On Thu, Aug 10, 2017 at 01:07:07PM -0700, Junio C Hamano wrote:
> Perhaps we should teach the receiving end to notice that the varint
> data it reads encodes a size that is too large for it to grok and
> die. With that, we can safely move forward with whatever size_t
> each platform uses.
Yes, this is very important even for "unsigned long". I'd worry that
malicious input could cause us to wrap to 0, and we'd potentially write
into a too-small buffer.
There's some prior art with checking this against bitsizeof() in
unpack_object_header_buffer() but get_delta_hdr_size() does not seem to
have a check.
 In most cases it's _probably_ not a vulnerability to wrap here,
because we'd just read less data than we ought to. But it makes me