> On 16 Jan 2018, at 18:15, Kristian Fiskerstrand > <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On 01/16/2018 07:12 PM, Andrew Gallagher wrote: >>> On 16/01/18 17:19, Leo Gaspard wrote: >>> “on 2018-04-01, please expose only the master key and its revocation >>> certificate(s) to clients” >> >> IF you wanted to go this route, it would be easier for keyservers to >> only serve the master key + revocation cert for *all* cases where a >> revocation cert exists. What does it matter who signed a key that has >> been revoked, or what IDs it used to be tied to? It's dead, throw it away. > > The important thing would actually be that the data is retained in the > database, as that wouldn't break sync.
Yes, absolutely. This would be a presentational fix. It would also be a method of giving people a way around right to be forgotten - revoke your cert and your info becomes more or less unsearchable. > this is within the scope of feasibility, > although wouldn't do anything one way or the other with regards to > security. Whether it would help privacy is also a questionable matter, > as the full data store is downloadable, so anyone can download it > containing the data wanting to be hidden. Agreed. I was thinking more along the lines of having some method of causing signature vandalism to expire. A _______________________________________________ Gnupg-users mailing list [email protected] http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
