Dear Ken, I'm pleased that you agree that at least the "applied" work is helpful. However, I'm not sure why you are so attached to the claim that there is nothing here of more theoretical interest.
(1) There is a distinction between theoretical and applied/practical ethics in the discipline of philosophy, and applied/practical ethics is a legitimate philosophical enterprise. However, I'm not enthusiastic about that distinction in general, and especially in this case. Partly this is because I'm not comfortable with the vision of the rest of us merely "applying" the works of Aristotle, Hume, etc., as if their works were simply hammers to pick out of our back pockets to hit things with. There is much more going on than that. (For example, even at the less radical end, one mainstream view is John Rawls' "reflective equilibrium" approach, where theory and practice are mutually informing, so that theory has sometimes to be adjusted in light of the cases. So, sometimes a new problem might cause us to revise or throw out some theory that previously seemed to be working well. Of course, this happens in physical science too.) (2) With all due respect, I'm not sure why you assume that the major figures of the past have given us all the theory we need to do the job. There is a substantial academic literature on this (for and against, but mainly against), both with respect to climate ethics in particular, and environmental ethics/environmental political theory much more generally. There are different disputes in different areas (some of which I named in my earlier email: e.g., global justice, intergenerational ethics, humanity's relationship to nature, scientific uncertainty), but I can't see that we'll get anywhere without confronting the arguments. (3) One thing that does seem clear to me is that the versions of the dominant theories prominent in the public realm - e.g., simple cost- benefit analysis, standard contract theories, the view that the value of nature is a matter of mere preference akin to a taste for gorgonzola - aren't up to it. I'm not convinced that the more sophisticated theoretical versions available are either, but this is only going to be sorted out through a serious and thorough engagement with those theories and the issues. I think that is partly what the Montana bibliography is trying to promote. In short, as a moral and political philosopher, I'm not very happy about going to the climate checkout armed only with our current ethical mathematics. Maybe it is true in principle that my old abacus would be up to the job if I really knew how to apply it. But that is a big "maybe", and even if it is true, I'm not sure that I know how, or can work it out quickly enough. I'm especially nervous about these new things called "derivatives" that my nephew keeps wanting to shove into the basket, and which no one seems to really understand yet. I'm told by the enthusiasts that they might protect me against escalating risk, but by others that they might make things much worse. I've also noticed that the people who will ultimately decide what they mean are the same ones who have done nothing so far to stop the risks escalating, and that this will give them unprecedented power over grocery buying and everything else. I'm not sure that we should get into the "derivatives" business at all; if we do get into it, I'm pretty sure that there's a lot at stake. I'm also worried that an important part of it has nothing to do with buying groceries. Best wishes, Steve Stephen Gardiner Ben Rabinowitz Endowed Professor of the Human Dimensions of the Environment University of Washington, Seattle (Currently Visiting Fellow at the Smith School of Enterprise and the Environment, Oxford University) On Apr 9, 2012, at 12:40 PM, Ken Caldeira wrote: It is clear to me that my conception of what constitutes 'philosophy' is different from both the popular conception and the conception of currently practicing academic philosophers. In my conception, philosophers of ethics develop theory and we all, when faced with moral problems, attempt to apply this theory in our moral reasoning. I drew the analogy with mathematics, where mathematicians develop theory and we all apply this theory when buying groceries. I am apparently the only person in this group that thinks this distinction between development and application of moral theory is worth maintaining. When I said that I saw nothing in geoengineering for moral philosophy, I meant that in the sense that I also see nothing in buying groceries for mathematicians (although I do not doubt that some mathematician will be inspired at the checkout line to develop new mathematical theory). I do believe that there is much in moral reasoning as developed by philosophers over the ages that can be applied to the moral problems posed by geoengineering. Call me obtuse, but nothing in this discussion has caused me to reassess the view I started out with: To me, a moral philosopher of geoengineering is like a mathematician of the grocery checkout line. _______________ Ken Caldeira Carnegie Institution Dept of Global Ecology 260 Panama Street, Stanford, CA 94305 USA +1 650 704 7212 [email protected] http://dge.stanford.edu/labs/caldeiralab @kencaldeira Currently visiting Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies (IASS) and Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Resarch (PIK) in Potsdam, Germany. On Mon, Apr 9, 2012 at 2:18 AM, [email protected] <[email protected]> wrote: Dear Ken, Like most of the others, I'm not much worried about whether or not geoengineering is "fundamentally new" in some technical sense. However, I would say that, much as we may love them, it is hard to argue that Aristotle, Hume, Kant, et al., have "already considered" the issues, if this is supposed to mean that they have *adequately addressed* the relevant questions. In my view, climate change brings together a large number of theoretical questions that we are not currently well equipped to handle - in areas such as global justice, intergenerational ethics, humanity's relationship to nature, scientific uncertainty, contingent persons, etc. Some sign of this comes with the difficulties faced by standard theories such as economic CBA, utilitarianism, contractarianism, and so on. So, there is lots of work to do. In general, my view is that there is an exciting emerging literature on these matters. The Montana bibliography is a very useful resource. Some of my own position is outlined in my recent book, A Perfect Moral Storm: The Ethical Challenge of Climate Change (Oxford, 2011), which includes a chapter on geoengineering. I've also written on the values of the Royal Society report on geoengineering, on Dale Jamieson's classic piece about whether climate change challenges our ethical concepts (my 'Is No One Responsible for Global Environmental Tragedy?'), and on whether Rawls has the theoretical resources to deal with climate change. These papers (and others) are available at: http://www.phil.washington.edu/POV/GardinerFormalPublicationList.htm I'd also recommend Allen Thompson and Jeremy Bendik-Keymer's new MIT collection on the ethics of adaptation (including material on ecological restoration and on geoengineering). Best wishes, Steve Stephen Gardiner Ben Rabinowitz Endowed Professor of the Human Dimensions of the Environment University of Washington, Seattle (Currently Visiting Fellow at the Smith School of Enterprise and the Environment, Oxford University) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "geoengineering" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to geoengineering [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/geoengineering?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "geoengineering" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/geoengineering?hl=en.
