Just to take the issue one step further, it has come up in the area of even doing field testing.
Let¹s suppose that we want to do a field test of the cloud brightening approach. The field test would be done at such a low level that it would not really generate present benefits (i.e., any significant counter-balancing of adverse impacts) for anyone, but let¹s suppose it might (though not clear how) cause some negative influence to some one‹say someone on an island out in the remote area where the test is being done. Let¹s also suppose that the field experiment would be expected to show that this approach could be used to counter-balance significant future climate change and in that way create a large net benefit (so, yes, some relatively limited negative impacts, but many, widespread benefits (or, at least, significant reductions in anticipated adverse impacts). So the question then arises, what if the present offended party objected to the experiment going forward because of negative impacts (or possible unknown consequences)? The net present effects of this experiment would be negative, but there would be great potential benefits in the future that would be foregone. In some sense, for the close-in direct consequences, this is likely not unlike the testing of new medicines, so there would be a need for informed consent and damages. While there may be precedents for the potential direct damages, a key question would be how to deal with the less well-defined unknowns and how does one consider the benefits of gaining knowledge about potentially achieving net benefits (so, yes, some damages) in the future. Pretty clearly, climate engineering will not go forward without testing, and testing raises the question of how to weigh/consider potential near-term negative consequences to gain confidence in an approach that would provide net benefits in the future. Basically, I would just suggest that we need to have social science consideration of both the issues arising around testing as well as for potential application. Mike On 2/21/13 9:28 AM, "David Morrow" <[email protected]> wrote: > Doug, > > Interesting question. I'd have to think about it more; it's probably more > complicated than it appears. (What isn't?) > > The basic issue is that on most ethical frameworks, one party may sometimes > have the right to insist that some other party refrain from harming them, even > when the latter party would benefit from doing so. To take a well-worn but > dramatic example, I have a right to insist that you refrain from harvesting my > organs, even if you were confident that doing so would save the lives of > several other people. I certainly don't need to compensate people for refusing > to give them my organs. The wrinkle is that this right may not apply when the > first party is responsible for the second party's distress -- and that may be > the case in your SRM scenario. Let us stipulate, for the sake of this > argument, that in virtue of their fossil fuel exports, Russia and Canada bear > some non-neglible responsibility for the climate change that some future > SRM-seeking states are trying to counteract. If Russia and Canada oppose SRM > because the warmer climate benefits them, they might not be able to defend > themselves by claiming that others have no right to harm them. If they blocked > SRM in that scenario, they might be obligated to compensate those who wanted > to use it. > > That's my initial response, anyway. Does that seem sensible? > > David > > > > On Wednesday, February 20, 2013 3:39:12 PM UTC-6, Doug MacMartin wrote: >> Agree that we all need to work together. Two quick comments: >> >> 1. Just want to reiterate to the non-physical-scientists that while it >> is quite plausible that some would be harmed by SRM (a trivial example being >> those who want to ship through the Arctic) it is premature to assume any >> specific harms from SRM, as it depends on the method, the amount, and how it >> is implemented (e.g. our Nature Climate Change paper indicating that some >> harms could be reduced by tailoring the distribution, along the lines of John >> & Stephen¹s observations that precip changes depend on where you do MCB.) >> And even if you specify everything, I would at least wait for GeoMIP analysis >> to understand a bit of model robustness. I only skimmed through, but I think >> Peter and Toby were reasonably careful to say ³could² most of the time rather >> than ³would² >> >> 2. This is a serious question, not a joke: is there an ethical >> framework to ask about compensation to those who would be harmed by blocking >> the use of SRM? I.e., in some hypothetical future scenario in which there >> was great confidence that many people could benefit from SRM, should those >> who don¹t want SRM compensate those who would likely be harmed by that >> decision? If not, why not? >> >> >> doug >> -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "geoengineering" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/geoengineering?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
