*Thanks to Leon for pointing this out*

icfg.eu /issue-brief-climate-security/
<https://icfg.eu/issue-brief-climate-security/> 12/09/2024
------------------------------
Why the EU Needs a Comprehensive Climate Security Strategy

This issue brief examines how the impacts of climate change and *climate
interventions* could affect the EU’s security, and explores how timely
governance and prudent research by the European Union can improve potential
outcomes. To this end, the International Center for Future Generations
(ICFG) *recommends the EU develop and implement a comprehensive Climate
Security Strategy, one that includes an analysis of solar radiation
modification and its potential effects on the EU’s security profile. *

*Download the brief here: *
<https://icfg.eu/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/ICFG_Issue-brief_security-implications-of-climate-change-and-climate-interventions.pdf>
*Annex 1: Key References to Security Implications of Climate Change and
Interventions *

The following provides an overview of key statements by institutions in the
US, EU, and UN pertinent to security implications of climate change and
climate interventions; in order of recency. Highlights are ours.

*United States Department of Defense, Climate change and global security,
2024:*
<https://dsb.cto.mil/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/DSB_SS2023_Climate_8-12-24_Cleared.pdf>
“Since weather extremes may alter the defence posture of both Allies and
potential adversaries, weather manipulation could be weaponized. The threat
of state-sponsored large-scale weather manipulation using geoengineering
techniques warrants an Allied ability to detect such actions.
While large-scale deployment of SAI is observable, many have called for
research to be conducted into SAI to facilitate informed policy debates. In
particular, The White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP)
states, “Outdoor experiments would be valuable in combination with model
and laboratory studies for understanding processes involved with potential
SRM (Solar Radiation Modification) deployment.” A report by the National
Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine proposes a small-scale
research, typically smaller than 100X, that would result in an observable
impact on climate and be conducted under an international regime of
governance founded on transparency. While international collaboration in
SAI research could be beneficial in creating sound policy decisions
regarding issues associated with climate intervention, one must also
address the concern of state actors who may conduct this type of research
without transparency and then may leverage knowledge gained to produce a
unilateral breakout capability. […]
A program to measure stratospheric aerosols and particulates is also needed
to *improve atmospheric modelling and prevent strategic surprise*. This
program should provide a capability for the widespread measurement of
atmospheric aerosols and particulates to ensure that an adversary cannot be
positioned for *strategic surprise in executing unilateral climate
interaction *(sic) action. Further, possessing the capability to deny that
stratospheric tampering occurred is a valuable message to counteract
potential histrionics used in psychological operations. […]
Finally, there is a need to leverage remote sensing for large-scale
monitoring, given the global implications of climate intervention
technologies. A partnership between the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence (ODNI) and the DoD could address the challenge of collecting
all available information, including the measurement data recommended
above, to provide an assessment of adversary plans for large-scale climate
intervention activities. […]
For the DoD, the implications of climate intervention include not only the
effect of such approaches on its military operations but also the *possibility
that it will have to respond to state sponsored climate intervention
activities*. The DoD will have to* develop the capability to monitor* such
activities, which includes deploying the appropriate sensing capability.
Measuring stratospheric aerosols and particulates to avoid strategic
surprise will be key. The DoD must also *partner with other government
agencies* developing these modeling and sensor capabilities.”

*European Environment Agency, European Climate Risk Assessment, 2024:*
<https://climate-adapt.eea.europa.eu/en/eu-adaptation-policy/key-eu-actions/european-climate-risk-assessment>
“The first European Climate Risk Assessment (EUCRA) is a comprehensive
assessment of the major climate risks facing Europe today and in the
future. It identifies 36 climate risks that threaten our energy and food
security, ecosystems, infrastructure, water resources, financial systems,
and people’s health. Many of these risks have already reached critical
levels and can become catastrophic without urgent and decisive action.
(Extreme) events, combined with environmental and social risk drivers, pose
major challenges throughout Europe. Specifically, they compromise food and
water security, energy security and financial stability, and the health of
the general population and of outdoor workers; in turn, this affects social
cohesion and stability.”

*UN Security Council 9547th meeting, Press Release, 2024:*
<https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15591.doc.htm>
“The Security Council today concluded its open debate on climate change and
food insecurity, with speakers calling for urgent action to address the
profound impact of these escalating crises particularly on vulnerable and
conflict-affected nations.”

*US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), Slowdown of the
Motion of the Ocean, 2023:*
<https://science.nasa.gov/earth/earth-atmosphere/slowdown-of-the-motion-of-the-ocean/>
“…the movement of water north and south throughout the Atlantic might be
weakening due to climate change,” with potentially severe consequences for
weather patterns in Europe.”

*European Commission and High Representative on Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy, Joint Communication on the Climate-Security Nexus, 2023:*
<https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/joint-communication-climate-security-nexus_en>
“In the context of accelerated global warming, deliberate large-scale
intervention in the Earth’s natural systems (referred to as
“geoengineering”), such as solar radiation modification, is attracting more
attention.  However, the risks, impacts and unintended  consequences that
these technologies pose are poorly understood, and necessary rules,
procedures and institutions have not been developed. These technologies
introduce new risks to people and ecosystems, while they could also
increase power imbalances between nations, spark conflicts and raise a
myriad of ethical, legal, governance and political issues. Guided by the
precautionary principle, the EU will support international efforts to
assess comprehensively the risks and uncertainties of climate
interventions, including solar radiation modification and promote
discussions on a potential international framework for its governance,
including research related aspects. …
Climate change and environmental degradation pose increasing risks to
international peace and security. Extreme weather events, rising
temperatures and sea levels, desertification, water scarcity, threats to
biodiversity, environmental pollution and contamination and loss of
livelihoods threaten the health and well-being of humanity, and can create
the potential for greater migratory movements and displacement, pandemics,
social unrest, instability and insecurity.”

*European Commission, Communication on Managing climate risks – protecting
people and prosperity, 2023:*
<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52024DC0091>
“Climate resilience is a matter of maintaining societal functions, but also
of competitiveness for economies and companies, and thus jobs. Managing
climate risks is a necessary condition for improving living standards,
fighting inequality and protecting people. It is a matter of economic
survival for rural and coastal areas, farmers, foresters and fishers. For
businesses, climate risks are already well recognised and are seen as the
top four risks in a decade.”

*Council of the EU, Council conclusions on Climate and Energy Diplomacy,
2023:*
<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/03/09/council-approves-conclusions-bolstering-climate-and-energy-diplomacy-in-a-critical-decade/#:~:text=The%20Council%20today%20approved%20conclusions%20reaffirming%20that%20EU,climate%20change%20effects%2C%20and%20increase%20collective%20climate%20finance>
“EU climate and energy diplomacy is a core component of the EU’s foreign
policy.”

*UN Environment Program, One Atmosphere, 2023:*
<https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/41903/one_atmosphere.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y>
“SRM could create societal risks including the potential for international
conflicts (because of transboundary effects), unilateral SRM (‘rogue’
parties may opt for SRM deployment) and counter and countervailing SRM
deployments. SRM deployment would therefore raise ethical, moral, legal,
equity and justice questions.
The lower cost estimate of an SRM deployment (about 20 billion USD per year
per 1°C of cooling) puts the cost of an SRM deployment within the reach of
many states and perhaps non-state actors, raising concern over how a ‘rogue
deployment’ might be avoided or responded to. […] There are also concerns
that differences of opinion over whether, what kind or how much SRM to
deploy could generate political and possibly even military conflict.
Critically, integrated assessments of many impacts, both positive and
negative, remain limited in scientific literature; for example, mortality
and morbidity from heat stress, water resources, flood risk, storm damage,
vector-borne diseases, biodiversity, food security, ocean ecosystems and
fisheries.”

*UN Security Council, Climate Crisis Generating Growing Threats to Global
Peace, 2023:* <https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15318.doc.htm>
* “*With the climate crisis generating an increasing threat to global peace
and security, the Security Council must ramp up its efforts to protect the
Organization’s peace operations around the world and lessen the risk of
conflicts emanating from rising sea levels, droughts, floods and other
climate-related events, briefers, ministers and delegates told the
15-nation organ.”

*European Parliament Research Services, Briefing: Climate change
considerations for EU security and defence policy, 2022: *
<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2022/729467/EPRS_BRI(2022)729467_EN.pdf>
“Among the sectors affected, security and defence is not spared: climate
change not only acts as a threat multiplier, but also impacts capabilities
and operational considerations.”

*UN Environment Program, Addressing Climate-Related Security Risks, 2019
and revised in 2022: *
<https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/40329/security_risks.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>
“Residents of urban and peri-urban areas in climate-exposed regions face
growing risks of displacement (and possibly secondary displacement),
especially in vulnerable coastal regions. The effect of environmental and
climatic changes on migration is best understood within the context of
existing migration patterns. Conflicts can force people in high-risk areas
to flee to less dangerous places within their own country or across
borders. In cases where environmental risks and violent conflicts occur at
the same time, this pressure can even be intensified, and in receiving
areas, an influx of migrants can put pressure on local resources or public
services, exacerbating the likelihood of political tensions or outbreaks of
violence. However, migration can also be an effective adaptation strategy.
Migration can improve living conditions and provide economic perspectives.
Temporary or seasonal migration from severely affected regions to less
affected areas, such as during seasonal rainfalls or heat waves, can help
cope with a crisis.”

*UN Development Program, A typology and analysis of climate-related
security risks, 2022:*
<https://www.undp.org/publications/typology-and-analysis-climate-related-security-risks-first-round-nationally-determined-contributions>
“The analysis shows that climate change is recognized by many countries as
a matter of national security, but also as a factor that exacerbates the
drivers of different types of conflict and security risks. Conflict and
insecurity are also described in the NDCs as increasing vulnerability to
climate change and/or as being potentially disruptive to climate action and
to the achievement of NDC targets, including in post-conflict situations.”

*United States National Intelligence Council, Climate Change and
International Responses Increasing Challenges to US National Security
Through 2040, 2021:*
<https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/NIE_Climate_Change_and_National_Security.pdf>
“Risk of Unilateral Geoengineering Increasing: We assess there is a growing
risk that a country would unilaterally test and possibly deploy large-scale
solar geoengineering technologies as a way to counter intensifying climate
effects if it perceived other efforts to limit warming to 1.5˚C had failed.
Without an international agreement on these technologies, we assess that
such a unilateral effort probably would cause blowback.”  And, “We assess
that the lack of any country level dialogue or governance body to set
regulations and enforce transparency over research increases the
possibility that state or nonstate actors will independently develop or
deploy the technology— possibly covertly—in a manner that risks conflict if
other nations blame them for a weather disaster they believe was caused by
geoengineering.
Large-scale geoengineering could be internationally disruptive because of
its potential to substantially affect the Earth’s biosphere, which would
change global weather patterns and provide climate benefits to some regions
at the expense of others. Depending on the scale and location of
deployment, it could change weather systems in the United States.
Researchers in several countries, including Australia, China, India,
Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, as well as several EU
members, are exploring geoengineering techniques. We assess that the lack
of any country level dialogue or governance body to set regulations and
enforce transparency over research increases the possibility that state or
nonstate actors will independently develop or deploy the technology—
possibly covertly—in a manner that risks conflict if other nations blame
them for a weather disaster they believe was caused by geoengineering.”

*EU Commission, Communication on Forging a climate-resilient Europe – the
new EU Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change, 2021:*
<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2021:82:FIN>
“The impacts of climate change have knock-on effects across borders and
continents. Even local climate impacts have regional or global
repercussions, and such transboundary climate risk can reach Europe. For
instance, the disruption of port infrastructure could hamper or even close
down trade routes, both for commodities and goods, with potential cascading
effects across international supply chains.”

*UN Climate Security Mechanism, Progress report, 2021:*
<https://dppa.un.org/sites/default/files/csm_progress_report_2021_final.pdf>
“The Climate Security Mechanism (CSM) is a joint initiative by the United
Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP). It was established in 2018 with the objective
of strengthening the capacity of the United Nations system to analyze and
more systematically address the adverse impacts of climate change on peace
and security. The CSM works with partners around the world to enhance a
gender-sensitive understanding of the issue and to support capacity
building efforts in United Nations entities and regional and subregional
organizations for the prevention and management of climate-related security
risks.”

*Council of the EU, Council conclusions on Climate Diplomacy, 2020:*
<https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5033-2020-INIT/en/pdf>
“The European Union is acutely aware that climate change multiplies threats
to international stability and security in particular affecting those in
most fragile and vulnerable situations, reinforcing environmental pressures
and disaster risk, contributing to the loss of livelihoods and forcing the
displacement of people. … The Council continues to encourage the UN
Security Council (UNSC) and the United Nations system to create a
comprehensive information basis for the UNSC on climate-related security
risks, to fully integrate short and long-term climate and environmental
risk factors in the assessment and management of threats to peace and
security, at country, regional and international levels, and to draw on the
expertise of the whole UN system in order to find operational responses to
these risks and strengthen UN missions on the ground.”

*EU External Action Service, Climate Change and Defence Roadmap, 2020:*
<https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-12741-2020-INIT/en/pdf>
“Climate change increases global instability. This will likely increase the
number of crisis situations to which the EU might need to respond while at
the same time the armed forces will be asked more frequently to assist
civilian authorities in response to flooding or forest fires, both at home
and abroad. Future capabilities will need to adapt to this changing
operational environment (e.g. extreme heat or higher sea levels). At the
same time, the armed forces need to invest in greener technologies
throughout their capability inventory and infrastructure.”

*International Military Council on Climate and Security, The World climate
and security report, 2020:*
<https://imccs.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/World-Climate-Security-Report-2020_2_13.pdf>
“Integrate climate into armed forces risk assessment, early warning,
surveillance, and operational preparations to include adaptation measures
to climate-proof military infrastructure.Early warning and surveillance
framework should also have the capacity to anticipate risks from emergent
climate-manipulating technologies such as geoengineering.”

*UN Development Program, Climate Security Nexus and Prevention of Violent
Extremism, 2020:*
<https://www.undp.org/publications/undp-climate-security-nexus-and-prevention-violent-extremism>
“Climate change can contribute to food and water insecurity, but also
increase competition for essential resources, impair livelihoods and coping
strategies to have disruptive effects on the life opportunities of young
people. It can drive forced displacement and rural-urban migration as well
as alter transhumance patterns, potentially fuelling social tensions
between different communities and exacerbating the drivers of conflict and
fragility. Investment in adaptation and resilience can offset some of these
impacts, but not all. These indirect impacts on governance and social
systems are an important consideration when examining the intersectional
risks posed by climate change and violent extremism.”

*Council of the EU, Conclusions on Security and Defence in the context of
the EU Global Strategy, 2019:*
<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/39786/st10048-en19.pdf>
“Underlines the importance environmental issues and climate change have for
security and defence, as outlined in the Council conclusions on Climate
Diplomacy of February 2019. The Council also welcomes the increased climate
sensitivity of EU actions on conflict prevention and sustainable security
and emphasises the need for adequate risk assessment and risk management
strategies. […] considering the impact of climate change within the
assessment of global threats and challenges.”

*EU External Action Service, EU Statement before the United Nations
Security Council, “Addressing the impacts of climate-related disasters on
international peace and security” 2019:*
<https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/eu-statement-%E2%80%93-united-nations-security-council-addressing-impacts-climate_en>
“Climate change acts as a threat multiplier for conflicts over access to
increasingly scarce resources and for instability and international and
internal displacement. […] Assessing climate and environmental risks and
their potential impact on socio-economic stability should be done in all
countries but has to become a priority especially in the most fragile
situations.”

*EU External Action Service, A Global Strategy for the European Union’s
Foreign and Security Policy, 2016:*
<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/public-register/public-register-search/?AllLanguagesSearch=False&OnlyPublicDocuments=False&DocumentLanguage=EN&ImmcIdentifier=ST%2010715%202016%20INIT>
“Yet today terrorism, hybrid threats, economic volatility, climate change
and energy insecurity endanger our people and territory. … Climate change
and environmental degradation exacerbate potential conflict, in light of
their impact on desertification, land degradation, and water and food
scarcity. We will therefore redouble our efforts on prevention, monitoring
root causes such as human rights violations, inequality, resource stress,
and climate change – which is  a threat multiplier that catalyses water and
food scarcity, pandemics and displacement.”

*European Union Institute for Security Studies EUISS, Report on Space
security **for Europe, 2016**:*
<https://csps.aerospace.org/sites/default/files/2021-08/Space%20Security%20for%20Europe%20Jul16.pdf>
“This can include reinforcing the use of space assets for addressing global
challenges (such as environment protection, climate change, sustainable
development, and disaster response) while at the same time building space
economic diplomacy to promote the European industrial base. International
space cooperation can thus become a diplomatic tool that serves both as a
market opener for the promotion of European solutions abroad and as a door
opener to deeper cooperation on space security issues.”

*UN Environment Program, Livelihood Security Climate Change, Migration and
Conflict in the Sahel, 2011:*
<https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/8032/-Livelihood%20Security_%20Climate%20change%2c%20conflict%20and%20migration%20in%20the%20Sahel-20111079.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y>
“Changes in the [Sahel’s] regional climate are impacting issues linked to
the availability of natural resources essential to livelihoods in the
region, as well as food insecurity. Along with important social, economic
and political factors, this can lead to migration, conflict or a
combination of the two.”

*UN General Assembly, “Invites Major United Nations Organs to Intensify
Efforts in Addressing Security Implications of Climate Change”, 2009: *
<https://press.un.org/en/2009/ga10830.doc.htm>
“Deeply concerned about the possible security implications of climate
change, the General Assembly today invited the major organs of the United
Nations, including the Security Council, to intensify their efforts to
address the challenge, as appropriate and within their respective mandates.”

*UN Security Council, “Security councils hols first-ever debate on impact
of climate change on peace, security”, 2007: *
<https://press.un.org/en/2007/sc9000.doc.htm>
“Security council holds first-ever debate on impact of climate change on
peace, security, hearing over 50 speakers. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon
said that projected climate changes could not only have serious
environmental, social and economic implications, but implications for peace
and security (…) outlined several “alarming, though not alarmist”
scenarios, including limited or threatened access to energy increasing the
risk of conflict, a scarcity of food and water transforming peaceful
competition into violence and floods and droughts sparking massive human
migrations, polarizing societies and weakening the ability of countries to
resolve conflicts peacefully.”
*Annex 2: Existing international treaties and UN Resolutions relevant to
SRM*

This section provides an overview of international treaties and resolutions
relevant to SEM. It is based on UNEP, 2023.
<https://www.unep.org/resources/report/Solar-Radiation-Modification-research-deployment>
*Conventions and Protocols*
*Convention / Treaty* *Year* *Potential relevance*
*Liability Convention (of the Outer Space Treaty)* *1972* The Liability
Convention
<https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/introliability-convention.html>
of the outer space treaty provides that a launching State shall be
absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage caused by its space
objects on the surface of the Earth or to aircraft, and liable for damage
due to its faults in space. The Convention also provides for procedures for
the settlement of claims for damages.
*ENMOD Convention* *1977* The ENMOD convention
<https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1978/10/19781005%2000-39%20AM/Ch_XXVI_01p.pdf>
prohibits hostile action to modify the environment as a means of warfare.
And it encourages the exchange of scientific and technological information
on the use of environmental modification techniques for peaceful purposes.
“States Parties in a position to do so shall contribute, alone or together
with other States or international organizations, to international economic
and scientific co-operation in the preservation, improvement and peaceful
utilization of the environment, with due consideration for the needs of the
developing areas of the world.”
*Vienna Convention **/ Montreal Protocol* *1985* Parties to the Vienna
Convention and Montreal Protocol
<https://ozone.unep.org/treaties/montreal-protocol>agree to adopt measures
to reduce or prevent human activities that have or are likely to have
adverse effects resulting from modification of the ozone layer.
The governance model may offer insight into regulating SAI deployment,
though the applicability is limited insofar that many of the substances
that could be used for SAI are naturally occurring or otherwise commonly
used and only when injected in the stratosphere would they hold adverse
effects.
*Convention on **Environmental **Impact Assessment **in a
Transboundary **Context
(UNECE)* *1991* The UN Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a
Transboundary Context
<https://unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/eia/documents/legaltexts/Espoo_Convention_authentic_ENG.pdf>
(under the UN Economic Commission for Europe 1991) calls for parties to
undertake environmental impact assessment, potentially including for SRM
activities.
*UNFCCC Article 3.3* *1992* The Parties should take precautionary measures
to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate change and
mitigate its adverse effects.

Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full
scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such
measures, taking into account that policies and measures to deal with
climate change should be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at
the lowest possible cost.
*UN Resolutions, draft resolutions, multilateral agreements, and COP
decisions *
*Convention / Treaty* *Year* *Potential relevance*
*CBD – Decision **X/33* *2010* Ensure … in the absence of science-based,
global, transparent and effective control and regulatory mechanisms for
geo-engineering … that no climate- related geoengineering activities that
may affect biodiversity take place, until there is an adequate scientific
basis on which to justify such activities and appropriate consideration of
the associated risks for the environment and biodiversity and associated
social, economic and cultural impacts, except for small scale scientific
research studies that would be conducted in a controlled setting…
*UNEP/CBD/**SBSTTA/16/INF/28* *2012* Impact of Climate-related
Geoengineering on Biological Diversity. Note by the Executive Secretary –
Chapter 4: Potential impacts on biodiversity of generic SRM that causes
uniform dimming.
*London Protocol Amendment on Marine Geoengineering*
The London Protocol amendment on marine geoengineering seeks to establish a
stable, legally-binding framework for the regulation of marine
geoengineering, while also allowing for regulatory flexibility and
adaptability to respond to new scientific and technological proposals that
may adversely affect the marine environment in the future based on a
precautionary approach. ‘Marine geoengineering’ is defined in the amendment
as a deliberate intervention in the marine environment to manipulate
natural processes, including to counteract anthropogenic climate change and
its impacts, and that have the potential to result in deleterious effects,
especially where those effects may be widespread, long-lasting or severe.

The governance model regarding permitting of research is seen by some as a
possible model for regulating SAI research (under a suitable convention),
though it is unclear if it is effective at ensuring the pursuit of research
of high value as permitting agencies may be incentivized to err excessively
on the side of prevention.
*Draft resolutions on **“Geoengineering” at UNEA-4 and on Solar Radiation
Modification at UNEA-6* *2019, 2024* UNEA-4 considered a proposal for a
UNEP-led report on the risks and potential of climate engineering, which
did not find consensus.

UNEA-6 considered a proposal, which initially suggested that UNEP would
convene a group of experts to produce a detailed assessment report and a
later revised version suggested asking UNEP to facilitate information
sharing, neither of which found consensus though Parties seemed to agree
that having a range of options for information sharing would be desirable
heading into UNEA-7 in 2025.
*The Montreal **Protocol Decision **XXXI/2: Area **of focus for **2022
Scientific **Assessment Panel* *2021* Potential areas of focus for the 2022
quadrennial reports of the Scientific Assessment Panel, the Environmental
Effects Assessment Panel and the Technology and Economic Assessment Panel:
“…An assessment of information and research related to solar radiation
management and its potential effect on the stratospheric ozone layer”.
*Security Council **SC/14732 **(Draft resolution)* *2021* Security Council
Fails to Adopt Resolution Integrating Climate-Related Security Risk into
Conflict-Prevention Strategies. The Security Council in a contentious
meeting, rejected a draft resolution that would have integrated
climate-related security risk as a central component of United Nations
conflict prevention strategies aiming to help counter the risk of conflict
relapse.
*General Assembly **Resolution **A/76/473, para. 12* *2021* 76/112.
Protection of the atmosphere – Resolution adopted by the General Assembly
on 9 December 2021 [on the report of the Sixth Committee (A/76/473, para.
12)]. Guideline 7 – Intentional large-scale modification of the atmosphere
Activities aimed at intentional large-scale modification of the atmosphere
should only be conducted with prudence and caution, and subject to any
applicable rules of international law, including those relating to
environmental impact assessment.
*Human Rights **Council **A/HRC/RES/48/14, **para. * *2022* 48/14. Mandate
of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights
in the context of climate change [Resolution adopted by the Human Rights
Council on 8 October 2021] Paragraph 6 – Requests the Advisory Committee of
the Human Rights Council to conduct a study and to prepare a report, in
close cooperation with the Special Rapporteur, on the impact of new
technologies for climate protection on the enjoyment of human rights, and
to submit the report to the Council at its fifty-fourth session.

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