http://fpif.org/class-war-thailands-military-coup/

Class War: Thailand's Military Coup

Outnumbered by the country's rural voters, Thailand's once vibrantly
democratic urban middle class has embraced an elitist, antidemocratic
agenda.

By Walden Bello <http://fpif.org/authors/walden-bello/>, May 27, 2014

Thailand's military coup is a victory for the country's elites and middle
classes. But the country's rural majority is unlikely to stand aside while
the elites dictate a new constitution. (Photo: Pittaya Sroilong / Flickr)

*This article is a joint publication of Foreign Policy In Focus
<http://fpif.org/> and TheNation.com <http://thenation.com/>. *

After declaring martial law on Tuesday, May 20, the Thai military announced
a full-fledged coup two days later. The putsch followed nearly eight months
of massive street protests against the ruling Pheu Thai government
identified with former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. The power grab by
army chief Gen. Prayuth Chan-ochacame two weeks after Thaksin's sister,
Yingluck, was ousted as caretaker prime minister by the country's
Constitutional Court for "abuse of power" on May 7.

The Thai military portrayed its seizure of power as an effort to impose
order after two rounds of talks between the country's rival factions failed
to produce a compromise that would provide Thailand with a functioning
government.

*Deftly Managed Script*

The military's narrative produced few takers. Indeed, many analysts saw the
military's move as a *coup de grace* to Thailand's elected government,
following what they saw as the judicial coup of May 7.

It is indeed difficult not to see the putsch as the final step in a script
deftly managed by the conservative "royalist" establishment to thwart the
right to govern of a populist political bloc that has won every election
since 2001. Utilizing anti-corruption discourse to inflame the middle class
into civil protest, the key forces in the anti-government coalition have,
from the start, aimed to create the kind of instability that would provoke
the military to step in and provide the muscle for a new political order.

Using what analyst Marc Saxer calls "middle class rage" as the battering
ram, these elite elements forced the resignation of the Yingluck government
in December; disrupted elections in February, thus providing the
justification for the conservative Constitutional Court to nullify them;
and instigated that same court's decision to oust Yingluck as caretaker
prime minister May 7 on flimsy charges of "abuse of power." Civil protest
was orchestrated with judicial initiatives to pave the way for a military
takeover.

The military says that it will set up a "reform council" and a "national
assembly" that will lay the institutional basis of a new government. This
plan sounds very much like the plan announced in late November by the
protest leader Suthep Thaugsuban, which would place the country for a year
under an unelected, unaccountable reform panel.

The military's move has largely elicited the approval of Suthep's base of
middle-class supporters. Indeed, it has been middle-class support that has
provided cover for the calculated moves of the political elites. Many of
those that provided the backbone of the street protests now anticipate the
drafting of an elitist new order that will institutionalize political
inequality in favor of Bangkok and the country's urban middle class.

*The Thai Middle Class: From Paragons to Enemies of Democracy*

The sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset once celebrated the middle class as
paragons of democracy. But in recent years, middle-class Thais have
transmogrified into supporters of an elitist, frankly antidemocratic
agenda. Today's middle class is no longer the pro-democracy middle class
that overthrew the dictatorship of General Suchinda Krapayoon in 1992. What
happened?

Worth quoting in full is an insightful analysis of this transformation
provided by Marc
Saxer<http://www.social-europe.eu/2014/01/thailands-middle-class/>
:

The Bangkok middle class called for democratization and specifically the
liberalization of the state with the political rights to protect themselves
from the abuse of power by the elites. However, once democracy was
institutionalized, they found themselves to be the structural minority.
Mobilized by clever political entrepreneurs, it was now the periphery who
handily won every election. Ignorant of the rise of a rural middle class
demanding full participation in social and political life, the middle class
in the center interpreted demands for equal rights and public goods as 'the
poor getting greedy'... [M]ajority rule was equated with unsustainable
welfare expenses, which would eventually lead to bankruptcy.

>From the perspective of the middle class, Saxer continues, majority rule

overlooks the political basis of the social contract: a social compromise
between all stakeholders. Never has any social contract been signed which
obligates the middle class to foot the tax bill, in exchange for quality
public services, political stability and social peace. This is why middle
classes feel like they are "being robbed" by corrupt politicians, who use
their tax revenues to "buy votes" from the "greedy poor." Or, in a more
subtle language, the "uneducated rural masses are easy prey for politicians
who promise them everything in an effort to get a hold of power."

Thus, Saxer concludes, from the viewpoint of the urban middle class,

policies delivering to local constituencies are nothing but "populism," or
another form of "vote buying" by power hungry politicians. The Thai
Constitutional Court, in a seminal ruling, thus equated the very principle
of elections with corruption. Consequently, time and again, the "yellow"
alliance of feudal elites along with the Bangkok middle class called for
the disenfranchisement of the "uneducated poor," or even more bluntly the
suspension of electoral democracy.

*Impossible Dream*

However, the elite-middle class alliance is deceiving itself if it thinks
the adoption of a constitution institutionalizing minority rule will be
possible. For Thailand is no longer the Thailand of 20 years ago, where
political conflicts were still largely conflicts among elites, with the
vast lower classes being either onlookers or passive followers of warring
elite factions.

What is now the driving force of Thai politics is class conflict with Thai
characteristics, to borrow from Mao. The central figure that has
transformed the Thai political landscape is the exiled Thaksin Shinawatra,
a charismatic, if corrupt, billionaire who managed through a combination of
populism, patronage, and the skillful deployment of cash to create a
massive electoral majority. While for Thaksin the aim of this coalition
might be the cornering or monopolization of elite power, for the social
sectors he has mobilized, the goal is the redistribution of wealth and
power from the elites to the masses and--equally important--extracting
respect for people that had been scorned as "country bumpkins" or
"buffaloes." However much Thaksin's "Redshirt" movement may be derided as a
coalition between corrupt politicians and the "greedy poor," it has become
the vehicle for the acquisition of full citizenship rights by Thailand's
marginalized classes.

The elite-middle class alliance is dreaming if it thinks that the Redshirts
will stand aside and allow them to dictate the terms of surrender, much
less institutionalize these in a new constitution. But neither do the
Redshirts at present possess the necessary coercive power to alter the
political balance in the short and medium term. It is now their turn to
wage civil resistance.

Since the coup, about 150 people have been reported detained--including Pravit
Rojanaphruk <http://www.trust.org/item/20140526191229-egnah/>, a prominent
reporter for Thailand's *Nation* newspaper known for his criticism of the
anti-government protest movement that precipitated the military's
intervention.

What now seems likely is that, with violent and non-violent civil protest
by the Redshirts, Thailand will experience a prolonged and bitter descent
into virtual civil war, with the Pheu Thai regional strongholds--the North,
Northeast, and parts of the central region of the country--becoming
increasingly ungovernable from imperial Bangkok. It is a tragic denouement
to which an anti-democratic opposition disdaining all political compromise
has plunged this once promising Southeast Asian nation.

*Walden Bello, a member of the House of Representatives of the Philippines,
was the principal author of A Siamese Tragedy: Development and
Disintegration in Modern Thailand (London: Zed Press, 1998).*

-- 
Peace Is Doable

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