On Mon, Nov 28, 2016 at 04:15:08PM -0800, Junio C Hamano wrote:
> * bw/transport-protocol-policy (2016-11-09) 2 commits
> (merged to 'next' on 2016-11-16 at 1391d3eeed)
> + transport: add protocol policy config option
> + lib-proto-disable: variable name fix
> Finer-grained control of what protocols are allowed for transports
> during clone/fetch/push have been enabled via a new configuration
> Will cook in 'next'.
I was looking at the way the http code feeds protocol restrictions to
CURLOPT_REDIR_PROTOCOLS, and I think this topic is missing two elements:
1. The new policy config lets you say "only allow this protocol when
the user specifies it". But when http.c calls is_transport_allowed(),
the latter has no idea that we are asking it about potential
redirects (which obviously do _not_ come from the user), and would
erroneously allow them.
I think this needs fixed before the topic is merged. It's not a
regression, as it only comes into play if you use the new policy
config. But it is a minor security hole in the new feature.
2. If your curl is too old to support CURLOPT_REDIR_PROTOCOLS, we will
warn if there is a protocol whitelist in effect. But that check
only covers the environment whitelist, and we do not warn if you
restrict other protocols.
I actually think this should probably just warn indiscriminately.
Even without a Git protocol whitelist specified, the code serves to
prevent curl from redirecting to bizarre protocols like smtp. The
affected curl versions are from 2009 and prior, so I kind of doubt
it matters much either way (I'm actually tempted to suggest we bump
the minimum curl version there; there's a ton of #ifdef cruft going
back to 2002-era versions of libcurl).