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*Day 2: Wednesday, July 8 2015*
The second day of the symposium included two separate sessions with
seven presentations each. The first session of the day, entitled
"Climate Engineering Uncertainties" aimed to help us understand exactly
where the blind spots in our scientific and technical knowledge of CE
lie, and to explore whether these uncertainties can be reduced.
The session kicked off with a keynote speech by Ulrike Lohmann, who
highlighted the many unknowns associated with the interaction between
aerosols and cirrus clouds and pointed out that many optimistic marine
cloud brightening (MCB) simulations could be simply an artifact of the
coarse resolution of the models used. She underlined that model
intercomparisons or multi-model-ensembles such as GeoMIP are key to
estimating MCB model uncertainty. Gregor Betz followed with a brief
commentary asking us to question whether we can even be certain about
what uncertainty is. He questioned that multi-model-ensembles will help
us estimate model uncertainty, suggesting that they can rather only give
us a lower bound on the maximum range of uncertainty. So comparing
models may not help us to find out exactly what we don't know, but
perhaps they can help us understand how little we know.
This theme was continued by David Keller, who raised the question as to
how much we should trust simulated CE models. The fact that we have
incomplete knowledge of how the back ground climate modeled works, and
that the stylized CE technologies introduced into that background
climate simulation do not yet exist combine to compound the inherent
uncertainty of models. David's take-home message for us was that model
parameter variability makes it very difficult to distinguish effects of
most CE scenarios in models, and he thus emphasized the need for better
perturbed parameter studies in the future.
Ulrike Niemeier followed with a presentation inquiring whether it is
possible to establish the theoretical limit to the amount of sulfate
which can be injected into the stratosphere. Her modeling work indicates
that with long-term sulfate injection, cooling efficiency decreases due
to the resulting increase in particle size and decreased scattering,
meaning: The more we inject, the less the effect. In the same vein as
the prior presenters Ulrike noted the difficulty in comparing her
modeling results with that of others, as the parameters used are often
different, making results largely model dependent.
In a change of pace from natural to social science, Andy Parker went on
to explore the concept of the "termination shock" in the fourth talk of
the day. The term "termination shock" refers to the sudden spike in
temperatures that would be expected to occur if long-term SRM measures
were suddenly ceased. As Andy pointed out, although the idea of what
could potentially happen if SRM was suddenly halted have frequently been
presented as prominent argument against deployment, so far there has
been little investigation into exactly why such a sudden cessation might
come to pass . Andy's presentation aimed to outline a conceptual toolbox
to structure the discussion on the issue of termination shock. Central
concepts to understanding termination shock include; the critical
forcing threshold before which it would be safe to turn off SRM without
significant negative side effects; a ramp-up and ramp-down period when
SRM is introduced and/or creased gradually rather than suddenly; and a
"buffer period" during which SRM, even if it had been temporarily ceased
without warning, could be reinitiated before the climate system starts
to react. He further differentiated between forced and elective
termination. He defined the former as any situation in which SRM
termination is forced upon humanity and listed some situations which
could qualify: A terrorist attack might result in termination shock, but
only if 1) defenses don't hold, 2) there is no SRM deployment back-up
plan and 3) no-one else is capable of deployment. However, Andy Parker
surmised that this would be quite unlikely as SRM is fungible. A
catastrophe might also lead to termination shock, but only if it was
global rather than regional (e.g. pandemic, nuclear war, asteroid
strike). In comparison elective termination in which one of more parties
have the will and the power to enforce the halt SRM, there are not
acceptable alternatives and no ramping down is attempted could lead to
termination shock. However, Andy suggested that as the termination of
SRM would be almost impossible to enforce unilaterally, elective
termination seems unlikely to lead to termination shock. He went on to
emphasize the necessity of evaluating the implications of these
considerations in light of intergenerational justice and the likelihood
of lock-in.
Shifting the focus back to natural science, Miriam Ferrer-Gonzales
followed with a discussion of the scope and side-effects of large-scale
ocean alkalinity enhancement. Her modeling indicated that that there
would be regional variations in resulting changes in surface atmospheric
temperatures, with more cooling in the arctic and over land than over
sea. While the effects of ocean acidification were mitigated in her
model, ocean pH and omega rose above pre-industrial levels, and there
was also an indication of an increase in heavy mental traces. The
audience raised questions about the effects of these changes on ocean
biodiversity, which remain largely unknown.
Johannes Lenhard then led us through a thought experiment on developing
a more suitable categorization of uncertainty with regard to CE. He
emphasized that choosing the right level of abstraction such a typology
is imperative: where as a simple risk vs. uncertainty dichotomy would be
too unspecific, an overly fine grained typology would not lead to
complexity reduction and increased understanding of the unknowns
associated with CE. He went on to suggest a four-type categorization
ranging from "Deep ignorance", over "Ignorance" and "Uncertainty" to
"Risk." The second part of Johannes' talk asked what CE modeling
simulations can achieve in terms of (un)certainty, indicating that with
growing model complexity, it becomes increasingly unclear what role
particular parameterization schemes or parameter values play and that
coupling different models aggravates the problem.
Continuing with the theme of how to understand and perceive concepts,
Matthias Honegger presented a proposal for a project to test how
knowledge about SRM could influence individuals' willingness to support
mitigation. His working hypothesis, based on assumptions of cultural
cognition theory, is that if information on CE is compatible with a
person's values, their willingness to pay for mitigation is reduced, and
vice versa. His project aims to test this hypothesis by identifying the
cultural values of groups of interview participants and then eliciting
their willingness to pay for mitigation pre-/post information about CE.
The day's second session which followed after lunch focused on questions
of CE governance. The seven presentations in the afternoon centered
around different aspects of the question: Even if the uncertainties
indentified in the morning's session could be reduced and fully informed
decisions could be made on CE research, development and deployment, who
would/could/should make these decisions?
In the first presentation after lunch, Joshua Horton looked at
mini-lateralism as a comprehensive SRM governance option. He defined
mini-lateral groups, clubs or exclusive coalitions as an
institutionalized cooperation among a subset of states and presented
results applying game theory to the formation and implementation of
international environmental agreements that indicated such exclusive
membership coalitions result in stable governance structures. This is
assumed to be because exclusivity allows states with similar
costs/benefits (interests) to keep others out, reducing conflict
potential. Additionally, since similar states get comparable benefits
(from cooperation) at comparable costs within the exclusive coalition,
there is a strong incentive to keep cooperating. Joshua then went on to
discuss how a mini-lateral "Climate Club" to govern CE could link SRM to
mitigation by making participation in SRM decision-making conditional on
a state's efforts on mitigation, thereby countering moral hazard and
facilitating bargaining. Discussing the problematic legitimacy of such
an exclusive CE governance group, Joshua pointed to several exclusive
international "clubs" that are often considerate legitimate, including
the WTO, G7, G20 and NATO, but indicated that many questions remain to
be answered regarding both the procedural and output legitimacy of such
a "Climate Club."
The next presentation by Daniel Heyen shifted the focus away from the
governance of deployment and onto the potential conflicts involved in
the governance of CE research and development (R&D). Based on a simple
game-theoretical model which included free-riders and free drivers,
Daniel asked, "If countries anticipate the outcomes in the deployment
game: How will this affect whether they want to engage in R&D?" Based on
the assumption that players in the CE "game" would have an incentive to
invest in R&D in light of potential benefits and strategic conflicts
associated with deployment in the future, Daniel concluded that if the
sum of R&D contributions exceed a certain (commonly known) threshold,
then the CE technologies would be available to both countries, otherwise
to none.
Jesse Reynolds' introduced the audience to the idea of a research
commons for SRM to deal with the governance challenge in the medium
term. He suggested that as state action on SRM governance is unlikely in
the near future because SRM is controversial and cuts against the
well-established climate discourse, private law may be able to act as a
bridge between short term self-regulation and long-term tans-national
governance proposals. With this in mind, he suggested that researcher
and institutions would commit to contribute their output into a research
commons. In return for compliance with agreed upon research standards,
those committed to the research commons would be given free access the
output generated by committed actors. The research commons would make
methods and research designs available ex ante, and ensure the
availability of all data in a standardized, centralized, a central,
public directory of all CE research results and publications. Jesse
additionally suggested that this commons could also include a patent
pool. Although many are opposed to the idea of patenting SRM
technologies, Jesse emphasized that simply foregoing filing patents does
not prevent others from doing so. As members of his suggested patent
pool, committed researchers would contractually agree to freely license
any patents from their research to other researches legitimate SRM
research which complies with agreed upon research standards, including
prior impact assessment, public notification, engagement, participation,
cooperation with regulators, independent assessment of results, best
practices for research, due diligence etc. Compliant members of the pool
would thus be free to share their patents among themselves, but could
only earn royalties outside the pool for non-CE applications of the
technologies developed. Jesse indicated that presently the best bodies
to take this on would be existing national and international scientific
bodies, but there is a need to develop additional capacity towards
integrating IGOs, NGOs etc and he envisages the private law framework
developing an increasingly public nature over time.
Emphasizing that action on CE does not involve a single decision, but a
dynamic chain of interrelated decisions, Weili Weng presented her work
with a computer-based Dynamic Decision-Making model. The model
incorporates contextual elements and dynamic, flexible interactive
stakeholders to simulate the complex web of the CE decision-making
process. She concluded by pointing out that the use of these type of
tools can only be used to gain insight into complex decision-making
processes, not as a basis for CE decision-making in the real world.
The Brian Citro and Patrick Smith picked up on the discussion on the
appropriateness of relying on cost benefit analysis to assess CE
technologies. Based on the assumption that it is unlikely that all human
interests are captured in utilitarian cost benefit analyses, their
presentation looked at developing an alternative CE assessment and
decision-making framework based on human rights. They looked at
identifying the need for constructivist deliberative way to evaluate
rights claims in a way that would ideally practice oriented. As a
multitude of individuals and groups make claims based on human rights
arguments, they suggested a focus on especially vulnerable or
marginalized groups and the prioritization of the principle of
non-discrimination when establishing the framework.
Wilfried Rickels followed with a presentation on how uncertainty and
incentives could play a role in the development of a SRM compensation
scheme. As the variability of the climate system prevents deriving a
clear causal link between observed climate and the level of SRM
deployment, he suggested an upper or lower threshold on climate
variation might be appropriate when deciding when compensation is
required. These thresholds would have to be negotiated and agreed upon
by the participating parties. The type of compensation scheme Wilfried
proposed would theoretically implement the social optimal solution and
aims to ensure that the climate engineer has full responsibility for the
climate.
In the final talk before the dinner break, David Morrow delved deeper
into our understanding of the slippery slope argument against CE
research and development. The basic slippery slope argument is as
follows: If some kinds of CE research are done, they will lead to
deployment, which would a bad outcome, therefore these types of research
should not be done. David asked: How exactly will research lead to
deployment? He identified five mechanisms which are often implied by
those using the slippery slope argument: 1) Vested interests -
Academics, bureaucrats and commercial entities invest time, energy and
money into research and development and then push for deployment; 2)
Jamieson's cultural imperative, which says if you build it, someone will
come and use it; 3) Legitimization or normalization of an idea through
research could lead to acceptance of its implementation; 4) Moral hazard
necessitates deployment - we stop mitigating, and thus are forced to
resort to CE; 5) Increasing inability to constrain rogue deployment. If
ongoing research lowers the cost of CE technologies, the more players
there are who could do it. So be engaging in further research, you
increase the number of people who could do it. David then presented some
ideas for how we could "throw sand on the slippery slope" by stopping
research, structuring our careers so that we are not solely dependent on
ongoing CE research, combating misinformation about CE in public
discourse, minimizing intellectual property ownership in making
deployment profitable, creating governance institutions that make
deployment decisions more globally democratic, and by slowing down
decision-making process to stop someone being able to suddenly push a
panic button.
After dinner we were treated to a very different kind of presentation on
CE. Josh Wodack did not present any results or research projects, but
rather art projects that illustrated different views on feelings,
images, hopes, and fears about environmental alternation. Under the
titled “Art that Sucks” a Dutch artist proposed a giant vacuum cleaner
that sucks smog from Beijing air. Other artistic displays dealt with
technical fixes or their outcomes. In Josh’s installations /Shape Things
to Come/ <http://www.arch-angle.net/installation.html#fffff> he explores
“how humans may shape things to come through climate engineering
interventions designed to separate existing life forms from six degrees
of catastrophe”. Installations, videos and other forms of art aim to
create new ideas or at least make more levels of CE visible. When asked
if art could also promote undesirable ideas, Josh replied that it could
in theory, but in particular it offered a way to encourage people to
become involved and begin thinking about crucial issues like climate change.
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