On Sun, Dec 12, 2021 at 3:45 PM mark <mc.pr...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Only in very, very specific configurations is log4j (gen. 1 / 1.2.x)
> vulnerable - but not in the same way as log4j2; it requires using a JMS
> Appender that uses jdni.
>
> please read
> https://github.com/apache/logging-log4j2/pull/608#issuecomment-990494126
> (and linked comments there)
>

Looking at the comments and code, I have the impression that even having
a JMSAppender configured, is not enough to trigger the issue, because it's
still not trying to expand user input that might come from a request.
The vulnerable code is in an initialization reading the configuration file.

So basically, in order to make that work, the attacker needs to have console
access, gain write access to the data directory, change the log
configuration
to one that would trigger the issue, and then wait for a GeoServer restart,
or a configuration reload.

The attacker has to go through all these lengths only if it cannot find
anything
else on the system that can be used for an attack.
Just to give you an idea, if they have rights to modify the GeoServer war
file,
they can swap a jar with one that has the same named classes, but which
internally do whatever
they please.

This looks, to me, a very narrow window of opportunity, in order to make
that happen
they already punched a hole in the network and ssh access, and of all the
possibilities
they have at that point, they go and choose an attack path that they cannot
even trigger
directly?

We might improve our deployment a bit by removing the JMSAppender class
from the
log4j 1.2.x jar (or replacing with one that just throws exceptions on
usage)...
it will help for cases where the attacker gets access to the console, can
write
on the data dir, but not to the war itself. And can be done in time for
next releases
(given the attacker needs to gain console access first, to leverage the
above vulnerability,
 do we really need to re-release GeoServer?)

Then we can discuss an upgrade to a newer logging library... (log4j2,
logback, or something else).
And maybe also looking into how to set aside a pot of money to handle
vulnerabilities like this one,
using donations only: I like how this balances well with the user
community, want free security fixes?
We'll be able to work on it proportionally to how much users themselves
care about the subject.

Cheers
Andrea

==
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==

Ing. Andrea Aime
@geowolf
Technical Lead

GeoSolutions Group
phone: +39 0584 962313

fax:     +39 0584 1660272

mob:   +39  333 8128928

https://www.geosolutionsgroup.com/

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