is it like any armed struggle (no matter how justified it is) will be patriarchal?
On Sat, Jan 24, 2009 at 7:26 AM, Afthab Ellath <[email protected]> wrote: > Behind the Myths about Hamas<http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/kumar210109.html> > by Deepa Kumar > > Most mainstream accounts of the Palestinian Hamas organization present it > as a bunch of rabid fanatics, bent on violence and motivated by an > irrational hatred of Jews and the state of Israel. This view is reflected > both in the mainstream media and in many books published on the topic. > > When we separate propaganda from reality, however, what we find is a group > that has taken on the mantle of national resistance against Israeli > occupation of Palestinian lands. > > Hamas describes itself like this: "The Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) > is a Palestinian national liberation movement that struggles for the > liberation of the Palestinian occupied territories and for the recognition > of the legitimate rights of > Palestinians."1<http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/kumar210109p.html#_edn1> > > In its manifesto in the lead-up to the 2006 elections, it stated: "Our > Palestinian people are still living through the phase of national > liberation; they have the right to endeavor to regain their rights and end > the occupation using all available means, including armed > resistance."2<http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/kumar210109p.html#_edn2> > > It is because of this commitment to the national liberation struggle -- and > the recognition among Palestinians that Hamas, whatever else it may stand > for, refuses to concede on the question of resisting Israeli repression -- > that the organization has won wide support. > > Hamas began to gain a hearing in the late 1980s, when the secular > nationalist Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), dominated by the Fatah > faction led by Yasser Arafat, gave up on the long-term goal of liberating > all of historic Palestine -- and followed a path of negotiations that > resulted in the Oslo Accords of 1993. > > The culmination of Hamas' growing support was the January 2006 elections to > the Palestine Legislative Assembly, in which Hamas won a majority. > > The reason for this victory lies not only in the failure of Oslo and the > continued brutality of the Israeli occupation, but also mass disillusionment > with the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority. Hamas' steadfast opposition to > occupation and constant criticisms of Fatah's compromises, combined with its > network of social service and charity agencies, bolstered its image not only > among religious Muslims, but also among secularists and Christians. > > Despite its victory in free and fair > elections<http://www.cartercenter.org/news/documents/doc2287.html>, > the U.S. and Israel sought to undermine and destroy Hamas. Israel suspended > the transfer of tax revenues collected from Palestinians in the amount of $50 > million a month <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4729000.stm>. > This began the strangulation of Gaza and set off a humanitarian crisis. > > While the public strategy involved the collective punishment of the people > of Gaza for electing Hamas, Israel and its U.S. ally also undertook a secret > operation to overthrow Hamas, funneling arms and money to Fatah > fighters<http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2008/04/gaza200804>to > enable them to carry out a coup in Hamas' base in Gaza. Hamas won the > battle for Gaza, and Fatah was routed. Yet mainstream accounts of the > conflict present Hamas as having launched a coup in order to come to power. > > Israel continued to step up its pressure on the people of Gaza, cutting off > much-needed supplies, electricity, and essentials and launching a military > assault late last month. > > The siege <http://freegaza.org/> and the latest > invasion<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WOtmgTTZxfM>of Gaza have caused > untold suffering, death, and misery. But they have not > accomplished Israel's aim of fomenting a Palestinian opposition ready to > topple Hamas. On the contrary, the group continued to gain > influence<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YNsXM6ShVIw>since the 2006 elections. > > The reason for this is simple. When a people lose their livelihood, their > homes, their loved ones, and their dignity at the hands of an occupying > power, they resist -- and in this case, the resistance movement is led by > Hamas. > > If elections were to be held in occupied Palestine, Hamas would likely win > again. This is > not<http://home.birzeit.edu/cds/opinionpolls/poll25/results.html>because all > the people of Palestine agree with Hamas' Islamist principles -- > and not at all because Palestinians are anti-Semitic fanatics -- but because > people living under inhuman conditions imposed by an occupying power will > turn to organizations that give voice to their aspirations for liberation. > > - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - > > Hamas was founded in 1987 in the context of the first Palestinian uprising, > or Intifada. Organizationally, it comes out of the Muslim Brotherhood, > established in 1945 in Jerusalem. > > The Brotherhood was formed as a social welfare organization involved in > cultural and social activities. It consciously stayed away from the arena > of politics. Even after the formation of the state of Israel and the war of > 1948, the Brotherhood maintained this approach. It operated on the premise > that its primary goal was to Islamize society -- only secondarily would it > "prepare the generations for battle" with Israel down the road. > > In 1948, when Israel took over and occupied 78 percent of historic > Palestine, the movement was fractured and split between the West Bank and > Gaza. The Brotherhood developed in different ways depending on the context. > > > In the West Bank, which came under Jordanian control, it flourished and > became a loyal opposition to Jordan's Hashemite regime. However, in Gaza, > under Egyptian administration, its fate was similar to the Egyptian Muslim > Brotherhood, which was persecuted by the ruling party. Under these > conditions, it had to go underground and operate in secrecy. > > In 1967, when Israel annexed the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the two > Muslim Brotherhoods were brought together. This fused the clandestine and > more militant tactics of the Gaza wing with the moderate tactics of the > Jordanian one. > > From 1967, the organization sought to expand its influence in a number of > ways. Between 1967 and 1975, it launched a campaign to build mosques > throughout the Occupied Territories. In this, it had the support of Israel, > which had started to view the Brotherhood as an ally against the secular > nationalist PLO, which dominated Palestinian > politics.3<http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/kumar210109p.html#_edn3> > > This dovetailed with a larger strategy adopted by the US in the region > where, directly or indirectly through Saudi Arabia, it supported and funded > Islamist groups as a bulwark against secular nationalist > parties.4<http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/kumar210109p.html#_edn4> > > In 1973, the Islamic Center (al-Mujamma al-islami) was founded in the Gaza > Strip. The Mujamma, whose goal was to Islamize Gazan society, set up > schools, medical clinics, day care centers, youth and sports clubs, and > other social and communal forums tied to the mosque. > > In Gaza, the number of mosques increased from 77 in 1967 to 200 by > 1989.5<http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/kumar210109p.html#_edn5> > The combination of mosques and social welfare organs would prove to be > crucial means for propagating the movement's message and for recruiting > cadres, at a time when the secular movements largely ignored these spheres. > > Nevertheless, the Islamists remained marginal players on the political > scene. Up until the late 1980s, the Fatah movement and the PLO dominated > Palestinian politics, with other more left-wing nationalist organizations > vying for influence. > > Once again seeking to counter the secular nationalists, the Israeli > government recognized and formally licensed the Mujamma in 1978. For > Israel, now led by the conservative Likud Party, the Islamists' hostility to > the left made them useful allies. At times, Israel even funded these > forces. > > The Mujamma, in turn, routinely clashed with secular nationalists and far > left forces. In 1980, it set fire to the Palestinian Red Crescent office, > which was a stronghold of the left. After 1983, it engaged in violent > clashes with PLO members for control over the Islamic University of Gaza. > The most bitter and violent confrontations were with more far left groups, > like the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). > > *- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -* > > In 1987, a popular Palestinian uprising, known as the Intifada, erupted > first in the Gaza Strip and then in the West Bank. The Muslim Brotherhood > (in the form of the Mujamma movement) was posed with a new reality that > challenged its gradualist approach to Islamizing Palestinian society. > > Up to this point, the Brotherhood had strategically refrained from direct > political activity in the national arena, concentrating on its social > welfare organs. But it now ran the risk of losing credibility if it did not > take part in the uprising. Hamas was set up by the leadership of the > Brotherhood to respond to and participate in the Intifada. > > Even before the Intifada, a debate had been brewing between the quietist > and militant sections of the MB's membership. As Khaled Hroub, one of the > most authoritative writers on Hamas, explains: > > Internally and by the time of the Intifada, the rank and file of the > Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood was witnessing intense internal debate on the > passive approach to the Israeli occupation. One [section] pushed for change > in policy toward confrontation with the occupation, thus bypassing [the > other section, which stood for the] old and traditional thinking whose focus > was on the Islamization of society first. . . When the Intifada erupted, > the exponents of the confrontational policy gained a stronger > position.6<http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/kumar210109p.html#_edn6> > > Hamas was the product of the pressure exerted by the more nationalist and > confrontationist section on the leadership of the Brotherhood. > > Around this time, the PLO, which had previously relied on the strategy of > armed struggle to liberate all of historic Palestine, began to gravitate > towards a more compromised stance. In particular, it relinquished the > long-term goal of liberating all of Palestine and recognized the right of > Israel to exist, and it opted for negotiations over struggle to form a > Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. > > Many Palestinians held out hope that the Oslo peace process might address > the horrific conditions under which they were forced to live. Yet by 2000, > the sham of Oslo was exposed, leading to the second Intifada. > > Hamas was able to grow and gain influence because it rejected Oslo, by > holding on to a vision of liberating all of historic Palestine. In short, > the weakness and wrong turns of secular nationalism and the left created the > opening for Hamas to grow. > > *- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -* > > Hamas today is a different organization than the one that was founded in > 1987. > > For instance, its 1988 charter makes little effort to distinguish between > an anti-Zionist and an anti-Jewish stance. Yet the experience of fighting > against the occupation and for national liberation transformed the > organization -- in 1990, it published a document stating that its struggle > was against Zionists and Zionism, and not Jews and Judaism. > > As Hroub wrote in 2000: > > Hamas' doctrinal discourse has diminished in intensity since the > mid-1990s. And references to its charter by its leaders have been made > rarely, if at all. The literature, statements and symbols used by Hamas > have come to focus more and more on the idea that the core problem is the > multidimensional issue of usurpation of Palestinian land, and the basic > question is how to end the occupation. *The notion of liberating > Palestine has assumed greater importance than the general Islamic aspect*(my > italics). > 7 <http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/kumar210109p.html#_edn7> > > This does not mean that Hamas has ceased to be an Islamist party. Its > day-to-day activities still involve a strong religious dimension. It > devotes time and energy to educating its membership in its particular > interpretation of Islam, to leading daily prayers, and to fighting "vice" in > the streets. > > At certain times, Hamas members have intervened to stop what the > organization defines as "immoral" behavior, such as partying, drinking > alcohol, not wearing the *hijab*, mixed swimming, and so forth. One such > incident occurred in 2005 in Gaza, when a Palestinian women was killed and > her fiancé beaten up after they were found in his car at a beach. > > Hamas' position on women is reactionary; it sees them as primarily > responsible for the home and family life. While it has repeatedly insisted > that it will not force women to wear the hijab -- and has, for the most > part, carried through on this -- there is an indirect pressure exerted on > women to follow Hamas' views on veiling, if they wish to seek their help. > > Women can join Hamas, but their realms of activity are limited to charities > and schools. They are largely invisible, and not one woman has occupied a > leadership position in the organization since 1987. While a limited number > of women have carried out suicide attacks, that task is assigned primarily > to men. > > Nevertheless, it bears underling that Hamas is not as reactionary as the > Taliban. It doesn't prohibit women from operating outside the family > sphere. Thirteen of the 66 Hamas candidates who ran for election in 2006 > were women. Yet despite seven winning their seats, only one woman was > included in the cabinet -- and, predictably, she was put in charge of > women's affairs. > > Hamas also differs from more fundamentalist Islamist parties in that it > accepts the concept of the nation state, rather than the *ummah*, a > religious community formation. Its party structures are modeled on Western > ones, and its internal affairs are carried out in a more or less democratic > manner. The leadership inside Palestine is elected from within, and by the > rank and file. It is also not anti-science or anti-technology. > > Hamas exhibits all the contradictions of modern Islamist parties. It > achieved prominence because of a political vacuum caused by the collapse of > secular nationalism and the left. Yet given its politics and class basis, > it doesn't present a long-term solution to the economic and political > problems faced by the people who turn to it. > > The class basis of Islamism is the middle class or the petty bourgeoisie. > In general, this class does not have the social weight necessary to bring > the system to a standstill or force concessions from powerful groups. > > This problem is further compounded in the case of Hamas by the context of > occupation. Hamas draws support from merchants, business people, and the > rich, but its cadre and leadership are drawn largely from the educated > middle classes or de-classed people in refugee camps. > > This explains why Hamas vacillates between armed struggle and radical > pronouncements on the one hand, and ceasefires and concessions on the > other. Ultimately, these strategies are a dead end. > > Palestinian liberation will depend on support from outside the Occupied > Territories -- most obviously, from the region's working classes, among whom > massive sympathy and solidarity with the Palestinian cause exists. > > Israel's assault on Gaza stirred > huge<http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/gaza110109.html> > demonstrations <http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/gaza190109.html> around > the world, from Indonesia and Pakistan to South Africa and Europe -- with > some of the largest in Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Morocco, and Turkey. > > In Egypt, in particular, the working class has expressed both anger against > the neoliberal Mubarak regime and sympathy for the Palestinian cause -- a > revolt that toppled Mubarak would remove a crucial source of complicity with > Israel's occupation. > > A strategy that offers hope for Palestinian liberation would connect > workers' struggles throughout the region to the fight for one secular, > democratic state in Palestine. And that would lay the basis for a lasting > peace in the Middle East. > > > > 1 <http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/kumar210109p.html#_ednref1> Khaled > Hroub, *Hamas: A Beginner's > Guide<http://www.amazon.com/Hamas-Beginners-Guide-Khaled-Hroub/dp/0745325904> > *, Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2006, p. 17. > > 2 <http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/kumar210109p.html#_ednref2> Azzam > Tamini, *Hamas: A History from > Within<http://www.amazon.com/Hamas-History-Within-Azzam-Tamimi/dp/1566566894> > *, Olive Branch Press, 2007, p. 294. > > 3 <http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/kumar210109p.html#_ednref3> Shaul > Mishal and Avraham Sela, *The Palestinian > Hamas<http://books.google.com/books?id=goccsOF7QqIC> > *, New York: Columbia University Press, 2000, p. 21. > > 4 <http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/kumar210109p.html#_ednref4> See Robet > Dreyfuss, *Devil's Game: How the United States helped Unleash > Fundamentalist Islam <http://books.google.com/books?id=hdfLNSnUx-AC>*, New > York:Henry Holt and Company, 2005. > > 5 <http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/kumar210109p.html#_ednref5> Mishal and > Sela, p. 21. > > 6 <http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/kumar210109p.html#_ednref6> Hroub, > 2006, p. 13. > > 7 <http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/kumar210109p.html#_ednref7> Khalid > Hroub, *Hamas: Political Thought and > Practice<http://www.amazon.com/Hamas-Political-Practice-Khaled-Hroub/dp/0887282768> > *, Institute for Palestine Studies, 2000, p. 44. > ------------------------------ > Deepa Kumar <http://www.scils.rutgers.edu/%7Edkumar/> is Assistant > Professor of Media Studies at Rutgers University. She is currently working > on a book on Political Islam, US Foreign Policy, and the Media. > ------------------------------ > URL: mrzine.monthlyreview.org/kumar210109.html > > > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Green Youth Movement" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/greenyouth?hl=en-GB -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
