I'd be very interested to see how the limitation by W/m2 can be drilled down to regional impacts. It's obvious from the 'chemtrails' conspiracy theory that any large-scale spraying is going to be controversial - and when drilled down to (perceived) local impacts, this controversy can only be expected to increase. If injection is of condensed aerosol, rather than precursor gases, there's going to be a pronounced local effect - such as to render the globally averaged result largely irrelevant to whoever is below the spraying.
I appreciate that this is likely to be equivalent in practice to a small and short-lived cirrus cloud, but I suggest this would be very controversial, particularly if it was done over anywhere populous - especially if that location is prone to febrile conspiracy theories. How can local effects be best considered and managed during testing? A On 24 September 2013 21:53, Andrew Lockley <[email protected]> wrote: > Response by Hamilton to Keith paper > > http://clivehamilton.com/geoengineering-governance-before-research-please/ > > Geoengineering: Governance Before Research Please > > at 22 SEPTEMBER 2013 > > In a recent issue of Science, Edward Parson and David Keith put forward a > plan to ‘end the deadlock on governance of geoengineering research’ (1). > Like geoengineering research itself, the question of governance is in its > infancy (2, 3). It is not apparent that rival camps with well-developed but > conflicting proposals have emerged, but Parson and Keith discern a > ‘deadlock’ and have a plan to end it.Before presenting their plan, they set > up the situation as one riven by ‘extreme’ positions between which theirs > falls as a middle-of-the road proposal. One ‘extreme’ is that of some NGOs, > whom they characterize as ‘abolitionists’ categorically opposed to all > research. They could be thinking only of the ETC Group as no other NGO is > campaigning on geoengineering. In fact, even the ETC Group accepts that some > geoengineering research should be permitted in the right regulatory > environment (4). The ETC Group has played an important role in advocating > for restrictions on geoengineering schemes at the Convention on Biological > Diversity, but has not advocated a ban (5).The other ‘extreme’ is > represented by ‘reckless adventurers’ who engage in ‘irresponsible’ > experimentation and reject all controls. There is perhaps only one > geoengineering researcher who fits this description, Russ George (6, 7). > While George may be guilty of recklessness, his ‘rogue’ status puts him well > outside the community of geoengineering researchers (8) and cannot be > counted as part of any debate over the governance of geoengineering.The > authors frame their own advocacy as ‘sound management of climate risk’, the > reasonable alternative to the ‘abolitionists’ and the ‘reckless rogues’. It > purports to recognize that in order to acquire a social licence to operate > those who want to carry out SRM experiments, including David Keith himself > (9), must accept some kind of public oversight. Yet their proposal is best > seen as part of push for minimalist, ‘light touch’ regulation proposed by > those who defend the view that scientists should be trusted to do their work > (10, 11).The planSo what is Parson and Keith’s plan to break the ‘deadlock’? > It is a plan for regulating geoengineering schemes classed as solar > radiation management rather than carbon dioxide removal, even though ocean > iron fertilization experiments have generated most controversy (6, 7, > 12).They begin with the apparently plausible principle that ‘large > interventions need more control than small ones’ (1) and develop a plan that > links the degree of regulation to the degree of measurable physical impacts > of proposed research projects. In particular, they recommend that, beyond > prevailing requirements for all scientific research in various > jurisdictions, SRM experiments should not be subject to any new forms of > regulation if they would affect radiative forcing by less than 10−6 Wm−2 > each year.For these small-scale experiments they support self-regulation, > along with a mechanism for transparency in the form of an international > research registry. On the other hand, they do propose some unspecified > international collaboration to outlaw ‘rogue’ experiments, those that risk > bringing legitimate researchers into disrepute.For large-scale experiments > that cross a threshold of 10−2 Wm−2 Parson and Keith support a moratorium > until the need for them can be established. They put forward no proposals > for the ‘hard governance issues’ thrown up by projects that fall between the > low and high thresholds, claiming (without support) that only the two tails > need urgent action.Why it will not workWhat is wrong with this plan? Parson > and Keith propose regulation according to technical criteria, as if the only > risks that matter are physical impacts on the environment. Yet the history > of major new scientific research programs (such as genetic modification of > organisms, nanotechnology and stem cell research) tells us that the > political and social risks of new technological paradigms are often more > important than any potential physical harms (13).The reasons are diverse but > in the case of geoengineering there are two principal kinds of non-physical > risk. The first is the risk of technological lock-in, which in this case is > the concern that once research activity in geoengineering crosses a > threshold it will gain so much momentum that it will be hard to stop (14). > Once a scientific, commercial and political constituency forms, the dangers > of climate engineering technologies may be downplayed, ignored or suppressed > (15). There are good reasons for believing that this risk is significant > (16).The second risk is related to the first. If a research program > normalizes geoengineering as a solution to climate change then it may reduce > the incentives to abate greenhouse gas emissions (2, 15, 17). This ‘moral > hazard’ argument is perhaps the foremost concern of those who are sceptical > about geoengineering as a response to climate change, who fear political > leaders will take the easy way out if given a chance. > > These two concerns testify to the risks of the cumulative impacts of > research projects. Every individual research project may fall below the > regulatory threshold proposed by Parson and Keith yet together a handful of > projects may change the political and social environment for geoengineering > research. As their plan takes no account of these risks it is unlikely to > gain any traction. > > An early, comprehensive and transparent governance structure—in which the > concerns of developing nations, for example, could find expression—would > serve to temper any rush into insufficiently proven geoengineering schemes > and act as a counterweight to the pro-geoengineering constituency that is > already taking shape (15, 18, 19).Politics cannot be wished awayIt is a > deeply held view among scientists that research can be isolated from the > sullying effects of ‘politics’. It is believed that after the knowledge has > been generated by objective research then politics and ethics can come into > play to govern how it might be used. The position is often put implicitly in > defence of geoengineering research (10). > > In addition to being self-serving, the argument that a boundary can be drawn > between doing research and making policy ignores a wealth of evidence to the > contrary. Conceptually, it is impossible to separate decisions about what is > studied and how it is studied from funding levels, funding sources, > institutional priorities, publication aims and complex decisions about what > to report and how to report it, so that facts are ‘constructed’ in the sense > of being shaped by a variety of specific circumstances (20).In practice, it > has been argued that society can more easily influence the direction of a > new technology in its early phases but that, once it becomes entrenched, > society has less control because its momentum is driven by the internal > dynamics and incentives of the research community, backed by external > parties and institutions that have acquired an interest in it (13). > > So before it begins and once it starts, geoengineering research is saturated > with politics. After all, ‘Plan B’ is now being researched only because of > the dramatic failure of governments to agree on ‘Plan A’. The fact that Plan > B is attracting support from political actors who have explicitly repudiated > climate science and campaigned against emission reductions also speaks to > its undeniable political context (15, 21). Moreover, there is a well-founded > concern that any program of research into geoengineering, irrespective of > its environmental impacts, may itself make deployment more likely (16). > > To imagine that some kinds of geoengineering research can be quarantined > from societal concern and demands for regulation, as Parson and Keith do, > requires a belief that pure research can somehow be precipitated out of a > social solution using the power of ‘objectivity’ as the precipitant. Yet the > history of geoengineering itself shows this to be untrue. > > For many years the climate science community accepted that all > geoengineering research had political implications. Prior to the pivotal > 2006 intervention by Paul Crutzen (22), which ‘opened the floodgates’ (15), > there prevailed a near-unanimous taboo against geoengineering research > precisely because of anxieties about the political uses to which it could be > put. Those scientists who shunned geoengineering did not accept that ‘more > information is always a good thing’. In breaking the taboo Crutzen was > subject to severe criticism from his peers (23).So the risks associated with > geoengineering research are principally social and political. Those risks > cannot be measured in Wm−2. Nor can the appeal to objectivity sweep away the > essential practical and ethical concern that scientists are not entitled to > conduct research into geoengineering in the absence of means to control its > deployment (24). In short, and contrary to those who call for an unregulated > zone (1, 10, 11), governance of geoengineering should precede research.- > > See more at: > http://clivehamilton.com/geoengineering-governance-before-research-please/#sthash.E4sw3on5.dpuf > > On Mar 14, 2013 6:33 PM, "Keith, David" <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> Edward A Parson and David W Keith. (2013). End the Deadlock on Governance >> of Geoengineering Research. Science, 339:1278-1279, doi: >> 10.1126/science.1232527 >> >> >> >> Also recently published: >> >> David W Keith and Andy Parker. (2013). The fate of an engineered planet. >> Scientific American,308:34-36. (PDF) >> >> >> >> See http://www.keith.seas.harvard.edu/geo.html for all my solar >> geoengineering pubs and http://www.keith.seas.harvard.edu/opeds.html for >> some videos. >> >> >> >> Cheers, >> >> David >> >> >> >> >> >> David Keith >> >> Gordon McKay Professor of Applied Physics, >> >> School of Engineering and Applied Sciences (SEAS); and, >> >> Professor of Public Policy, >> >> Kennedy School of Government, >> >> Harvard University >> >> [email protected] >> >> www.keith.seas.harvard.edu >> >> >> >> President, Carbon Engineering >> >> www.carbonengineering.com >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "geoengineering" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/geoengineering?hl=en. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "geoengineering" group. 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