[In "their" lexicon, they have two similar sounding terms: "intelligence" and "actionable intelligence".While after an "attack" - a failure of the system by its very definition, the designated intelligence agency would almost inevitably claim that they had forewarned - provided the "intelligence input" to the state police; the state police would instinctively counter that it was no "actionable intelligence" - too vague, general and routine.
Just the other day, Indian Prime Minister publicly declared that further terrorists attacks against sensitive targets in India are being planned on Pakistani soil. Leave aside the silliness of it, this is a graphic illustration of "non-actionable intelligence", if of course one could locate some intelligence in it! It goes without saying that the spectacular terrorist attack on November 26 last on various high-profile targets in Mumbai indicates large and gaping holes in the "security" system in place. It could have not just happened otherwise. The way a bag containing RDX was just lying unattended in in the VT Station for days, which could have had furter disastrous consequences, is just another strong pointer. That's precisely why the Report must be made public to facilitate a larger public debate. And that is absolutely essential to compel the system take self-correcting measures. Otherwise, it would always claim that there was no fault in the system. What happened was just unavoidable under the given circumstances. And the only remedy is more draconian powers in the hands of the state / police, who have actually miserably bungled. And more powers in the hands of the state would only further aggravate the malady, make the system even more ineffective if the flaws are not looked into and corrected. Even if we forget about the sinister implications of such draconian powers on the already appalling human rights situation. We must focus our attention on this aspect. Demand that Report be made public. Open debates be conducted. Credible correctives be taken. And point out how draconian laws only worsen the situation by making the police force even more corrupt, high-handed and lousy. If it has the option of catching a rabbit and display it as a the tiger and hang, then they'd scarcely ever take the trouble of going after the actual tiger on the prowl. That we'd forget only at our great peril.] http://www.tehelka.com/story_main42.asp?filename=Ne220809why_cant.asp *WHY CAN’T YOU SEE THE 26/11 REPORT?* *Will the tabling of the Ram Pradhan Committee report affect Ajmal Kasab’s trial or is it under wraps only for political reasons?**HARINDER BAWEJA** accesses the report to find the answers* DURING HIS visit to Mumbai after the terror attack, Union Home Minister P Chidambaram apologised to the citizens of the state; this itself indicated lapses from the Union government… Forget the Mumbai police, no police force of the country was prepared to face the warlike situation.” *Destination* Near the spot the terrorists landed*Easy target *Leopold Cafe after the terrorist attacks*Warpath* Ajmal Kasab at the CST railway station*Remains* The day after the attack on the train station*Urban Theatre* The NSG in action at Nariman House*Red Alert* Flames wreathe the Taj’s exterior*Scrap* A taxi in Vile Parle after a bomb blast*Battlelines* Security forces cordon off the Taj This is what RD Pradhan, former governor and union home secretary, said in April, soon after submitting his committee’s report to the Maharashtra chief minister in April. In many ways, Pradhan’s comments reveal the tone of the report. The two-member committee had been constituted in December 2007, soon after the horrific attacks in Mumbai on 26/11 and had been expressly asked to uncover any lapses by the state government in acting on intelligence inputs provided by the centre and probe lapses by the Mumbai Police in reacting to the attacks. The report was submitted in April but Chief Minister Ashok Chavan has steadfastly refused to table it in the assembly and has stalled it being made public – on the grounds that it could affect the trial of Ajmal Kasab, the only terrorist to be caught alive. The Commissioner of Police (Hasan Ghafoor) should have taken command. More important, he ought to have presented himself as taking command’ No formal debriefing sessions were held by the Commissioner of Police with all/a group of officers to make an assessment of what went wrong on 26/11’ Despite six alerts between August 2006 and April 2008 about the likelihood of terrorists using the sea route, the state did not beef up coastal security’ Officers must constantly watch the security scenario… otherwise, the political system, as has happened after 26/11, has to pay a price’ Vulnerable Police surround the burning Taj Mahal hotel on November 27, 2008 *Photo:* REUTERS What does the report really contain? Is the information really sensitive or is the state government worried that the contents could become politically damaging in Maharashtra’s forthcoming assembly elections? The BJP is already in rabble-rousing mode, with Nitin Gadkari, its state President alleging that the government is attempting a “cover up,” while “the common man needs to know who is responsible for the deaths of several police officers and citizens. If there is any incriminating information on the role of ministers and bureaucrats, it should be made public.” TEHELKA has managed to examine the controversial Pradhan report. We found that while the Committee has detailed the Mumbai Police’s fault lines — no arms, no ammunition and no coordination — it has not fixed any responsibility. Alarmingly, while it details the entire process of how the state government handled the intelligence alerts, as well as the Mumbai Police’ rigor mortis under fire, the report stops short of naming names. The only two who come up for criticism are the then Police Commissioner Hasan Gafoor and Chhagan Bhujbal, though the latter has not been named but is identified only by his designation – deputy chief minister in 2002, when an order passed by him severely delayed the procurement of arms and ammunition, crip pling the police’s modernisation process. Let’s examine some findings of the Pradhan committee as to how Maharashtra reacted to intelligence inputs. *“The Committee found total confusion in the processing of intelligence alerts at the level of the state government and the Police”* It is well known that there were several intelligence inputs indicating a possible attack on Mumbai via the sea route. It has also been documented and established that the Taj Hotel was specifically mentioned in some of these reports. So what happened to these IB and RAW reports that ought to have been taken seriously? Why did the Mumbai Police fail to put their heads together and realise that a major attack was being planned on the city? As the committee’s report says, “an overall assessment of the intelligence reports would have revealed a strong indication that some major terrorist action was being planned against Mumbai city, had the essence of these intelligence alerts been analysed.” The answer to why the intelligence was not ‘analysed’ — mildly put — is shocking: Two senior officers – Additional Chief Secretary (Home) and the Principal Secretary (Home) – told the Pradhan committee in writing that they had NOT (emphasis needed) received any intelligence alerts from the Ministry of Home Affairs *Question:* What is the Centre doing about this? Have the then home minister, Shivraj Patil and the then home secretary, Madhukar Gupta been asked to explain this critical lapse? D Sivanandan, in charge of the State Intelligence Department (SID) was NOT aware of any intelligence alert on an impending terrorist attack before 26/11. In a glaring systemic loophole, the committee found that the intelligence from central agencies (IB, RAWetc) is processed at the state level in the office of the Director General of Police. The State also has a senior officer whose only job it is to process intelligence, but D Sivanandan (made Police Commissioner after Hasan Gafoor) told the Pradhan Committee that despite he being the nodal authority on intelligence in the State, all central intelligence alerts went to the DGP and Commissioner of Police with NO copy marked to him. He comes to know of such alerts only if the DGP marks a copy to him. Even proceedings of the Multi Agency Centre (set up after the Kargil Review Committee submitted its report) were not marked to him. Sivanandan told the committee that the IB and the RAW should be informed that the SID Commissioner is the nodal officer for intelligence in the State. According to the Committee’s report, this is an important matter that needs immediate attention. Question: How can crucial information be left to whims and fancies of whether the DGP will or will not mark a copy to the SID? What is the use of having a state intelligence department if it does not receive terrorist-related alerts? The Principal Secretary (Home), Maharashtra presented the Committee with copies of some circulars issued by a Desk Officer to all concerned on some such alerts between February and July 2008. The Committee was itself shocked by this and noted, “The Committee was told that under the ‘Desk Officer’ System, such circulars are directly received and processed by the concerned Desk Officer who MAY OR MAY NOT keep the higher officials informed. This is a shocking revelation of [the] working of a system that does not enable the senior most officials in Mantralaya to keep themselves briefed on the intelligence front. This state of affairs is not desirable having regard to Section 4 of the Bombay Police Act, 1951, which makes it mandatory for the Home Department to exercise superintendence of the police force throughout the State. Officers holding positions such as the Additional Chief Secretary(Home) or Secretary, Law and Order, (Home) (who is normally a senior IPS officer) cannot merely perform secretarial work of handling paper work but must take active interest in keeping under constant watch the security scenario… otherwise, the political system, as has happened after 26/11 has to pay a price. The officers can certainly not escape responsibility cast upon them by the legislators. The least that they should attempt, in the interest of the people, is to work out cooperative administrative ways of functioning, for which Mantralaya bureaucracy as well as the political system had a well-earned reputation.” *'If the report contains information incriminating ministers and bureaucrats, it should be made public’ NITIN GADKARI*, BJP President, Maharashtra Question: How can vital intelligence be left to the mercy of desk officers? Should there be no action taken against the senior officers? Should they be getting the benefit of the doubt for a ‘reputation’ that was earned in the past? Why is CM Ashok Chavan refusing to table the report instead of taking action? Will he come under pressure if the report is made public? There was enough intelligence available with the State, even if it lay neglected in various offices. While it is well known that the Taj Hotel’s name figured in various alerts and that some attempts were made to beef up the security at this venue, what is not known is that similarly, the Mumbai Police had looked at the security arrangements at the Oberoi Trident and the Leopold Café. In fact, there was a specific intelligence alert about Leopold being a possible target. The Committee has noted that, “Despite receiving as many as six alerts between August 2006 and April 2008 about the likelihood of sea route being used by the terrorists, no significant steps had been taken by the state administration/government to beef up coastal security by having regular interaction by the coast guards.” Hasan Gafoor informed the Committee that on 26/11, five police boats were patrolling the seafront. This turned out to be a lie as DCP in charge of the boats revealed that all of them were in the Worli area where an agitation had started on 24/11 against the new Worli Sea Link bridge. Critically, there were no patrol boats in the Cuffe Parade area where Kasab and his accomplices alighted from their dinghy on 26/11. Question: Why is the chief minister shielding Hasan Gafoor? Chavan went to the extent of saying that he did not agree with the Committee’s criticism of Gafoor. In its report the Committee observes that the Commissioner of Police — who stayed put at the Oberoi instead of taking over the control room — should have taken command. To quote the report, “More important, he ought to have presented himself as taking command. That was a serious lapse as much of individuals as of the system in place.” *“The Mumbai Police initially responded to multi-targeted attacks efficiently but … like in a law and order situation.”* *'The officers cannot escape the responsibility cast on them by the law. In the interests of the people, they must function cooperatively’ PRADHAN COMMITTEE REPORT* Apart from a detailed analysis of how that state handled the intelligence alerts, the Committee also studied the police response at each of the target spots – CST, Cama Hospital, Leopold Café and the Taj and Oberoi Hotels. The force was clearly outgunned and outwitted by the AK47- wielding terrorists, but was also disadvantaged for several other important reasons: Quick Response Teams (QRTs) were trained by the State Reserve Police Force in a commando course in Pune for six weeks and by the NSG for three months in Manesar. However, no actual stimulated training in hostage rescue and in facing terrorist attacks was given to them. The Committee, in fact, notes that since September 27, 2007, no firing practice was done due to shortage of practice ammunition. While the battle dress worn by the teams includes bullet-proof jackets, which protect vital organs from rifle rounds, they do not protect against grenade blasts. *'The DGP’s office merely forwards intelligence alerts to operational units but someone knowledgeable should be studying them’ PRADHAN COMMITTEE REPORT* The Mumbai Police has an anti-terrorist unit called the Assault Mobiles, which are located at vital spots in the city. These are six-man teams with one police sub-inspector and five men. They are armed with one 9 mm pistol, one AK47, one SLR and one Carbine. The Committee, however, found that “these men are nothing more than armed police units, who may be of use to tackle certain law and order activities — such as gang wars — or these may be more useful to deal with sudden violent attacks initially but cannot be effective in dealing with live terrorist situation as on 26/11.” Red tape has held up many police modernization plans as well as purchases of arms and ammunition. “The order of the former deputy chief minister (Chhagan Bhujbal) dated 29.05.2000 in getting vendor approval for all police purchases above Rs 25 lakhs even after regular sanctions are received has created a serious bottleneck in modernizing the police forces and their equipment. The order led to the following: the QRTs could not do any firing practice since September 2007 due to shortage of ammunition although they are to do firing practice every fourth day; due to shortage of funds only Rs 15 crores has been sanctioned in the last five years as against a demand of Rs 66.14 crore, leading to a serious shortage of arms and ammunition for the Maharashtra Police; the last supply of AK47 rounds of 45,000 were received in 2005 and after December 2006, no ammunition has been received. *'Due to red tape, the police Quick Response Teams had received no ammunition since 2006 and no firing practice since 2007’ PRADHAN COMMITTEE REPORT* Three intelligence alerts were received from the IB regarding the possibility of Jewish targets being attacked. While they did not mention Nariman House, the police was taken completely by surprise when it was attacked. Neither the Special Branch (which is in charge of the foreigners division), nor the local police station or, for that matter, even the local Israeli consulate any idea that there was a Jewish sect residing in Nariman House. Thus when the attack came at 22:17, neither the local police nor the control room had any idea where this attack was taking place. *Questions:* If the Mumbai Police is so severely disabled — due to lack of information and equipment — is it in a position to face another attack? Interestingly, the Committee’s report starts with the observation that the Maharashtra police has not experienced a direct commando attack such as the 2001 Parliament attack or the 2002 Akshardham attack and that because the 1993 serial bomb attacks were carried out through hidden and timed explosive devices, that had led to a police mindset of thinking only of stealthy time bomb attacks. But then, as the Committee’s report also warns – the next time, the terrorists might launch an air-borne attack. Of course, the ultimate question is: Is India prepared? The question becomes even more urgent since the government is reluctant to table a report that has examined one of the worst terrorist assaults that India has faced. • *WRITER’S EMAIL: *[email protected] *From Tehelka Magazine, Vol 6, Issue 33, Dated August 22, 2009* --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Green Youth Movement" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/greenyouth?hl=en-GB -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
