Mike

I agree completely with what you say which is why I am trying to get an everywhere-to-everywhere transfer function of the side-effects of cloud albedo control and why I am disappointed with the lack of enthusiasm being shown by the climate modelling people to try the coded modulation experiment described in the email I sent with my email of 20 February. It is almost as if they did not like to get ideas from electronics engineers, that they do not like being told that they are using the wrong colours and map projections to show their results and that it might be interesting to test spray variation according to the phases of the monsoons and the el Nino cycle, which they have not yet done.

You mentioned islands in a remote area. Such places are the most likely to be affected by rising seal levels and so we ought to think about levels of compensation for not having geo-engineering hardware ready for use if needed and not understanding all of its effects. I have already seen estimates of the costs of the droughts and the probability that they are the result on climate change. But it is not clear who is going to pay.

Stephen

Emeritus Professor of Engineering Design School of Engineering University of Edinburgh Mayfield Road Edinburgh EH9 3JL Scotland [email protected] Tel +44 (0)131 650 5704 Cell 07795 203 195 WWW.see.ed.ac.uk/~shs



On 21/02/2013 17:28, Mike MacCracken wrote:
Re: [geo] pre-print of forth-coming paper: Svoboda, T and Irvine, PJ, "Ethical and Technical Challenges in Compensating for Harm Due to Solar RadiationManagement Geoengineering" Just to take the issue one step further, it has come up in the area of even doing field testing.

Let's suppose that we want to do a field test of the cloud brightening approach. The field test would be done at such a low level that it would not really generate present benefits (i.e., any significant counter-balancing of adverse impacts) for anyone, but let's suppose it might (though not clear how) cause some negative influence to some one---say someone on an island out in the remote area where the test is being done. Let's also suppose that the field experiment would be expected to show that this approach could be used to counter-balance significant future climate change and in that way create a large net benefit (so, yes, some relatively limited negative impacts, but many, widespread benefits (or, at least, significant reductions in anticipated adverse impacts). So the question then arises, what if the present offended party objected to the experiment going forward because of negative impacts (or possible unknown consequences)? The net present effects of this experiment would be negative, but there would be great potential benefits in the future that would be foregone.

In some sense, for the close-in direct consequences, this is likely not unlike the testing of new medicines, so there would be a need for informed consent and damages. While there may be precedents for the potential direct damages, a key question would be how to deal with the less well-defined unknowns and how does one consider the benefits of gaining knowledge about potentially achieving net benefits (so, yes, some damages) in the future. Pretty clearly, climate engineering will not go forward without testing, and testing raises the question of how to weigh/consider potential near-term negative consequences to gain confidence in an approach that would provide net benefits in the future. Basically, I would just suggest that we need to have social science consideration of both the issues arising around testing as well as for potential application.

Mike


On 2/21/13 9:28 AM, "David Morrow" <[email protected]> wrote:

    Doug,

    Interesting question. I'd have to think about it more; it's
    probably more complicated than it appears. (What isn't?)

    The basic issue is that on most ethical frameworks, one party may
    sometimes have the right to insist that some other party refrain
    from harming them, even when the latter party would benefit from
    doing so. To take a well-worn but dramatic example, I have a right
    to insist that you refrain from harvesting my organs, even if you
    were confident that doing so would save the lives of several other
    people. I certainly don't need to compensate people for refusing
    to give them my organs. The wrinkle is that this right may not
    apply when the first party is responsible for the second party's
    distress -- and that may be the case in your SRM scenario. Let us
    stipulate, for the sake of this argument, that in virtue of their
    fossil fuel exports, Russia and Canada bear some non-neglible
    responsibility for the climate change that some future SRM-seeking
    states are trying to counteract. If Russia and Canada oppose SRM
    because the warmer climate benefits them, they might not be able
    to defend themselves by claiming that others have no right to harm
    them. If they blocked SRM in that scenario, they might be
    obligated to compensate those who wanted to use it.

    That's my initial response, anyway. Does that seem sensible?

    David



    On Wednesday, February 20, 2013 3:39:12 PM UTC-6, Doug MacMartin
    wrote:

        Agree that we all need to work together.  Two quick comments:

        1.       Just want to reiterate to the non-physical-scientists
        that while it is quite plausible that some would be harmed by
        SRM (a trivial example being those who want to ship through
        the Arctic) it is premature to assume any specific harms from
        SRM, as it depends on the method, the amount, and how it is
        implemented (e.g. our Nature Climate Change paper indicating
        that some harms could be reduced by tailoring the
        distribution, along the lines of John & Stephen's observations
        that precip changes depend on where you do MCB.)  And even if
        you specify everything, I would at least wait for GeoMIP
        analysis to understand a bit of model robustness.  I only
        skimmed through, but I think Peter and Toby were reasonably
        careful to say "could" most of the time rather than "would"

        2.       This is a serious question, not a joke: is there an
        ethical framework to ask about compensation to those who would
        be harmed by blocking the use of SRM?  I.e., in some
        hypothetical future scenario in which there was great
        confidence that many people could benefit from SRM, should
        those who don't want SRM compensate those who would likely be
        harmed by that decision?  If not, why not?


        doug

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