-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 El 26-02-2011 20:07, Aaron Toponce escribió: ... > Thoughts? > > http://eprint.iacr.org/2010/023.pdf
In this section, the attack assumptions are described. ² Correct and faulty ciphertexts calculated from the same plaintext are known. ² One pair of correct plaintext and ciphertext is known. But GnuPG uses a randomly generated session key each time it encrypts something, so if an attacker has plaintext and ciphertext, he already has what he wants, and retrieving the key is useless, since it won't be used again. Best Regards -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJNaZB6AAoJEMV4f6PvczxAFDUH/RwBmHXHfR8c5PqVwsxTbqgd /dq86kESEalley2NMe2wGxupWfnwW+B6KwFsr48UANYfB80r/yC2naduDYLACfVm w5yDxztwrK6c9hSRM7NTc0h+qJegqSeC8z6dBiv2XrS71x7O+c80hR/2OQGgJ8rn I3MXnqk8/fZp0jr586fljaaDK5wX+5G61UBVZk00dSoqYLunhsXCcviF9GZ9b1sn B3kB7FFWIXICecKZMymjqgz2YXZ70e+thrZC8ZEhFSG/+JlqyHGn1nXiLiGKgHGV Z4IjM7nBsSDEIhOFTnhNVmq1pXcOz6pfahhjYQexFnDhHmh0n8rUwHwryevOV2k= =7s5k -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Gnupg-users mailing list [email protected] http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
