything you can do from a > shell unless you've done something to contain it. Running it in a > container would obviously be one way of containing it. Running it > under another UID would be another, though users can generally see all > the processes in the system and read any file that is world-readable. > > I'm not sure how the flatpak version of zoom that was mentioned > earlier is packaged. I believe flatpak is container-based, but I > haven't used it and I can't speak to how well-contained it actually > is, either in general or in its implementation of this particular > application. In theory they could make it very secure, but that > doesn't mean that they did. I'm checking Jitsi. Seems nicer than zoom. > > Oh, and keep in mind that X11 itself isn't the most secure piece of > software in existence. In particular any window on your desktop can > spy on the keyboard input into any other window on your desktop, > unless you're employing protective measures that nobody actually > employs outside of maybe pinentry (I haven't checked that one and I > forget if it is completely modal - as in you can't type in any other > x11 window while it is displayed). Right. I propose using a dedicated X session, in a VT other than the usual one. Having more than one X session alive is easy, at least for users of ligthweight stuff like openbox. Thanks for the input Jorge > > -- > Rich >
