David Kastrup wrote: [...] > > And once again you attempt to misinterpret Wallace's case. > > Well, he _has_ no case, remember? That's what the court finally rules
Both courts ruled (and erred) on the issue of injury (standing). It's the same legal situation as with a case asserting patent infringement (for example) filed by someone not owning enforceable rights. Try reading http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/FEDERAL/judicial/fed/opinions/02opinions/02-1555.html might help. ----- The district court determined that Telepresence held no enforceable rights in the 501 patent at the time it filed suit because the assignment of the 501 patent from Gluck to LNCJ, Ltd., licensor of the 501 patent to Telepresence, was ineffective. Therefore it lacked the cognizable injury necessary to assert standing under Article III of the Constitution. Accordingly, the court dismissed Telepresences infringement action [...] To be given preclusive effect, a judgment must be a final adjudication of the rights of the parties and must dispose of the litigation on the merits. See 18A C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 4427, at 4-5 (2d ed. 2002). The Ninth Circuit, in common with other federal courts, recognizes that standing is a threshold question that must be resolved before proceeding to the merits of a case. L. A. County Bar Assn v. Eu, 979 F.2d 697, 700 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 517-18 (1975) ( The rules of standing, . . . are threshold determinants of the propriety of judicial intervention.). The doctrine of standing limits federal judicial power and has both constitutional and prudential components. See United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 551 (1996). Article III standing, like other bases of jurisdiction, must be present at the inception of the lawsuit. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 570 n.5 (1992) (plurality opinion) ([S]tanding is to be determined as of the commencement of suit.); see also Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64, 67 (1997) (holding that standing is an aspect of the case or controversy requirement, which must be satisfied at all stages of review); Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 207 (1993) ([T]he jurisdiction of the Court depends upon the state of things at the time of the action brought.). Pursuant to Article III, standing . . . is jurisdictional and not subject to waiver. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 n.1 (1996). Because standing is jurisdictional, lack of standing precludes a ruling on the merits. Thus, the district court erred in giving preclusive effect to the Telepresence judgment because its dismissal of Telepresences complaint for lack of standing was not a final adjudication of the merits. Scott v. Pasadena Unified Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 646, 653-54 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that [w]e must establish jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits of the case); Bird v. Lewis & Clark Coll., 303 F.3d 1015, 1019 (9th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that before reaching the merits of the case, the court must determine the threshold issue of standing); accord H.R. Techs. v. Astechnologies, Inc., 275 F.3d 1378, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Because lack of standing is not an issue that goes to the merits of the underlying patent issues, a dismissal of a complaint for lack of standing would not normally be expected to be made with prejudice.). ----- [...] > But licenses are bound to particular physical copies. This is the The GPL license is "bound" to intangible WORK, not "particular physical copies". Stupid. regards, alexander. _______________________________________________ gnu-misc-discuss mailing list [email protected] http://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/gnu-misc-discuss
