*This item and others will be in the monthly “Solar Geoengineering Updates Substack” newsletter:* https://solargeoengineeringupdates.substack.com/ -----------------------------------------------------------------
*PART#01* https://legal-planet.org/2024/03/07/countries-failed-to-agree-first-steps-on-geoengineering-what-went-wrong/ *Countries failed to agree first steps on solar geoengineering at the UN. What went wrong?* *DUNCAN MCLAREN* *07 March 2024* Duncan McLaren and Olaf Corry observed as diplomats in Nairobi wrestled with a resolution on solar radiation management In the last weeks, diplomats from all over the world were negotiating more than twenty draft resolutions at the UN Environment Assembly (UNEA). The Assembly is a biennial intergovernmental meeting which sets the global environmental agenda. It also sets the strategy for the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), and outlines policy responses to address emerging environmental challenges. In amongst proposals regarding plastic pollution, air quality, pesticides and circular economies, to mention but a few, the most controversial was a Swiss-led proposal to establish an expert group on solar radiation modification (SRM). [image: Delegates arrive at the UN in Nairobi] Back in 2019, at the last face-to-face Assembly, the Swiss proposed a resolution to assess the science and possible governance of ‘climate altering techniques’ aka geoengineering. That came to naught in the face of persistent opposition from the US and Saudi Arabia. The opponents argued for assessment in the IPCC, not UNEP; and for separate treatment of carbon removal techniques and SRM. The US also objected to efforts from Bolivia and the EU to stress a precautionary approach, and to respect diverse forms of knowledge, not merely scientific analysis. So what happened this time? We were back in Nairobi again observing the negotiations for a second time. Here in part 1 of our report, we explain the process and describe the positions adopted by different states. In part 2 <https://legal-planet.org/?p=38758&preview=true> – coming tomorrow – we try to interpret the debates and outcomes. *Fast forward* This time the Swiss resolution focused on SRM only, again calling for a UNEP led assessment process through an appointed expert group with a mandate to consider and advise on the state of knowledge. The experts were to marshal what the world collectively knows about science, development, application, deployment, control, ethics and potential impacts of SRM, including risks, benefits and uncertainties. The US again argued (again supported by Saudi Arabia and Japan) that assessment should happen elsewhere than UNEP: in this case through the recently announced scientific ‘lighthouse’ process <https://council.science/current/blog/world-climate-research-programme-launches-a-lighthouse-activity-on-climate-intervention-research/> of the World Climate Research Programme of the World Meteorological Organisation. US negotiators also resisted efforts to include assessment of governance options, and of social, legal, geopolitical and security risks, arguing that anything other than a strictly scientific process would be premature. Successive re-drafts of the resolution reflected many of these demands, despite attempts by the EU and others to broaden the scope of the assessment and membership of the expert group. *Wider involvement* The most striking development compared to 2019 was that this time around many more countries got involved. And most – especially those from Africa and the rest of the Americas – sought very different outcomes that the US. Senegal, Kenya, Cameroon, Djibouti and South Africa all intervened, as did Brazil, Mexico, Columbia, Barbados, Argentina and Ecuador. The African states appointed a formal regional representative, putting forward their agenda. They wanted the resolution to recognise calls for a moratorium on solar geoengineering, as reflected in the African Ministerial Conference on the Environment (AMCEN) decision in August 2023 to call for a ‘global governance mechanism for non-use of SRM’ <https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/43789/K2316003E-AMCEN-19-6-ADVANCE-REPORT.pdf?sequence=3>. But they also wanted the resolution to support better and broader access to information, and mandate compilation of member state positions and existing expert knowledge through a broad-based inclusive process. Some of the states most vulnerable to climate change – including Fiji, Vanuatu and Pakistan – broadly supported the African position, and emphasized deep concerns about SRM. So did those concerned about unauthorised experimentation, notably Mexico – who saw the ‘Make Sunsets’ balloon launches <https://www.reuters.com/business/environment/how-two-weather-balloons-led-mexico-ban-solar-geoengineering-2023-03-27/> as a ‘violation of sovereignty’. *What’s the procedure?* How might such disagreements be resolved within UNEA – which aspires to consensus? Any country can submit a draft resolution in advance of the meeting. Each resolution consists of some preambular material, typically referencing previous agreements or highlighting relevant concerns; and some ‘operational paragraphs’ mandating some action – typically convening a consultative, working or expert group, preparing a report, or urging member states or other international institutions to take relevant action. To achieve adoption by the summit, the draft resolution is discussed through a series of informal and formal meetings open to all delegates. First come informal negotiations under the auspices of the Committee of Permanent Representatives (in the days before the Assembly convenes). Uncontroversial resolutions can be agreed in this process and adopted by the opening Plenary of UNEA. This is rare. On most resolutions negotiations continue under a body called the ‘Committee of the Whole’, which allocates them to smaller ‘contact groups’ with chairs appointed from amongst Nairobi based delegates by the UNEA presidency and secretariat. To facilitate wide participation, contact group agendas are further subdivided into smaller clusters, but states with small delegations are still often unable to follow all the resolutions that concern them. *Negotiating norms* The normal process of negotiation of each text begins with a reading through of the draft, and compilation of suggested amendments followed by more detailed discussion of concerns. The aim is to achieve consensus by eliminating or compromising over disputed issues. Drafts typically become covered with proposals for additions and deletions, many in square brackets, indicating disagreement. The proponents, or the co-chairs, might issue a revised draft, typically simplifying, or ‘streamlining’ language in the hope of minimizing further dispute. Texts agreed under the process go forward for formal endorsement by the UNEA closing plenary. Those with limited remaining disagreements might be further discussed in the high-level segment of the meeting (following closure of the Committee of the Whole), while those still strongly disputed tend to be withdrawn. So any country, especially a globally powerful one, can hold the process hostage, and shoot down the whole resolution if it doesn’t get its way. And compromise resolutions can end up converging on the ‘lowest common denominator’ of agreement. A familiar playbook In 2019 the Swiss were forced to withdraw in the face of US and Saudi intransigence, even after suggesting a revised and streamlined draft conceding to many of their demands. This time, over a series of drafts and negotiated texts the operative text was again repeatedly pared back, eventually constituting merely a proposal that the UNEP executive should prepare a paper. This paper was only to set out options for the establishment of a repository for voluntary submissions of relevant information on SRM. But even this proved divisive, with contestation over the modalities of such a repository continuing amid persistent simmering disagreement over how the proposal should be framed. Once again, the Swiss eventually withdrew the battered remnants of their text. During discussions, the US, with support from Saudi Arabia and Japan, consistently pushed for language unpopular with most in the negotiating room – in this case regarding the preeminence of science and a leading role for the WMO, and maintained reservations over much of the remaining Swiss proposal. Africa, whilst wanting to improve access to information on SRM, also had concerns about the Swiss proposals. They wanted to ensure that establishing an assessment process, or even a repository, did not legitimate unfettered research, experimentation and development of the technologies. Instead, any mandated action should merely share existing information, focused on understanding the risks involved. Other delegates broadly aligned with the African position and pushed for broader language about the sort of information that should be gathered, including ethical, human rights and security dimensions. *Deep divisions* But it was not only the operational text that proved divisive. There was protracted debate on how the climate challenge should be described in the preambular paragraphs, and whether reference to emissions reductions or temperature goals was more appropriate. The extent of reference to prior decisions at the Convention on Biological Diversity <https://www.cbd.int/climate/geoengineering>, and the London Protocol <https://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/Pages/geoengineering-Default.aspx> also generated controversy. More intense struggles took place over language about ‘potential risks and benefits’, with many preferring reference only to ‘negative impacts’ or ‘risks and concerns’. Indeed, at one point one developing country delegate insisted that the risks of solar geoengineering should not be described anywhere as ‘potential’, but always as ‘unacceptable’. *A whimper, not a bang* The negotiations finally collapsed when delegates were presented with a simplified compromise draft prepared by the meeting co-chairs, which would have mandated UNEP to prepare a paper on options for establishing (in collaboration with WMO) a repository of existing scientific information, research advancements, and activities on SRM. The repository would have included member state and stakeholder submissions. The draft punted any further possible steps to the future. Many states had previously supported establishing some form of repository to improve access to information on SRM, and somehow producing a synthesis of existing knowledge. But the co-chairs’ proposal still proved divisive. Arguments continued over who might establish a repository, and on what terms. The Africans couldn’t accept WMO involvement, nor the apparent legitimation of unspecified new SRM ‘activities’. The Americans opposed gathering member state and stakeholder materials before the vaunted ‘neutral scientific information’ was in hand. And the proposed preambular text acknowledging precaution and concerns remained too strong for the US, and too weak for Africa and others including Pakistan, Mexico, and Pacific islanders. With negotiating time running out, the talks were over. *A missed opportunity?* Most states participating in UNEA still indicated that they don’t know enough about SRM – especially about the risks. As in 2019, many emphasised not only gaps in knowledge, but also the dominance of Northern ways of knowing. Following the 2019 failure, UNEP commissioned an expert report on SRM <https://www.unep.org/resources/report/Solar-Radiation-Modification-research-deployment> anyway, albeit without the broader legitimacy that would have been conferred by the resolution. In advance of UNEA-6 the UN establishment also highlighted SRM amongst topics for advance consultation with its Major Groups and Stakeholders <https://www.unep.org/civil-society-engagement/why-civil-society-matters/major-groups-stakeholders> . In their presentations at UNEA-6 several Major Groups raised deep concerns about consideration of SRM: the Science and Technology Major Group described SRM as a “speculative and unproven technology with associated long-term risks.” All the Major Groups that adopted positions on SRM supported either a moratorium or non-use stance. The Youth Group also advocated assessment taking an intergenerational perspective and involving developing countries. An opportunity to acknowledge the broad concerns of most states and stakeholders and to ensure that existing information is shared more broadly has therefore been missed. No steps have been taken towards stronger governance of experiments and development of SRM. But neither have such steps been endorsed or legitimated by a UNEA resolution. *Where does this leave us?* In the second part of this blog <https://legal-planet.org/?p=38758&preview=true> – we will discuss lessons we might take from these negotiations and the implications for future action. To summarise: many states see deployment of SRM as illegitimate, and even research as meriting governance. Major powers do not seem to want to deploy, or even develop SRM, but acted in ways that would allow them freedom on action on the technology now and in the future. And the window within which effective governance could be established is closing. Any claim that SRM is demanded by vulnerable countries, and that research is primarily for their sake, feels disingenuous – or at least premature. While climate scientists focus on refining model simulations, very few countries appear to see geoengineering as primarily a question of narrowly scientific or even purely climatic feasibility. Most want to start from a precautionary stance and include governance conversations. Finally, while almost everyone wanted to learn more, and see more equitable access to knowledge, reasonable suspicions are harboured by developing nations about what SRM’s function will be, while deep divides remain about what sorts of knowledge are valid, and whether, how and by whom new knowledge might be generated. *PART#02* https://legal-planet.org/2024/03/08/the-global-conversation-about-solar-geoengineering-just-changed/ The global conversation about solar geoengineering just changed at the UN Environment Assembly. Here’s how.Duncan McLaren and Olaf Corry reflect on the implications of the UNEA-6 non-decision on solar radiation modification for research and governance As we wrote in part 1 <https://legal-planet.org/?p=38740&preview=true>, a Swiss-led proposal to the UN Environment Assembly (UNEA) to establish an expert group on solar radiation management (SRM) proved divisive and was eventually withdrawn. Here we explore why, and what that means for any global conversation about SRM. SRM has long generated concerns that, as a powerful lever on the Earth system, it could have unwanted side-effects and generate political and ethical risks, as well as lowering temperatures. But rules and norms about such technologies are patchy, and recent unauthorized experiments have set alarm bells ringing. [image: Image shows how different solar geoengineering techniques might reflect solar radation]Different forms of Solar Geoengineering (NOAA/CIRES) With good will on all sides, a UNEA resolution might have been a step towards a genuinely global assessment process, respecting a wide range of knowledge types and facilitating well governed research that would help everyone understand the issues at stake. But it wasn’t to be. Business as usual? At one level, the failure was business as usual. As in 2019, when the Swiss brought forward a similar draft, the proposals this year were dramatically watered down over a series of negotiations. Eventually they got pared back to merely exploring options for setting up a ‘repository’ for voluntary collation of already existing scientific information. But even this failed to find agreement. The visibly crestfallen Swiss withdrew the resolution, muttering words like ‘disappointing’, ‘starting-point’, and ‘worthwhile’. Perhaps it was – worthwhile, that is – this time around, because we got some clarity on at least five fronts. What counts as ‘knowledge’? Firstly, there were deep divides about what sorts of knowledge are valid, and whether, how and by whom new knowledge might be generated, despite almost everyone at UNEA-6 wanting to learn more, and at least see more equitable access to knowledge. Both this round and the last, the US – and Saudi Arabia – resisted efforts to widen the types of knowledge with which SRM be evaluated. The US insisted on ‘science first’ as a way to avoid ‘prejudging’ SRM. But others this as already prejudging the kinds of knowledge that would be relevant, and as presuming that SRM would be desirable as long as ‘the science’ deemed it so. Unfortunately, ‘scientific’ knowledge on SRM is often equated with a body of results from climate model simulations of interventions. SRM seems to reduce overall climate risks when experimentally deployed in simulated future worlds. But such simulations exclude thornier environmental, practical and (geo)political issues that would make geoengineering much messier and less optimal in reality than it appears in ‘model-land <https://www.theguardian.com/books/2022/dec/30/escape-from-model-land-by-erica-thompson-review-the-power-and-pitfalls-of-prediction> ’. Many developing countries wanted to include social, legal, ethical, human rights, geopolitical and security dimensions – and governance – in the remit of the ‘repository’ (or any assessment process). The US argued that anything other than strictly scientific content would be ‘premature’. Implicit in this position was a sense of primacy of the natural sciences – and knowledge about biophysical climatic effects – over the social and political sciences. From this perspective, knowledge generated by the humanities and law, let alone from indigenous ways of knowing, is not even on the radar. Location, location, location Secondly, this hierarchy of knowledge was a major reason why the location was contentious. In 2019 the US argued that any assessment should be located in the IPCC and not UNEP. The IPCC has a narrower scientific remit and culture than UNEP, cherished by developing countries especially for its broader approach to sustainability and development and its information services to less well-endowed countries. In 2024 the US argued something remarkably similar. This time the preferred venue for any information collation or assessment was the recently announced scientific ‘lighthouse’ process <https://council.science/current/blog/world-climate-research-programme-launches-a-lighthouse-activity-on-climate-intervention-research/> of the World Climate Research Programme (WCRP). Few details yet exist of the WCRP lighthouse activity on climate intervention, but the co-chairs are both scientific modelers, and the WCRP defines its vision as ‘A world that uses sound, relevant, and timely *climate science* to ensure a more resilient present and sustainable future’ (emphasis added). SRM’s multipolar moment Thirdly, the SRM cast has changed, even if much of the script was familiar. In 2019 it was largely the US (and the Saudis) facing off against the EU (who had a radical flank in Bolivia). In 2024 many more developing nations came prepared to intervene and African countries led the charge. Climate vulnerable states including Vanuatu and Pakistan, and others concerned about unauthorized experimentation, also got involved. Whilst wanting to improve access to information about the risks SRM might involve, Africa, and indeed most developing country participants, also wanted to avoid legitimating new research, experimentation and unchecked development of the technologies. Between the US and African positions, the EU found itself somewhat ‘stuck in the middle’ with the Swiss proponents. No longer the main counter-weight, the EU took up an ‘honest broker’ role. But it followed a somewhat uni-polar playbook of seeking pragmatic compromises around a US center of diplomatic gravity, one that may no longer exist as it once did. What we saw In Nairobi instead was a microcosm of an increasingly multi-polar <https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/99/6/2339/7337131> – that is, decentered and pluralistically led – international order, where middle income and smaller states are better coordinated and demanded equal recognition. As one delegate put it, the divisions also reflected different ‘world-views’ – something to which ‘every country has a right’, not just the West. Who’s afraid of the big bad governance? Fourth, not everyone currently wants governance. Under a Biden White House which has made emissions reductions a priority at home, and produced a report on SRM research <https://www.whitehouse.gov/ostp/news-updates/2023/06/30/congressionally-mandated-report-on-solar-radiation-modification/> only under congressional pressure, US intransigence on SRM governance might seem strange. But if a multi-polar order is emerging, international relations theory suggests that ‘great powers’ will seek to maintain their freedom of maneuver. The US routinely exempts itself from international legal commitments and restrictive norms, from the Treaty of Versailles to the International Criminal Court. Its positions at UNEA have followed this tradition. ‘Sequencing’ was now the preferred term: no governance – or member state views – before science has spoken (the IPCC assessment <https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGII_CCB-CWGB_Compilation.pdf> apparently wasn’t enough). Another delegate suggested to us that the US sees itself as having a technological lead in this area – which it might keep by limiting the sorts of information shared. At any rate, avoiding steps towards regulation would leave them free to develop norms and policy on SRM as they see fit. *Did other major powers show signs of following suit?* Russia supported the US in deleting text that might have implied freedom of access to geopolitical and security assessments of SRM. Neither Russia, China nor India actively supported reference to ‘non-use’ or condemnation of unauthorized experiments. India though was much more supportive of the original Swiss knowledge gathering proposals than the US, while China and Russia largely held fire. Less powerful states, on the other hand, generally supported processes and fora that could lead towards governance to restrict research, or especially development, of such technologies in risky ways. A resolution focused only on science, that neither moved towards discussion of governance, nor clearly stated a precautionary position regarding risks, would have been of little worth to them. It might also have been interpreted as undermining previous <https://www.cbd.int/climate/geoengineering> decisions <https://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/Pages/geoengineering-Default.aspx> in other Multilateral Environmental Agreements. SRM – a minority interest? Fifth, SRM really is quite unpopular in global terms. Virtually every country involved expressed concerns and seemed to view deployment of SRM as illegitimate. No-one wants to develop material SRM infrastructure yet, as far as we know. Text recognizing the African leaders’ call for ‘non-use of solar radiation management’ <https://legal-planet.org/wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/43789/K2316003E-AMCEN-19-6-ADVANCE-REPORT.pdf?sequence=3> was (re)introduced in every draft where the text was negotiated. Looking ahead, a moratorium on development and deployment might actually enable careful research and knowledge exchange <https://legal-planet.org/2023/02/23/should-there-be-a-non-use-agreement-on-solar-geoengineering/> by reducing the risk of a rush to deployment. Many delegations explicitly rejected a risk-benefit approach to assessment in favor of a precautionary orientation with emphasis on *known risks* over *uncertain benefits*. It seems many understand that the benefits of SRM seen in models are in no way guaranteed to arise in real world applications, given the extent of environmental, technical, economic, social and political uncertainties <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S2214629618305140>. Most strikingly, some of the countries most vulnerable to climate change – including Pakistan and Fiji – presented positions vehemently opposed the very idea of SRM and were most outspoken in highlighting that they saw many more, and more serious risks than benefits. Presuming that such skeptical views are ill-formed opinions, or ones that will be changed simply by more science or information, seems foolish – not least given the fraught history of climate debate <https://www.mikehulme.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/Hulme-Carbon-Yearbook.pdf>. Furthermore, anyone claiming a mandate to research or develop SRM based on arguments of a moral duty to the global poor <https://keith.seas.harvard.edu/files/tkg/files/horton_and_keith_2016.pdf> and vulnerable, would need to explain why the representatives of many of those states have either rejected SRM or stood hard on the demand for it be treated with strong precaution. What of precaution? Despite apparent consensus around non-deployment any time soon, and no obvious appetite for development as opposed to research, no deal was reached. In 2019 those wishing to see further assessment of geoengineering pinned the collapse <https://geoengineering.environment.harvard.edu/blog/perspectives-unea-resolution#JesseReynolds> on EU demands for precaution and the combination of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) and SRM in the same resolution. In 2024 CDR was not included, and reference to precaution was perhaps more widely seen as ‘constructively ambiguous’ – as was noted in an early intervention – not a matter for interminable debate. But understandings of ‘precaution’ still mattered. Those wanting language about ‘potential risks and benefits’ implicitly interpreted precaution as referring to the climate threat; while those favoring reference to ‘negative impacts’ or ‘risks and concerns’ were clearly applying precaution to SRM itself. The latter view was most strongly expressed in a proposal to change all references to ‘potential risks’ of solar geoengineering to ‘unacceptable risks’. Where next? Regardless of UNEA-6’s latest non-decision, research continues to be funded in more developed nations (e.g. US <https://www.technologyreview.com/2022/07/01/1055324/the-us-government-is-developing-a-solar-geoengineering-research-plan/> , UK <https://www.ukri.org/what-we-do/browse-our-areas-of-investment-and-support/modelling-environmental-responses-to-solar-radiation-management/>) and at small scale in some developing countries through the Degrees Initiative <https://www.degrees.ngo/>. Private sector attention is growing – with start-ups in the US <https://makesunsets.com/> and Israel <https://www.wsj.com/science/environment/geoengineering-projects-cool-planet-weather-f0619bf7> (‘Stardust Solutions’), (at least) seeking to commercialize SRM. A practical application of precautionary governance seems increasingly urgent. Most states want to know more – especially about the risks. African, Latin American and South American countries consistently emphasized both ‘gaps’ in knowledge and the dominance of Northern knowledge. Many saw some form of repository as a way to improve access to information on SRM and favored some version of a synthesis of existing knowledge – although in both cases the details were contested. *Will we learn?* Perhaps if the African leaders’ call last year for a non-use mechanism had been acknowledged at UNEA-6 alongside other existing intergovernmental statements and decisions, and if a broader range of knowledges had been admitted into the repository alongside well governed and fairly distributed research, a deal might have landed, despite US and Saudi concerns. Signalling clearly that deployment is off limits for now, and extending precautionary governance to research, to minimize risks of a ‘slippery slope’ to deployment, could help assuage concerns driving demands to focus on gathering and sharing only *existing *information. A better regulated space could also help ensure wider involvement in research. Brazil’s early call for funding for research capacity-building found support from several developing countries, but was later opposed by both the US and the African group for different reasons. Allaying fears of a research free-for-all could be paired with resources for developing countries to undertake research according to their own needs and objectives. Without that developing countries will continue to struggle to understand the broad range of risks – or potential benefits – associated with SRM in context. *A cloudy future?* As it is, the ‘Make Sunsets’ and ‘Stardust Solutions’ of this world, driven by commercial incentives, can continue to develop – and experiment. A new US administration may prove less committed to mitigation, and less reticent about SRM research. And if research and development continue without effective governance, the risk that SRM might distract from accelerated mitigation will inevitably grow. The US delegation advocated wording reaffirming the Paris goals, but offered no practical plan for how to avoid SRM playing into the hands of political and commercial interests that have much to lose <https://www.lse.ac.uk/granthaminstitute/explainers/what-are-stranded-assets/#:~:text=But%2C%20to%20get%20an%20idea,at%20risk%20of%20becoming%20stranded%29.> from the rapid decarbonization required.[1] <https://legal-planet.org/2024/03/08/the-global-conversation-about-solar-geoengineering-just-changed/#_ftn1> As the dust settles on UNEA-6, we are left without intergovernmental knowledge sharing and research governance and coordination. A research-race may well escalate among leading states, while others are left to their own devices to navigate the scientific, political, ethical and democratic challenges that SRM poses. *Source: Legal Planet* -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "geoengineering" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/geoengineering/CAHJsh99aUKjMh_D8DjMFWPkFNDDkBrjo-Erx_yXbN_9OSQ0zvA%40mail.gmail.com.
