http://scroll.in/article/821175/trumps-victory-will-not-make-america-great-again-it-will-deepen-its-decline

US ELECTIONS 2016

Trump’s victory will not 'Make America Great Again' – it will deepen its decline

In his narrowly domestic imagination, America is competitor rather
than leader on the world stage.

Yesterday · 10:30 am

Keshava Guha

Some years are branded for all time by their political events: 1789,
1848, 1917, 1989. It is too early to add 2016 to that list, or to
speculate on the historical significance of a Donald Trump presidency.
But Trump’s election itself is the logical culmination of a year that
has ended, decisively, an era in the West that began with the end of
the Cold War.

Liberal internationalism is in retreat, both in politics and in
economics. White voters, especially working-class and rural ones, have
rejected rule by elite consensus. Nativism, xenophobia, sexism and
outright racism have been deployed more openly and effectively than
for decades. The United States and its closest ally Britain have
turned inwards.

Trump’s election has been widely described as a stunning upset. It is
liable to be compared to Brexit. But such a view is difficult to
reconcile with the facts. On the eve of the election, Trump was level
with Hillary Clinton, or within the margin of error in national polls,
and within striking distance in every battleground state. The most
influential forecaster, Nate Silver of FiveThirtyEight, rated Trump’s
chances at 35% or over for much of the past week. A one-in-three shot
– hardly Leicester City. As with Brexit, the idea that this was a
shock result only reveals the extent to which expectations are shaped
by wishful thinking.

A victory for bigotry
In this narrow sense, Trump’s win was unlikely but not unexpected.
More generally, the fact that Republicans had a strong night isn’t
surprising either. Since 1945, there have been ten US presidential
elections in which the incumbent party had been in power for two terms
or more. In eight of those ten elections, the challenging party won.
Barack Obama is the third consecutive two-term president to be
succeeded by a member of the opposite party.

But, in so many other ways, this is one of the most bizarre – and
appalling – events in American political history. Donald Trump will be
the 45th President, but the first true outsider, with no history of
either civilian or military government service. Six in 10 voters,
according to exit polls, regarded him as unqualified for the office.
Majorities also doubted his temperament and judgment. Unlike every
modern presidential candidate, he did not release his tax returns, and
is believed to have paid virtually no income tax at all for the past
20 years.

Trump ran a campaign of open ethnic and religious polarisation,
targeting Hispanics and Muslims in particular. Perhaps the most
unsavoury aspect of all was his sexism – embodied in the leaked 2005
video in which he bragged about committing sexual assault.

Over 60 million Americans have voted for a candidate who is brazenly
racist and sexist. It is fatuous to absolve these voters of moral
responsibility for his election – every vote for Trump is on the
spectrum from tolerance of racism and sexism to an enthusiastic
embrace of those things. His election is, thus, evidence of the
enduring extent of bigotry in the US. A narrow majority of white women
supported a candidate who has been accused of assault by twenty-four
different women.

How we got here
Trump’s election is, rightly, the cause of such dismay that it is
tempting, in pondering how we got here, to look not for causal factors
but for people and institutions to blame. Such a list might begin with
a Republican Party that has, beginning with Richard Nixon’s Southern
Strategy, practiced dog-whistle politics and subtle racial
polarisation for half a century. In the early stages of the Republican
primary, Trump’s rivals refrained from directly attacking him for fear
of alienating his voters.

Bernie Sanders and his allies pushed an agenda that was free of
Trump’s bigotry but similarly protectionist and anti-internationalist.
These outsider candidates of right and left shared the view that
globalization, particularly in the form of free-trade deals, has
disproportionately benefited the Third World at America’s expense.
Liberal internationalism might have rejoiced in American policies that
exported prosperity, but Sanders and Trump, in very different ways,
embodied a new, inward-looking nationalism. Trump’s decisive victory
in the Rust Belt states of Michigan, Wisconsin, Ohio and Pennsylvania
depended in part on Sanders supporters who didn’t vote for Clinton.

Others will point to a primary process that rewards ideological
extremism, and to the electoral college system, which renders the
votes of a majority of Americans meaningless, and concentrates the
campaign in a handful of “battleground states”. FBI director James
Comey will be accused of having swung the election – unfairly, given
the extent of Trump’s Rust Belt victory.

The media, as usual, is a popular target, for providing Trump free
airtime and for its prominent coverage of Clinton’s use of a private
email server. But Trump was always going to be the most compelling
story of this election and, on the whole, the media did a thorough job
of covering his indiscretions. Voters were well aware of Trump’s
record of racism, sexism, and dubious financial dealings – and elected
him anyway.

Instead of scapegoating Comey or the media, Clinton supporters would
be better served examining the failings of their party and its
candidate. Like Britain’s Labour Party, the Democrats have abandoned
their historic base – the white working-class – in favour of a new
coalition of college-educated urban voters, young women and
minorities. Barack Obama’s targeting of the white working-class was
central to his successful re-election of 2012. In attempting to
preserve the ‘Obama coalition’, the Clinton campaign lacked a coherent
strategy to prevent this group from defecting to a Republican who
appealed directly to them. Assuming that “demography is destiny”,
Democrats believed that the increasing minority share of the
electorate guaranteed them victory.

The outsider
How does Donald Trump become President of a country in which Barack
Obama has an approval rating in the mid-50s? In large part because the
Democrats produced a candidate ill-equipped to beat him.

In the year of the outsider – in the US and beyond – Hillary Clinton
was the ultimate insider. Her supporters, including Obama, peddled the
absurd claim that she was “the most qualified person ever to run for
President” – when, in truth, she had performed her various political
roles with no particular distinction.

Her reputation for insincerity and opportunism was enhanced by her
flip-flop on the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and by revelations that
the Democratic National Committee had egregiously favoured her in her
race with Sanders. Like all supposed ‘Clinton scandals’, her use of a
private email server was overplayed by both the media and her
opponents, but the original decision and her handling of the fallout
spoke to a strange lack of political judgment in a politician with
decades of experience. So did her speeches to Goldman Sachs and other
corporations, and her courting of less-than-reputable foreign donors
for the Clinton Foundation. Her campaign itself was alarmingly
complacent: in Wisconsin, a state that Trump won, she declined to
campaign at all, assuming she would win.

Clinton represented all that Trump successfully claimed to be running
against. At a time when voters show little regard for formal
experience, he had a narrative, while she had a resume. The experience
of the Iraq and Afghan wars have led Americans to despise hawkish
interventionism. Even though her original support of the Iraq invasion
cost her the Democratic nomination in 2008, she continues to be an
interventionist. In every sense, Clinton represented the post-Cold War
liberal internationalism that voters have rejected in 2016: centrist
economics, with broad support for Wall Street and free trade; high
levels of immigration of both skilled and unskilled workers;
interventionism; and, above all, rule by elite experts.

Clinton’s command of policy detail is as impressive as that of any
candidate in recent history, and certainly dwarfed Trump’s, but that
almost served to count against her. The Iraq disaster, the financial
crisis, and the wage stagnation and economic insecurity caused by
deindustralisation have led many voters to distrust elites. It is this
that explains the central fracture of the 2016, even more than race:
the divide between the college-educated minority and the non-college
educated majority.

Finally, Trump was the beneficiary of longer-term changes – or decay –
in American political culture. As long ago as 1982, Gore Vidal said,
“As the age of television progresses the Reagans will be the rule, not
the exception. To be perfect for television is all a President has to
be these days.”

Trump is, of course, the first reality TV star to be elected
President, in an era when politics has become a form of entertainment.
Central to reality TV is the fiction that it is unscripted – this, as
much as a hatred of political correctness, enabled Trump to get away
with his many outrageous, false and hateful statements. Every
fact-checker found Clinton to be more honest, but it was Trump, a
brazen and prodigious liar even by political standards, who was
perceived as authentic.

It will be for historians to judge whether the role of race in this
election represents cultural decay or consistency. But the nature of
the opposition to President Obama – from the immediate formation of
the Tea Party to birtherism – was a prophecy of the open racial
polarisation that helped elect Trump.

What lies ahead
In less than three months, Donald Trump will take office as President.
It is said of every President that his first task – tragically still
“his” – is to unite the country. Never has this cliché been truer, and
never has there been a President less suited to the task. Where Bush
was tragedy, Trump may be farce. But Bush had not alienated large
swathes of the electorate. Trump’s paradox is expectations: from his
opponents and from the media, these will be the lowest conceivable;
for his supporters, they will be Trump Tower-high.

Some have already imagined what a Trump presidency would look like.
The nature of his cabinet appointments will reveal whether we are to
expect a fairly conventional Republican administration, or something
without precedent. In domestic terms, the most immediate areas of
interest – or fear – are healthcare and the Supreme Court. Trump’s
election vindicates, politically if not morally, the Republican
strategy of blocking Merrick Garland’s appointment to the Court’s
ninth seat. Trump will restore to the Roberts Court the conservative
majority that, among other things, struck down parts of the Voting
Rights Act, thus easing the suppression of minority votes that
contributed to Trump’s election.

Like all Republican candidates, Trump promised to repeal the
Affordable Care Act, better known as ‘Obamacare’. With majorities in
both house of Congress, he has no excuse not to. This is likely to be
a messy and drawn-out process. In the absence of an alternative plan
for universal coverage – which Trump has praised as an ideal, but
without specifics – repealing Obamacare could confiscate health
insurance from millions who have recently received coverage for the
first time.

But with healthcare, as with most areas of policy, it is difficult to
know exactly what to expect of Trump. Many have speculated that he is
a closet liberal, but it is difficult to see how he would reconcile
this with the party that elected him. Others see him as a conventional
pro-business Republican, but governing in this way would constitute a
betrayal of his working-class base.

One way in which a Trump presidency should cause all of us – not just
Americans – alarm is the environment. He has floated the theory that
climate change is a hoax peddled by China, and his likely choice as
the head of the Environment Protection Agency, Myron Ebell, is a
climate change denier – as is Jim Inhofe, the Chairman of the Senate
Environment and Public Works Committee. The real, but insufficient
progress on climate change under Obama is likely to be reversed, with
horrific consequences.

Trump is unlikely, as some have feared, to be an ally of Russia. The
opposition to such a stance within the American national security
establishment would be too strong to overcome. But his inward-looking
nationalism, under the ‘America First’ slogan, has already terrified
those states, beginning with the Baltic republics who, in the
post-Cold War era, looked to the US for protection against Moscow.
Under Presidents Bush and Obama, Russia has invaded non-NATO states
with impunity. Under Trump, there is the incredible prospect of NATO
itself falling apart. The question of NATO commitments, and of the
American defence of Japan and South Korea, will be an early test of
whether the Republican and national security establishments can
successfully ‘normalise’– or, in Yes Minister terms, ‘house-train’–
Trump.

The decline of America
Whatever the actual consequences of his presidency in policy terms,
Trump’s election itself has changed both America and the world, not
irrevocably but at least for the foreseeable future. Domestically, he
has revived the racial politics and ethnic nationalism that sanguine
liberals had thought they had defeated in the 20th century. After
9/11, George W Bush said repeatedly that his government was at war
with Islamic terrorists, not with Islam itself. Trump, by contrast,
has made 3 million Muslim Americans feel unwelcome – and unsafe – in
their own country.

His open sexism, and the fact that it was successfully harnessed to
defeat the first major-party female candidate, has set the cause of
women in American politics back just as it was on the cusp of its most
important victory. Hillary Clinton will, eventually, receive immense
regard for how close she came, twice, to breaking the “highest glass
ceiling”, but it is difficult to see a woman being elected President
in the near future.

The second half of the post-Cold War era, from the Iraq invasion
onwards, has witnessed a progressive decline in America’s standing in
the world, a decline only slowed, rather than reversed, by Barack
Obama. Trump’s cry of “Make America Great Again” is essentially
ironic: he is the first presidential candidate to embrace this
decline. It is this narrowly domestic view of America’s interests,
America as competitor rather than leader on the world stage, that
animates his trade and foreign policies. That Bernie Sanders adopted a
version of this worldview – as did Britain’s Brexiteers, and others in
Europe – underlines how broadly shared it is across the West.

White America, like white Britain, has turned inward. Trump’s election
symbolises this shift. Yet, for the first time in living memory,
Americans have to look abroad to understand their new
commander-in-chief. Is he Berlusconi? Or Mussolini? Whatever he turns
out to be, his campaign as an authoritarian strongman, trumpeting
narrow nationalism, fits right into a world in which Xi Jinping,
Vladimir Putin, Narendra Modi and Recep Tayyip Erdogan have
centralised power in the name of national interest, in a sharp
departure from the heady liberal optimism of the 1990s. That optimism
came out of the American victory in the Cold War – of the belief that
the US could export free elections and free markets and pay for their
defence. Whether President Trump turns out to be an effectual
strongman, or merely a clown, his election marks the death of that
vision.


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Peace Is Doable

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