Do not confuse "its keyspace and blocksize are insufficient for today's needs" with "DES is not worthy of serious study".You are making an assumption about whom quantum cryptanlysis will eventually be available to.NSA isn't expecting it'll be available to their enemies until 2055. Add fifteen years to that and you're projecting out to 2070.I'm not worried.
“...to *their* enemies...” What if NSA is an adversary in your threat model? It is now a worse threat even than it was before, due to the 2025 dictatorial self-coup in the United States. We’ve known since cypherpunks that cryptography is the greatest shield of free speech— while on 2025-09-25, the new U.S. régime decreed that much domestic political opposition and dissident speech is “domestic terrorism”.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/09/countering-domestic-terrorism-and-organized-political-violence/In troubled times, why not have the long-term peace of mind of a free upgrade of your FOSS encryption software, including GnuPG 2.5.x?
As for blindly trusting NSA advice generally, sorry but I’m not: Anyone who trusts NSA recommendations that *decrease* security is, in a charitable presumption, uninformed about events from the Church Committee, to NSA’s DES keyspace weakening to the point it was insufficient *in the 1970s*[0], to Snowden—among other things; and...
[...] and that leads me to grave doubts about whether to take you seriously.(<https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/2025-October/067894.html>, Robert J. Hansen wrote to someone else in another context.)
[0] http://www.toad.com/des-stanford-meeting.html Always, [email protected] -- A makeshift way to distribute my current PQ-PGP key: https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/attachments/20250107/4732a382/attachment.key 01A6D81EEAD7EEEC393DEC1401F4894C154E1B8EE32E9059CA5566792A836823
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