http://www.rediff.com/news/column/lahore-stopover-modi-heeds-washingtons-wishes/20151226.htm

Lahore stopover: Modi heeds Washington's wishes

December 26, 2015 15:24 IST
'Clearly, the Modi government is proving to be far more willing than
any previous government in Delhi to hitch India's wagons with the US'
regional strategies,' says Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar.

The letter to Bharatiya Janata Party President Amit Shah by the
party's 3-time MP Kirti Azad, questioning the move to initiate
disciplinary action against him would have been, normally speaking,
assured of media headlines, since it is invested with huge political
symbolism. Shah derives his halo from Prime Minister Narendra Modi,
but is no longer an awe-inspiring figure, and Azad is reputed to be a
wily off-spinner.

But Modi elbowed out Azad, hogging media headlines with his impulsive
decision to 'drop by' in Lahore en route to Delhi from Kabul. How
enduring would be Modi's achievement?

A comparison between the Indian and Pakistani media is in order. The
Indian media has gone euphoric, savouring the bits of information
falling from the high table. But Pakistani dailies offer a study in
contrast, exercising a due sense of proportions. The Pakistan foreign
ministry statement was notably restrained and all but hinted at the
hospitality that Lahore is famous for.

The Indian establishment attributes entirely to Modi the credit for
Friday's 'historic' happening -- as if a brilliant thought occured so
very casually to our prime minister.

The spin doctors scrambled to get the tale across. There are different
versions as to how the Indian high commissioner managed to reach
Lahore in time. Some say he chartered an aircraft and flew, others say
he drove at breakneck speed in his Merc down the highway to Lahore.

But senior Pakistani officials were not that lucky. Those who couldn't
make it included Pakistan's Foreign Policy Advisor (and de facto
foreign minister) Sartaj Aziz, National Security Advisor Lieutenant
General Naseer Khan Janjua and the special assistant to the prime
minister on foreign affairs, Syed Tariq Fatemi. None of the key
figures in the Pakistani foreign and security policy establishment was
present in Lahore.

Indeed, we may have to wait for the next column by Jugnu Mohsin,
publisher and editor of the Lahore-based Friday Times, to know what
really transpired on Friday evening in the city.

Perhaps, Washington knows something more than the Pakistani
establishment or what the Indian spin doctors revealed. The comments
in real time by the US State Department spokesman John Kirby that
Modi's overture would 'benefit the entire region&' hits the nail on
the head.

The United States is appropriately casting Modi's bonhomie with Sharif
against the grand backdrop of regional politics rather than vainly
looking for substantive results in the India-Pakistan relationship.

>From such a perspective, the Lahore stopover came at the fag-end of a
foreign tour to Moscow and Kabul. These were destinations where Modi
got an irresistible opportunity to indulge in some Pakistan bashing
under the garb of the fight against terrorism (which is a common cause
for India, Russia and Afghanistan.)

But Modi instead opted not to exercise that option. Run a fine comb
through the India-Russia joint statement issued in Moscow or the text
of the magnificent speech Modi made in Kabul at the inaugural of the
Afghan parliament in Kabul, and it almost seems that he was acutely
conscious of the importance of not causing embarrassment to Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif by harping on Pakistan's support of the Taliban,
despite that being a major factor undermining regional security and
stability.

The Kabul speech, made just before Modi dialled Sharif's number in
Lahore, is particularly conspicuous for its great reticence,
notwithstanding the tsunami of anti-Pakistan sentiments sweeping over
the Hindu Kush. Modi disappointed his Afghan audience by instead
visualising Pakistan as a potential 'bridge' of regional cooperation
between India and Afghanistan.

Suffice it to say, Modi's tour hints at a major course correction by
India. This is precisely what Kirby alluded to. The US has been
exerting sustained pressure on India to normalise with Pakistan by
rolling back its Great Game impulses on Afghan turf.

And there is evidence, finally, that Modi is paying heed to
Washington's wishes. His stopover in Lahore after a visit to Kabul by
itself carried immense symbolism -- signalling that Delhi no longer
harbours a zero-sum mindset over the Afghan situation.

Hopefully, this policy shift will register not only on Sharif, but
also on the GHQ of the Pakistani military in Rawalpindi. Rawalpindi
has made India's perceived activities from Afghan soil as the litmus
test of the Modi government's intentions toward Pakistan. Modi has now
put his personal imprimatur on the policy shift.

For Washington, on the other hand, India-Pakistan normalisation is
highly desirable for the furtherance of its regional strategies in
terms of the 'rebalance' in Asia and the containment policies toward
Russia -- one may say it has become an imperative need.

Clearly, the Modi government is proving to be far more willing than
any previous government in Delhi to hitch India's wagons with the US'
regional strategies. The Modi government has even begun flaunting this
willingness, casting aside the lingering residues of strategic
ambiguity, as is apparent from the huge upswing in the military
cooperation and, most important, the near-certainty of acceding to the
Pentagon's long-standing demand to conclude the Logistic Support
Agreement, LSA, which would give free access for the US forces to
Indian bases.

The LSA is a force multiplier for the US in the region and the utility
of the US-Indian congruence is simply seamless if the US chooses to
confront China militarily anytime.

The Indian establishment has begun selectively briefing the media
lately with a view to sensitising public opinion that India is inching
close to concluding the LSA, which signifies a paradigm shift in the
country's policy of non-alignment and its adherence to strategic
autonomy in a volatile regional and international mileu.

Enter Pakistan. In order for US regional strategies to be effective,
Pakistan's steady build-up as China's strategic partner needs to be
arrested. And this is best done by reducing Pakistan's threat
perceptions from India, which can only be achieved by persuading Delhi
to abandon the Great Game in Afghanistan and improving the climate of
relations with Islamabad.

The US estimates that a propitious moment has come with an unabashedly
pro-American government in power in India under a strong-willed leader
who can be trusted to take controversial decisions (such as the LSA)
and an incumbent Pakistani military leadership, which, unlike the
previous one, would share the Pakistani civilian elites' traditional
'Westernism.'

Can Washington swing this audacious attempt to bury India-Pakistan
tensions? The good thing is that Modi is a willing torch-bearer and
the ultra-nationalistic Sangh Parivar is in reality quite amenable to
American influence.

But is that enough? The point is, Modi and the Sangh Privar do not
make even anywhere near one half of India. Again, Pakistan will
forever continue to suspect that the leopard cannot change its spots.

It is going to be a Herculean effort for Washington to shake up and
loosen the tight Sino-Pakistan embrace. Make no mistake, China and
Russia (and Iran) won't let go Pakistan and the Pakistani elites
themselves know the relative worth of their country's strategic
choices.

That is to say, there is going to be severe limits to what the US can
offer as recompense to Pakistan either bilaterally or by way of
getting Modi to act quickly on what some of the starry-eyed Indian
pundits call the 'low-hanging fruits.'

Not only are there formidable backlogs of mutual suspicions and
hardened mindset of mutual animosities on both sides of the flawed
India-Pakistan relationship that need to be cleared (in systemic as
well as in political terms), but Modi is no longer as strong as he
used to be 19 months ago when he became prime minister.

Meanwhile, Azad's letter to Shah testifies to gathering storms. Such a
daredevil act by a BJP MP with political lineage from the Hindi
heartland to question the judgment of his party leader whose real heft
lies in him being Modi's Man Friday would have been unthinkable even a
couple of months ago.

It only shows that Shah no longer inspires shock and awe and the
ground beneath his feet is shifting. Arguably, it is a reflection on
Modi himself.

The problem with Modi's evening in Lahore is that it is a one-act
play. It is a law of nature that hype becomes unsustainable for long
once the climax is through. Whereas, Azad's letter is only Scene 1 of
Act one in what may turn out to be a Five-Act Play.

Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar is arguably India's leading expert on Afghanistan.

M K Bhadrakumar


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Peace Is Doable

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