Thank you for your interest in our policy brief calling for a comprehensive European Climate Security Strategy. Given the flurry of justified concerns regarding tipping points with their knock-on impacts on societies' very functioning and the possibility of (un-)coordinated SRM deployment with uncertain benefits and risks, we believe that the development of such a strategy would be crucial to identifying key threats and possibilities for addressing them across the ecosystem of European institutions.
We are currently *not* prepared. I am happy to get any questions or feedback. Even more importantly – if you agree, share the message with your country representatives, research funders, or other pertinent agencies! Renaud de RICHTER schrieb am Donnerstag, 24. Oktober 2024 um 12:52:51 UTC+2: > *Thanks to Leon for pointing this out* > > icfg.eu /issue-brief-climate-security/ > <https://icfg.eu/issue-brief-climate-security/> 12/09/2024 > ------------------------------ > Why the EU Needs a Comprehensive Climate Security Strategy > > This issue brief examines how the impacts of climate change and *climate > interventions* could affect the EU’s security, and explores how timely > governance and prudent research by the European Union can improve potential > outcomes. To this end, the International Center for Future Generations > (ICFG) *recommends the EU develop and implement a comprehensive Climate > Security Strategy, one that includes an analysis of solar radiation > modification and its potential effects on the EU’s security profile. * > > *Download the brief here: * > > <https://icfg.eu/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/ICFG_Issue-brief_security-implications-of-climate-change-and-climate-interventions.pdf> > > *Annex 1: Key References to Security Implications of Climate Change and > Interventions * > > The following provides an overview of key statements by institutions in > the US, EU, and UN pertinent to security implications of climate change and > climate interventions; in order of recency. Highlights are ours. > > *United States Department of Defense, Climate change and global security, > 2024:* > <https://dsb.cto.mil/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/DSB_SS2023_Climate_8-12-24_Cleared.pdf> > “Since weather extremes may alter the defence posture of both Allies and > potential adversaries, weather manipulation could be weaponized. The threat > of state-sponsored large-scale weather manipulation using geoengineering > techniques warrants an Allied ability to detect such actions. > While large-scale deployment of SAI is observable, many have called for > research to be conducted into SAI to facilitate informed policy debates. In > particular, The White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) > states, “Outdoor experiments would be valuable in combination with model > and laboratory studies for understanding processes involved with potential > SRM (Solar Radiation Modification) deployment.” A report by the National > Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine proposes a small-scale > research, typically smaller than 100X, that would result in an observable > impact on climate and be conducted under an international regime of > governance founded on transparency. While international collaboration in > SAI research could be beneficial in creating sound policy decisions > regarding issues associated with climate intervention, one must also > address the concern of state actors who may conduct this type of research > without transparency and then may leverage knowledge gained to produce a > unilateral breakout capability. […] > A program to measure stratospheric aerosols and particulates is also > needed to *improve atmospheric modelling and prevent strategic surprise*. > This program should provide a capability for the widespread measurement of > atmospheric aerosols and particulates to ensure that an adversary cannot be > positioned for *strategic surprise in executing unilateral climate > interaction *(sic) action. Further, possessing the capability to deny > that stratospheric tampering occurred is a valuable message to counteract > potential histrionics used in psychological operations. […] > Finally, there is a need to leverage remote sensing for large-scale > monitoring, given the global implications of climate intervention > technologies. A partnership between the Office of the Director of National > Intelligence (ODNI) and the DoD could address the challenge of collecting > all available information, including the measurement data recommended > above, to provide an assessment of adversary plans for large-scale climate > intervention activities. […] > For the DoD, the implications of climate intervention include not only the > effect of such approaches on its military operations but also the > *possibility > that it will have to respond to state sponsored climate intervention > activities*. The DoD will have to* develop the capability to monitor* > such activities, which includes deploying the appropriate sensing > capability. Measuring stratospheric aerosols and particulates to avoid > strategic surprise will be key. The DoD must also *partner with other > government agencies* developing these modeling and sensor capabilities.” > > *European Environment Agency, European Climate Risk Assessment, 2024:* > <https://climate-adapt.eea.europa.eu/en/eu-adaptation-policy/key-eu-actions/european-climate-risk-assessment> > “The first European Climate Risk Assessment (EUCRA) is a comprehensive > assessment of the major climate risks facing Europe today and in the > future. It identifies 36 climate risks that threaten our energy and food > security, ecosystems, infrastructure, water resources, financial systems, > and people’s health. Many of these risks have already reached critical > levels and can become catastrophic without urgent and decisive action. > (Extreme) events, combined with environmental and social risk drivers, > pose major challenges throughout Europe. Specifically, they compromise food > and water security, energy security and financial stability, and the health > of the general population and of outdoor workers; in turn, this affects > social cohesion and stability.” > > *UN Security Council 9547th meeting, Press Release, 2024:* > <https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15591.doc.htm> > “The Security Council today concluded its open debate on climate change > and food insecurity, with speakers calling for urgent action to address the > profound impact of these escalating crises particularly on vulnerable and > conflict-affected nations.” > > *US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), Slowdown of the > Motion of the Ocean, 2023:* > <https://science.nasa.gov/earth/earth-atmosphere/slowdown-of-the-motion-of-the-ocean/> > “…the movement of water north and south throughout the Atlantic might be > weakening due to climate change,” with potentially severe consequences for > weather patterns in Europe.” > > *European Commission and High Representative on Foreign Affairs and > Security Policy, Joint Communication on the Climate-Security Nexus, 2023:* > <https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/joint-communication-climate-security-nexus_en> > “In the context of accelerated global warming, deliberate large-scale > intervention in the Earth’s natural systems (referred to as > “geoengineering”), such as solar radiation modification, is attracting more > attention. However, the risks, impacts and unintended consequences that > these technologies pose are poorly understood, and necessary rules, > procedures and institutions have not been developed. These technologies > introduce new risks to people and ecosystems, while they could also > increase power imbalances between nations, spark conflicts and raise a > myriad of ethical, legal, governance and political issues. Guided by the > precautionary principle, the EU will support international efforts to > assess comprehensively the risks and uncertainties of climate > interventions, including solar radiation modification and promote > discussions on a potential international framework for its governance, > including research related aspects. … > Climate change and environmental degradation pose increasing risks to > international peace and security. Extreme weather events, rising > temperatures and sea levels, desertification, water scarcity, threats to > biodiversity, environmental pollution and contamination and loss of > livelihoods threaten the health and well-being of humanity, and can create > the potential for greater migratory movements and displacement, pandemics, > social unrest, instability and insecurity.” > > *European Commission, Communication on Managing climate risks – protecting > people and prosperity, 2023:* > <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52024DC0091> > “Climate resilience is a matter of maintaining societal functions, but > also of competitiveness for economies and companies, and thus jobs. > Managing climate risks is a necessary condition for improving living > standards, fighting inequality and protecting people. It is a matter of > economic survival for rural and coastal areas, farmers, foresters and > fishers. For businesses, climate risks are already well recognised and are > seen as the top four risks in a decade.” > > *Council of the EU, Council conclusions on Climate and Energy Diplomacy, > 2023:* > <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/03/09/council-approves-conclusions-bolstering-climate-and-energy-diplomacy-in-a-critical-decade/#:~:text=The%20Council%20today%20approved%20conclusions%20reaffirming%20that%20EU,climate%20change%20effects%2C%20and%20increase%20collective%20climate%20finance> > “EU climate and energy diplomacy is a core component of the EU’s foreign > policy.” > > *UN Environment Program, One Atmosphere, 2023:* > <https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/41903/one_atmosphere.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y> > “SRM could create societal risks including the potential for international > conflicts (because of transboundary effects), unilateral SRM (‘rogue’ > parties may opt for SRM deployment) and counter and countervailing SRM > deployments. SRM deployment would therefore raise ethical, moral, legal, > equity and justice questions. > The lower cost estimate of an SRM deployment (about 20 billion USD per > year per 1°C of cooling) puts the cost of an SRM deployment within the > reach of many states and perhaps non-state actors, raising concern over how > a ‘rogue deployment’ might be avoided or responded to. […] There are also > concerns that differences of opinion over whether, what kind or how much > SRM to deploy could generate political and possibly even military conflict. > Critically, integrated assessments of many impacts, both positive and > negative, remain limited in scientific literature; for example, mortality > and morbidity from heat stress, water resources, flood risk, storm damage, > vector-borne diseases, biodiversity, food security, ocean ecosystems and > fisheries.” > > *UN Security Council, Climate Crisis Generating Growing Threats to Global > Peace, 2023:* <https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15318.doc.htm> > * “*With the climate crisis generating an increasing threat to global > peace and security, the Security Council must ramp up its efforts to > protect the Organization’s peace operations around the world and lessen the > risk of conflicts emanating from rising sea levels, droughts, floods and > other climate-related events, briefers, ministers and delegates told the > 15-nation organ.” > > *European Parliament Research Services, Briefing: Climate change > considerations for EU security and defence policy, 2022: * > <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2022/729467/EPRS_BRI(2022)729467_EN.pdf> > “Among the sectors affected, security and defence is not spared: climate > change not only acts as a threat multiplier, but also impacts capabilities > and operational considerations.” > > *UN Environment Program, Addressing Climate-Related Security Risks, 2019 > and revised in 2022: * > <https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/40329/security_risks.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y> > “Residents of urban and peri-urban areas in climate-exposed regions face > growing risks of displacement (and possibly secondary displacement), > especially in vulnerable coastal regions. The effect of environmental and > climatic changes on migration is best understood within the context of > existing migration patterns. Conflicts can force people in high-risk areas > to flee to less dangerous places within their own country or across > borders. In cases where environmental risks and violent conflicts occur at > the same time, this pressure can even be intensified, and in receiving > areas, an influx of migrants can put pressure on local resources or public > services, exacerbating the likelihood of political tensions or outbreaks of > violence. However, migration can also be an effective adaptation strategy. > Migration can improve living conditions and provide economic perspectives. > Temporary or seasonal migration from severely affected regions to less > affected areas, such as during seasonal rainfalls or heat waves, can help > cope with a crisis.” > > *UN Development Program, A typology and analysis of climate-related > security risks, 2022:* > <https://www.undp.org/publications/typology-and-analysis-climate-related-security-risks-first-round-nationally-determined-contributions> > “The analysis shows that climate change is recognized by many countries as > a matter of national security, but also as a factor that exacerbates the > drivers of different types of conflict and security risks. Conflict and > insecurity are also described in the NDCs as increasing vulnerability to > climate change and/or as being potentially disruptive to climate action and > to the achievement of NDC targets, including in post-conflict situations.” > > *United States National Intelligence Council, Climate Change and > International Responses Increasing Challenges to US National Security > Through 2040, 2021:* > <https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/NIE_Climate_Change_and_National_Security.pdf> > “Risk of Unilateral Geoengineering Increasing: We assess there is a > growing risk that a country would unilaterally test and possibly deploy > large-scale solar geoengineering technologies as a way to counter > intensifying climate effects if it perceived other efforts to limit warming > to 1.5˚C had failed. Without an international agreement on these > technologies, we assess that such a unilateral effort probably would cause > blowback.” And, “We assess that the lack of any country level dialogue or > governance body to set regulations and enforce transparency over research > increases the possibility that state or nonstate actors will independently > develop or deploy the technology— possibly covertly—in a manner that risks > conflict if other nations blame them for a weather disaster they believe > was caused by geoengineering. > Large-scale geoengineering could be internationally disruptive because of > its potential to substantially affect the Earth’s biosphere, which would > change global weather patterns and provide climate benefits to some regions > at the expense of others. Depending on the scale and location of > deployment, it could change weather systems in the United States. > Researchers in several countries, including Australia, China, India, > Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, as well as several EU > members, are exploring geoengineering techniques. We assess that the lack > of any country level dialogue or governance body to set regulations and > enforce transparency over research increases the possibility that state or > nonstate actors will independently develop or deploy the technology— > possibly covertly—in a manner that risks conflict if other nations blame > them for a weather disaster they believe was caused by geoengineering.” > > *EU Commission, Communication on Forging a climate-resilient Europe – the > new EU Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change, 2021:* > <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2021:82:FIN> > “The impacts of climate change have knock-on effects across borders and > continents. Even local climate impacts have regional or global > repercussions, and such transboundary climate risk can reach Europe. For > instance, the disruption of port infrastructure could hamper or even close > down trade routes, both for commodities and goods, with potential cascading > effects across international supply chains.” > > *UN Climate Security Mechanism, Progress report, 2021:* > <https://dppa.un.org/sites/default/files/csm_progress_report_2021_final.pdf> > “The Climate Security Mechanism (CSM) is a joint initiative by the United > Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), the > United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations > Environment Programme (UNEP). It was established in 2018 with the objective > of strengthening the capacity of the United Nations system to analyze and > more systematically address the adverse impacts of climate change on peace > and security. The CSM works with partners around the world to enhance a > gender-sensitive understanding of the issue and to support capacity > building efforts in United Nations entities and regional and subregional > organizations for the prevention and management of climate-related security > risks.” > > *Council of the EU, Council conclusions on Climate Diplomacy, 2020:* > <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5033-2020-INIT/en/pdf> > “The European Union is acutely aware that climate change multiplies > threats to international stability and security in particular affecting > those in most fragile and vulnerable situations, reinforcing environmental > pressures and disaster risk, contributing to the loss of livelihoods and > forcing the displacement of people. … The Council continues to encourage > the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the United Nations system to create a > comprehensive information basis for the UNSC on climate-related security > risks, to fully integrate short and long-term climate and environmental > risk factors in the assessment and management of threats to peace and > security, at country, regional and international levels, and to draw on the > expertise of the whole UN system in order to find operational responses to > these risks and strengthen UN missions on the ground.” > > *EU External Action Service, Climate Change and Defence Roadmap, 2020:* > <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-12741-2020-INIT/en/pdf> > “Climate change increases global instability. This will likely increase > the number of crisis situations to which the EU might need to respond while > at the same time the armed forces will be asked more frequently to assist > civilian authorities in response to flooding or forest fires, both at home > and abroad. Future capabilities will need to adapt to this changing > operational environment (e.g. extreme heat or higher sea levels). At the > same time, the armed forces need to invest in greener technologies > throughout their capability inventory and infrastructure.” > > *International Military Council on Climate and Security, The World climate > and security report, 2020:* > <https://imccs.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/World-Climate-Security-Report-2020_2_13.pdf> > “Integrate climate into armed forces risk assessment, early warning, > surveillance, and operational preparations to include adaptation measures > to climate-proof military infrastructure.Early warning and surveillance > framework should also have the capacity to anticipate risks from emergent > climate-manipulating technologies such as geoengineering.” > > *UN Development Program, Climate Security Nexus and Prevention of Violent > Extremism, 2020:* > <https://www.undp.org/publications/undp-climate-security-nexus-and-prevention-violent-extremism> > “Climate change can contribute to food and water insecurity, but also > increase competition for essential resources, impair livelihoods and coping > strategies to have disruptive effects on the life opportunities of young > people. It can drive forced displacement and rural-urban migration as well > as alter transhumance patterns, potentially fuelling social tensions > between different communities and exacerbating the drivers of conflict and > fragility. Investment in adaptation and resilience can offset some of these > impacts, but not all. These indirect impacts on governance and social > systems are an important consideration when examining the intersectional > risks posed by climate change and violent extremism.” > > *Council of the EU, Conclusions on Security and Defence in the context of > the EU Global Strategy, 2019:* > <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/39786/st10048-en19.pdf> > “Underlines the importance environmental issues and climate change have > for security and defence, as outlined in the Council conclusions on Climate > Diplomacy of February 2019. The Council also welcomes the increased climate > sensitivity of EU actions on conflict prevention and sustainable security > and emphasises the need for adequate risk assessment and risk management > strategies. […] considering the impact of climate change within the > assessment of global threats and challenges.” > > *EU External Action Service, EU Statement before the United Nations > Security Council, “Addressing the impacts of climate-related disasters on > international peace and security” 2019:* > <https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/eu-statement-%E2%80%93-united-nations-security-council-addressing-impacts-climate_en> > “Climate change acts as a threat multiplier for conflicts over access to > increasingly scarce resources and for instability and international and > internal displacement. […] Assessing climate and environmental risks and > their potential impact on socio-economic stability should be done in all > countries but has to become a priority especially in the most fragile > situations.” > > *EU External Action Service, A Global Strategy for the European Union’s > Foreign and Security Policy, 2016:* > <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/public-register/public-register-search/?AllLanguagesSearch=False&OnlyPublicDocuments=False&DocumentLanguage=EN&ImmcIdentifier=ST%2010715%202016%20INIT> > “Yet today terrorism, hybrid threats, economic volatility, climate change > and energy insecurity endanger our people and territory. … Climate change > and environmental degradation exacerbate potential conflict, in light of > their impact on desertification, land degradation, and water and food > scarcity. We will therefore redouble our efforts on prevention, monitoring > root causes such as human rights violations, inequality, resource stress, > and climate change – which is a threat multiplier that catalyses water and > food scarcity, pandemics and displacement.” > > *European Union Institute for Security Studies EUISS, Report on Space > security **for Europe, 2016**:* > <https://csps.aerospace.org/sites/default/files/2021-08/Space%20Security%20for%20Europe%20Jul16.pdf> > “This can include reinforcing the use of space assets for addressing > global challenges (such as environment protection, climate change, > sustainable development, and disaster response) while at the same time > building space economic diplomacy to promote the European industrial base. > International space cooperation can thus become a diplomatic tool that > serves both as a market opener for the promotion of European solutions > abroad and as a door opener to deeper cooperation on space security issues.” > > *UN Environment Program, Livelihood Security Climate Change, Migration and > Conflict in the Sahel, 2011:* > <https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/8032/-Livelihood%20Security_%20Climate%20change%2c%20conflict%20and%20migration%20in%20the%20Sahel-20111079.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y> > “Changes in the [Sahel’s] regional climate are impacting issues linked to > the availability of natural resources essential to livelihoods in the > region, as well as food insecurity. Along with important social, economic > and political factors, this can lead to migration, conflict or a > combination of the two.” > > *UN General Assembly, “Invites Major United Nations Organs to Intensify > Efforts in Addressing Security Implications of Climate Change”, 2009: * > <https://press.un.org/en/2009/ga10830.doc.htm> > “Deeply concerned about the possible security implications of climate > change, the General Assembly today invited the major organs of the United > Nations, including the Security Council, to intensify their efforts to > address the challenge, as appropriate and within their respective mandates.” > > *UN Security Council, “Security councils hols first-ever debate on impact > of climate change on peace, security”, 2007: * > <https://press.un.org/en/2007/sc9000.doc.htm> > “Security council holds first-ever debate on impact of climate change on > peace, security, hearing over 50 speakers. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon > said that projected climate changes could not only have serious > environmental, social and economic implications, but implications for peace > and security (…) outlined several “alarming, though not alarmist” > scenarios, including limited or threatened access to energy increasing the > risk of conflict, a scarcity of food and water transforming peaceful > competition into violence and floods and droughts sparking massive human > migrations, polarizing societies and weakening the ability of countries to > resolve conflicts peacefully.” > *Annex 2: Existing international treaties and UN Resolutions relevant to > SRM* > > This section provides an overview of international treaties and > resolutions relevant to SEM. It is based on UNEP, 2023. > <https://www.unep.org/resources/report/Solar-Radiation-Modification-research-deployment> > *Conventions and Protocols* > *Convention / Treaty* *Year* *Potential relevance* > *Liability Convention (of the Outer Space Treaty)* *1972* The Liability > Convention > <https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/introliability-convention.html> > > of the outer space treaty provides that a launching State shall be > absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage caused by its space > objects on the surface of the Earth or to aircraft, and liable for damage > due to its faults in space. The Convention also provides for procedures for > the settlement of claims for damages. > *ENMOD Convention* *1977* The ENMOD convention > <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1978/10/19781005%2000-39%20AM/Ch_XXVI_01p.pdf> > > prohibits hostile action to modify the environment as a means of warfare. > And it encourages the exchange of scientific and technological information > on the use of environmental modification techniques for peaceful purposes. > “States Parties in a position to do so shall contribute, alone or together > with other States or international organizations, to international economic > and scientific co-operation in the preservation, improvement and peaceful > utilization of the environment, with due consideration for the needs of the > developing areas of the world.” > *Vienna Convention **/ Montreal Protocol* *1985* Parties to the Vienna > Convention and Montreal Protocol > <https://ozone.unep.org/treaties/montreal-protocol>agree to adopt > measures to reduce or prevent human activities that have or are likely to > have adverse effects resulting from modification of the ozone layer. > The governance model may offer insight into regulating SAI deployment, > though the applicability is limited insofar that many of the substances > that could be used for SAI are naturally occurring or otherwise commonly > used and only when injected in the stratosphere would they hold adverse > effects. > *Convention on **Environmental **Impact Assessment **in a Transboundary > **Context > (UNECE)* *1991* The UN Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a > Transboundary Context > <https://unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/eia/documents/legaltexts/Espoo_Convention_authentic_ENG.pdf> > > (under the UN Economic Commission for Europe 1991) calls for parties to > undertake environmental impact assessment, potentially including for SRM > activities. > *UNFCCC Article 3.3* *1992* The Parties should take precautionary > measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate change > and mitigate its adverse effects. > > Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full > scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such > measures, taking into account that policies and measures to deal with > climate change should be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at > the lowest possible cost. > *UN Resolutions, draft resolutions, multilateral agreements, and COP > decisions * > *Convention / Treaty* *Year* *Potential relevance* > *CBD – Decision **X/33* *2010* Ensure … in the absence of science-based, > global, transparent and effective control and regulatory mechanisms for > geo-engineering … that no climate- related geoengineering activities that > may affect biodiversity take place, until there is an adequate scientific > basis on which to justify such activities and appropriate consideration of > the associated risks for the environment and biodiversity and associated > social, economic and cultural impacts, except for small scale scientific > research studies that would be conducted in a controlled setting… > *UNEP/CBD/**SBSTTA/16/INF/28* *2012* Impact of Climate-related > Geoengineering on Biological Diversity. Note by the Executive Secretary – > Chapter 4: Potential impacts on biodiversity of generic SRM that causes > uniform dimming. > *London Protocol Amendment on Marine Geoengineering* > The London Protocol amendment on marine geoengineering seeks to establish > a stable, legally-binding framework for the regulation of marine > geoengineering, while also allowing for regulatory flexibility and > adaptability to respond to new scientific and technological proposals that > may adversely affect the marine environment in the future based on a > precautionary approach. ‘Marine geoengineering’ is defined in the amendment > as a deliberate intervention in the marine environment to manipulate > natural processes, including to counteract anthropogenic climate change and > its impacts, and that have the potential to result in deleterious effects, > especially where those effects may be widespread, long-lasting or severe. > > The governance model regarding permitting of research is seen by some as a > possible model for regulating SAI research (under a suitable convention), > though it is unclear if it is effective at ensuring the pursuit of research > of high value as permitting agencies may be incentivized to err excessively > on the side of prevention. > *Draft resolutions on **“Geoengineering” at UNEA-4 and on Solar Radiation > Modification at UNEA-6* *2019, 2024* UNEA-4 considered a proposal for a > UNEP-led report on the risks and potential of climate engineering, which > did not find consensus. > > UNEA-6 considered a proposal, which initially suggested that UNEP would > convene a group of experts to produce a detailed assessment report and a > later revised version suggested asking UNEP to facilitate information > sharing, neither of which found consensus though Parties seemed to agree > that having a range of options for information sharing would be desirable > heading into UNEA-7 in 2025. > *The Montreal **Protocol Decision **XXXI/2: Area **of focus for **2022 > Scientific **Assessment Panel* *2021* Potential areas of focus for the > 2022 quadrennial reports of the Scientific Assessment Panel, the > Environmental Effects Assessment Panel and the Technology and Economic > Assessment Panel: “…An assessment of information and research related to > solar radiation management and its potential effect on the stratospheric > ozone layer”. > *Security Council **SC/14732 **(Draft resolution)* *2021* Security > Council Fails to Adopt Resolution Integrating Climate-Related Security Risk > into Conflict-Prevention Strategies. The Security Council in a contentious > meeting, rejected a draft resolution that would have integrated > climate-related security risk as a central component of United Nations > conflict prevention strategies aiming to help counter the risk of conflict > relapse. > *General Assembly **Resolution **A/76/473, para. 12* *2021* 76/112. > Protection of the atmosphere – Resolution adopted by the General Assembly > on 9 December 2021 [on the report of the Sixth Committee (A/76/473, para. > 12)]. Guideline 7 – Intentional large-scale modification of the atmosphere > Activities aimed at intentional large-scale modification of the atmosphere > should only be conducted with prudence and caution, and subject to any > applicable rules of international law, including those relating to > environmental impact assessment. > *Human Rights **Council **A/HRC/RES/48/14, **para. * *2022* 48/14. > Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human > rights in the context of climate change [Resolution adopted by the Human > Rights Council on 8 October 2021] Paragraph 6 – Requests the Advisory > Committee of the Human Rights Council to conduct a study and to prepare a > report, in close cooperation with the Special Rapporteur, on the impact of > new technologies for climate protection on the enjoyment of human rights, > and to submit the report to the Council at its fifty-fourth session. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "geoengineering" group. 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