I/III.
http://www.thequint.com/opinion/2016/01/06/the-pathankot-attack-was-a-disgrace-for-us

OPINION | 4 min read
The Pathankot Attack Was a Disgrace For Us
Lt General HS Panag (Retd.)
Today, 4 hours ago

An email was sent by Lieutenant General HS Panag (retd), a former
Northern Army Commander, to Major General Pradyot K Mallick (retd),
formerly of the National Defence College. It was what a former Lt
General felt as the Pathankot Terror attack unfolded. It was first
published by Mohan Guruswami on his facebook page.

The letter has been edited here for readability.

Dear Pradyot,
You are being mild. It is better to raise a hue and cry while the
incident is still in the limelight. In two days, the next party will
begin. This operation was a disaster from the word go. Luck and
providence saved the air base.

Infiltration can be effected with impunity all around the Shakargarh
Bulge. The border Security Force (BSF) always lies.

Pathetic internal coordination. Despite the windfall of SP Salwinder
Singh’s carjacking and the use of his mobile, we were not only slow to
respond, but also caught with our pants down.

Lt Gen H S Panag(R) @rwac48
2/2 @hsmishra1961 Having been surprised the tespose showed lack of
coord.Casualties must not become an emotional cover 4 lapses.
4:01 PM - 4 Jan 2016
  9 9 Retweets   5 5 likes

Be that as it may, Doval held a conference on 1 January at 1500 hrs
which was also attended by the Chief of Army Staff. The air base was
assessed as the target and everyone was warned. A battery of the
National Security Guard (NSG) was dispatched to Pathankot air base. A
Special Forces team was flown in and put in location at Mamun.

No lead agency or overall Commander was appointed. Unless Doval felt
he could control the events. The area in the vicinity of the base was
not combed. The public was not informed. It was a failure of the
Pathankot police and, possibly, the Indian army, if they were tasked
at all. If the General Officer Commanding (GOC) 29 Div was in charge,
this would have been done. Preventive security of the air base was not
beefed up. Given the size, an Infantry Battalion should have manned
the perimeter and patrolled the wall from outside.

[Photo: Soldiers stand guard near the Indian Air Force (IAF) base at
Pathankot in Punjab, India, January 3, 2016. (Photo: Reuters)]

The less said about the security of our air bases in general, the
better. Four-five platoon (60 men) of rag tag DSC are capable of being
static security guards only. There are approximately 20-30 poorly
trained Garuds. No electronic sensors of any kind are present along
the wall and fence and the outer periphery is not lit up. Civilian
houses are right next to the wall. Recall Air Forward Defence
Battalions in 1971. One was located at the Pathankot air base but was
later merged with normal infantry. Our air bases are sitting ducks. We
have been singularly lucky that despite Mehran and Kamra, ISI did not
target air bases near the International Border.

Despite the 24 hour warning, 5-8 terrorists scaled the wall and
entered the administration area and attacked the DSC Mess where men
were unarmed despite the warning. Five men were lost.

Lt Gen H S Panag(R) @rwac48
@binugazi Problem is we fail to reform.
4:09 PM - 4 Jan 2016
  2 2 Retweets   2 2 likes

The less said about the response of the NSG and the Garuds, the better
as well. The initial casualties imposed too much caution. The Indian
army moved in and killed two terrorists while two were killed by the
NSG. Victory was declared by the evening of the 2 January by everyone
including the Prime Minister and the Home Minister. Fundamental
precaution of combing the area was not taken. Consequently, it took
another 48 hours to get one more terrorist – the operation was still
on. A Lt Col of the NSG was lost due to not following Standard
Operating Procedure on 3 January. Seven to eight NSG were wounded.

The villain of the piece seems to be Doval, followed by the Indian air
force and the Indian army. What was the NSG doing in a purely military
installation? The time is not far when we will take orders from the
Home Minister, the National Security Advisor or the police.

Union Home Minister Rajnath Singh at Rajya Sabha (Photo: ANI)

Once again we have become the laughing stock for the whole world, and
given our weaknesses on a platter to the ISI.

The operation should have been under GOC 29 Div. Air base security
should have been placed under the Indian army. An Infantry Battalion
responsible for preventive security, Special Forces team and Infantry
quick reaction teams should have been placed inside the base. On 1
Jan, the area in the vicinity of the base should have been combed. Any
one of us familiar with our air bases and their lack of security, and
with the hindsight of Mehran and Kamra would have done this.

All this has been put on Twitter by me from day one! It is better to
shame ourselves in public to force reforms rather than do nothing!

II/III.
http://www.thequint.com/opinion/2016/01/05/probing-suspect-gurdaspur-sp-may-open-can-of-worms

OPINION | 4 min read
Probing Suspect Gurdaspur SP May Open Can of Worms
Vipin Pubby
January 6, 2016, 2:30 pm

Snapshot

* Gurdaspur SP Salwinder Singh must be subjected to an IB-led interrogation
There has been a delay in questioning Singh, and his two acquaintances.

* Singh recently received a punishment posting against accusations of
sexual harassment by five Punjab Police women constables.

* A strong drug mafia-politician-police nexus exists in Punjab, and is
spread across the border.

*Singh might have been involved in the drug net.

*The counter-operation should not have been called off 3 January,
without properly sanitising the area.

As the counter-terror operations came to a close in Pathankot, with
security forces confirming that all six terrorists have been
eliminated, intelligence agencies must now find out how the suspected
Jaish-e-Mohammad operatives gained entry into Indian territory.

The needle of suspicion continues to remain pointed at the Gurdaspur
Superintendent of Police (Headquarter) Salwinder Singh. His presence
in neighbouring Pathankot district, close to the India-Pakistan
border, his so-called providential escape from the clutches of the
terrorists, and unconvincing explanations are sufficient grounds to
subject him to an Intelligence Bureau-led interrogation.

Prior to the Pathankot attack, SP Salwinder Singh was abducted by
suspected terrorists. His unconvincing answers are sufficient grounds
for interrogation. (Photo: ANI screengrab)

Why the Delay in Questioning Salwinder Singh and his Acquaintances?

The Director-General of Punjab Police Suresh Arora today said that
Salwinder’s activities in the company of a jeweller friend, and his
cook were suspicious enough to warrant a probe. The circumstances
leading to the terror attack on the Indian Air Force (IAF) base in
Pathankot will be jointly investigated by the National Investigation
Agency (NIA) and the Punjab Police.

[Video: Also watch Pathankot Attack: Gurdaspur SP Recounts his Abduction]

But questions are being raised on the delay in interrogating Salwinder
Singh, his jeweller friend Rajesh Verma, and cook Madan Gopal. The
SP’s claim that he was in Pathankot to pay obeisance in a shrine, at
midnight on 1 January strains credulity. Did he walk into a trap set
by the drug mafia that operates in Punjab, as well as across the
border? Was he then forced to give up his official car –perhaps
explaining why he, his friend and cook were spared their lives – which
the terrorists drove before launching their attack at the air base?

In the attack at the airbase that cost many soldiers their lives, why
were Salwinder Singh, his friend and cook spared? (Photo: PTI)

A Nefarious Police-Politician-Mafia Drug Nexus
The SP’s story has at once baffled and amused intelligence and
security officials in Punjab. Whenever the official probe against
Salwinder begins, the Punjab Police would be nervous about the details
of the drug mafia-politician-police nexus that might emerge in the
course of the investigation.

A former senior Punjab Police officer Shashi Kant had earlier said
that “drug money is used in financing militancy. To check militancy we
will also have to control the drug problem. But the trade is
flourishing because of the alleged involvement of politicians,
bureaucrats and police officers.”

Security officials continue to express doubts over the presence and
conduct of the SP in Koliyan village under Narot Jarnail Police
Station. They insist that the probe must try to find out whether he
made, or received phone calls, to, or from Pakistan.
The SP was transferred a few days ago, in what is called a punishment
posting as Deputy Commandant in Punjab Armed Police (PAP), following
complaints of sexual harassment by at least five female constables of
Punjab Police.

Army being mobilised in Pathankot to neutralize the militants who
attacked an Indian Air Force (IAF) base in the city on Jan 2, 2016.
(Photo: IANS)

Blunders and Lessons for the Future
Yet the information provided by him to his seniors about the presence
of `four to six’ terrorists forwarded to the central security and
intelligence agencies indeed led to the dispatch of commandoes to
Pathankot. However, looking back, it seems that enough steps were not
taken to seal the sensitive air force station to prevent their entry.

Security analysts have now begun to describe the latest attack as an
undeclared war, since the terrorists appeared to have been trained and
briefed about holding out retaliation by Indian security forces and to
target the defence establishment. The blunder in calling off the
operation on 3 January, without sanitising the area is something that
would need explanation and would serve as a lesson for future
counter-operations.

(The writer is a Chandigarh-based senior journalist)

III.
http://www.thequint.com/opinion/2016/01/04/pathankot-air-base-attack-why-this-hysteria

OPINION | 4 min read
Pathankot Air Base Attack: Why This Hysteria?
Amar Bhushan
January 5, 2016, 9:04 am

Snapshot

* Defence analysts vouching for proactive military action are
forgetting that it will mean full-fledged war, which is unpredictable
and expensive.

* Carrying out covert military operations in Pakistan will mean that
India becomes the perpetrator, not victim of terror.

*Prevent another Pathankot by remaining vigilant against both internal
and external enemies.

* The entire Pak Army is not against normalisation of relations
between the two nations.

* As far as Modi’s visit to Pakistan is concerned, it must take place
as scheduled.

Proactive Military Action Will Prove Expensive
The Jaish-e-Muhammad fidayeen attacks on Pathankot airbase on 2
January have evoked ill-informed reactions, betraying immaturity to
comprehend strategic realities. Defence analysts are screaming for
proactive military action, meaning that you carry out trans-border
raids on training centres and staging posts of terrorists in Pakistan.

But you can not do this unless you are prepared for a full-fledged
war, which will cost a huge number of lives. Besides, you have no idea
of how it will end and whether or not nuclear arsenals will be
emptied. You are not Israel, nor are you dealing with Palestinians.
Such is the world military equation today that even Russians cannot
attack Turkey to avenge the downing of its military aircraft.

Let’s stop talking of military adventurism. It is true that more of
our security personnel are getting killed than terrorists, but in any
defensive war, casualties are always disproportionately higher for
those at the receiving end. What then we must do is to make the border
security impregnable and get in the habit of trusting inputs of
intelligence agencies – however insipid and laughable they may appear
– and take follow-up measures. The Pathankot attack clearly
illustrates the lapse in following up the leads, seriously and
assiduously.

An Impractical Alternative
As an alternative to military action, security experts are making a
strong pitch for covert operations, suggesting that we train agents
and push them inside Pakistan to destroy Pak defence installations and
engineer blasts. They want the agencies to hit Pakistan so hard that
it realises the depth of pain that goes with sending terrorists in
India on suicide missions.
This idea is maddening. If you practice this, you will be branded not
a victim but a promoter of terrorism with far reaching, adverse
consequences for your economy, your defence preparedness and your
quest to be counted in the comity of nations. The only way you can
prevent another Pathankot is by remaining eternally vigilant against
both your internal and external enemies.

A military truck at the Pathankot Air Force Base. (Photo: AP)

Confused, Ill-Informed Political Discourse
Meanwhile, political commentators have made outrageous remarks. Some
say caustically that Prime Minister Modi has been back stabbed by
Nawaz Sharif within a week of hosting him over tea. Others maintain
that if he has to talk, he should instead talk to Raheel Sharif, Army
Chief in Rawalpindi.

They argue that notwithstanding former ISI’s chief’s meeting with the
NSA in Bangkok, Pak Army would never allow its politicians to
compromise on military support to Kashmiri separatists and creating
instability in India through terrorist operations, no matter how much
Delhi humours the civilian leadership. Hence, they want Delhi to
freeze all interactions with Islamabad for next several years and PM
to cancel his forthcoming talks with Nawaz Sharif.
To believe that the entire Pak Army establishment is against
normalisation of relations is not wholly correct. It is true that
majority of rank and file who were radicalised during General
Zia-ul-Haq’s rule are still inimical to India but the way to
neutralise them is to keep them engaged in dialogue. The communication
must not end with only Janjua’s meeting with NSA but opportunities
should be created for top level officers of the Defence Forces of the
two nations to meet and exchange their concerns freely and frequently.

Protestors hold placards and shout slogans, condemning the attack at
Pathankot Air Force Base. (Photo: AP)

Modi Must Visit Pakistan
As far as PM Modi’s visit is concerned, it must take place. If nothing
else, it will at least give him an opportunity to confront Sharif and
question him on why he had to invite him over tea when plans were
afoot to attack Pathankot air base. An embarrassed Sharif will surely
pour his heart out about what went wrong. This will also make Sharif’s
political life difficult if he has conspired with the Army to hurt us
strategically, as our hawkish experts would like us to believe.

Finally, in an operation of this nature, politicians must avoid making
brave and inaccurate claims about casualties and the nature of the
operation. It is also inadvisable to indict the Pak Army unless we can
prove conclusively the handler’s connect with them. It is true that
such attacks will not take place without the active assistance of Pak
Army, but mere suspicion will show us only as cry babies. Let evidence
speak for our charges, only then we will be taken seriously.

We Must Not Exhibit Panic
We must also refrain from exhibiting panic. There was no need for our
Foreign Minister’s brainstorming session at this time with ex-foreign
Secretaries and former High Commissioners to Pakistan. It sends wrong
signals all around. Such discourses produce only a cocktail of
outdated ideas and add confusion to the decision-making process. It is
saner that you trust your men in harness and encourage them to break
the logjam that bedevils India and Pakistan relations.

(The writer is a former Special Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat)
-- 
Peace Is Doable

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