Jeff King <> writes:

> On Thu, Aug 10, 2017 at 01:07:07PM -0700, Junio C Hamano wrote:
>> Perhaps we should teach the receiving end to notice that the varint
>> data it reads encodes a size that is too large for it to grok and
>> die.  With that, we can safely move forward with whatever size_t
>> each platform uses.
> Yes, this is very important even for "unsigned long". I'd worry that
> malicious input could cause us to wrap to 0, and we'd potentially write
> into a too-small buffer[1].
> There's some prior art with checking this against bitsizeof() in
> unpack_object_header_buffer() but get_delta_hdr_size() does not seem to
> have a check.
> -Peff
> [1] In most cases it's _probably_ not a vulnerability to wrap here,
>     because we'd just read less data than we ought to. But it makes me
>     nervous nonetheless.

As I said in my other message in the thread, as long as the callers
of get_delta_hdr_size() are written correctly, it should be OK.  And
patch_delta() should be OK, even for "unsigned long" when it is too
small.  It just will not produce correct result and instead abort,
and the patch under discussion fixes that.

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