This piece, by Toby Svoboda, was originally published by the Forum for Climate Engineering Assessment: http://ceassessment.org/procedural-justice/ <http://ceassessment.org/procedural-justice/>
On Thursday, August 24, 2017 at 1:54:15 PM UTC-4, Andrew Lockley wrote: > > Poster's note : deja vu, but seemingly not posted before > > https://www.environmentguru.com/pages/elements/element.aspx?id=5368065 > > Why Procedural Justice Matters for Climate Engineering HOMENEWSAIR > QUALITYCLIMATE CHANGE Select Language▼ Broadly speaking, we may > distinguish two types of justice: substantive and procedural. Both are > relevant for climate policy. Substantive justice concerns how states of > affairs ought to be ordered, including how the burdens and benefits of some > policy should be distributed among various parties. Procedural justice > concerns how decisions ought to be made, including whose voices should be > heard in decision-making. This type of justice presumably requires that > parties with a substantial stake have an opportunity to contribute to > relevant decisions. It is fairly obvious that substantive justice matters > for climate engineering policies. This is true of both solar radiation > management and greenhouse gas removal varieties, because either could > affect the distribution of burdens and benefits among persons. Because of > this, we could evaluate whether some such policy is likely to secure the > distribution required by substantive justice (whatever that might be). The > result of this evaluation might give us ethical reasons to oppose or > support the policy in question. It is perhaps less obvious that procedural > justice matters for climate engineering. Why should we care about how > decisions are made, provided that the outcomes of such decisions are line > with substantive justice? In my recent book, The Ethics of Climate > Engineering: Solar Radiation Management and Non-Ideal Justice (Routledge), > I offer the following three reasons why procedural justice is important for > decision-making about climate engineering. There is an ethical obligation > to comply with procedural justice, rooted in the obligation to respect > other persons. Deferring to procedural justice offers a useful way to > navigate ethical and scientific uncertainty. Under conditions of ethical > and scientific uncertainty, interested parties have a special right to > contribute to decision-making that is likely to impact them substantially. > First, and most conventionally, I argue that it is ethically impermissible > to ignore the demands of procedural justice. To do so would exhibit > disrespect for those persons who are inappropriately excluded from > decision-making. Importantly, this would be impermissible even if the > resulting policy benefited parties who were unjustly excluded. We might > think of that as a kind of paternalism. The second reason is pragmatic. > There is a great deal of scientific uncertainty surrounding the likely > impacts of potential climate engineering policies. Continued research might > reduce this uncertainty but is unlikely to eliminate it. Likewise, there is > a great deal of ethical uncertainty regarding what climate policies we > ought to adopt. Climate change raises a host of controversial ethical > issues, including the question of what substantive justice requires. It is > therefore not clear that common-sense moral thinking is up to the task of > determining what climate policies are appropriate. Deferring to > procedurally just decision-making processes can be useful for navigating > such scientific and ethical uncertainty. As I argue in the book, “This is > because, plausibly, a procedurally just framework will allow for > decision-making that is iterative, responsive to changing conditions, and > open to various points of view. This last feature, in particular, may > provide a helpful check on controversial proposals” (page 76). The third > reason to favor procedural justice resembles elements of the previous two, > but it is nonetheless distinct from both. The claim is that, in cases of > substantial uncertainty, interested parties have a right to contribute to > decisions likely to impact them in substantial ways. This is different from > the first reason, because the right in question only arises due to > substantial uncertainty, whereas the obligation to respect persons is > always in play. I use the analogy of a patient whose doctor offers two > courses of treatment, both of them risky and uncertain to work. Just as the > patient should be permitted to decide how to proceed, so should interested > parties be permitted to contribute to decisions on whether to deploy > climate engineering. I have said nothing here about what procedural justice > specifically requires. Rather, I have sought to give reasons for why we > should care about it in the first place. For those interested, the book > itself provides a more detailed account of these reasons. Toby Svoboda > is an assistant professor in the department of philosophy at Fairfield > University. His research focuses on environmental ethics, Kant, and climate > change. He is the author of The Ethics of Climate Engineering: Solar > Radiation Management and Non-Ideal Justice (Routledge). The Forum for > Climate Engineering Assessment does not necessarily endorse the ideas > contained in this or any other guest post. Our aim is to provide a space > for the expression of a range of perspectives on climate engineering. Forum > for Climate Engineering Assessment Climate Change Greenhouse Gas > Published:8/23/2017 > > Source: > https://www.environmentguru.com/pages/elements/element.aspx?id=5368065 > © EnvironmentGuru.com > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "geoengineering" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/geoengineering. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
