On Tue, 27 Feb 2001, Kevin D. Clark wrote:
>>> In fact, some implementations are quite secure, and are always
>>> improving.
>>
>> Name one.
>
> If you can't find one, you shouldn't be running a publicly accessible
> ftp server.
Well, can you name one? :-)
Just about every popular, Open Source FTP daemon I know of has been nailed
with at least one really nasty, remote take-over exploit. Even the ones
supposedly built with security in mind, not based on BSD's ftpd, blah blah.
There may be an unpopular one that hasn't been nailed, but is that because
it is more secure, or simply because of obscurity? :-)
Personally, I think a lot of this is moot. Using cleartext FTP for
authenticated access over the public 'net is a really unnecessary risk these
days. When used only for anonymous access, a chroot'ed, anonymous-only FTP
daemon solves most security problems by default. And on a trusted LAN [1],
remote exploits become a non-issue.
If I didn't think cleartext authentication over the 'net was a mistake, I
would likely have more of an opinion on FTP servers. As it is, I think they
are solving the wrong problem.
That being said, if I absolutely, positively had to implement cleartext
authenticated FTP, I would use ProFTPd (http://www.proftpd.com). It isn't
immune to security problems, but seems to have better luck that wuftpd
("Providing remote root access since 1994!").
Footnotes
---------
[1] This assumes a "trusted LAN" really exists. If not, go back to "public
'net" again. :-)
--
Ben Scott <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Net Technologies, Inc. <http://www.ntisys.com>
Voice: (800)905-3049 x18 Fax: (978)499-7839
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