Reproduced herebelow is the link to another note on the outcome of UP poll - not political significance etc., which essentially claims that it is the chronicle of a victory foretold, of course by the author, based on the poll arithmatc.
Especially relevant: "I had pointed out in my column dated January 6 (“BJP not winning UP would be the only surprise”) that the quality and depth of BJP’s 2014 victory in UP was so high that it would take a three times worse performance than Bihar to lose UP. In other words, 10% of BJP voters of 2014 had to shift loyalties for the party to lose UP in 2017, not 3%." Also: "Even though BJP’s vote share dropped by a few percentage points in exactly the same constituencies that it contested across 2014 and 2017, its massive margin of victory in 2014 gave it enough cushion to be able to absorb some of these vote share losses and still win these constituencies." Of course, a related contention of his is not based on actual facts: "While post facto analysis is always misleading, it is evident from data that BJP would have still won a thumping majority in UP regardless (of a ‘mahagathbandhan’ of SP, Congress and BSP, as in Bihar between JD(U), RJD and Congress)." The hard fact is: In UP, this time: BJP: 39.7% SP: 21.8% Congress: 6.2% (So, SP + Congress: 28%) BSP: 22.2 (SP + Congress + BSP = 50.2% as against 39.2% + 1.7% = 40.9% of BJP + 2 Allies.) In this regard, Surjit Bhalla on *March 9*, at <http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/uttar-pradesh-assembly-elections-2017-samajwadi-party-bjp-congress-no-proof-required-seeking-redemption-in-up-2017-4560884/>, is far more realistic: "For the 2017 UP election, the SP and Congress have formed an alliance. But unlike Bihar, a major third party, the BSP, is not part of the alliance. Bihar was an “alliance math election”, as UP will likely turn out to be. This math states that if the 2017 votes are a replica of the 2014 vote, a Bihar-like MG (SP + BSP + INC) would result in a resounding victory for the MG — 263 seats. But 2017 is a three-way fight — BJP+, BSP, and G — and three-way fights should not be confused with two-way match-ups. Going from MG to G, the “alliance” is able to win only 78 seats with the BJP winning 317, and the BSP winning only eight seats." Now, the link: <http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/57615182.cms>. Sukla On 13/03/2017, Sukla Sen <[email protected]> wrote: > [Analysts have started talking about the 2017 election results the way > they did with the 2014 results of the general election. They call it > inclusive and a mandate beyond caste. They seem embarrassed by the > BJP’s campaign, which was brazenly anti-Muslim, casteist and divisive. > The references to the Ram Mandir, anti-Romeo squads, displacement of > Hindus, appeasement of Muslims at the cost of Dalits and backward > castes were raised at the beginning of the campaign and remained till > the end. There was hardly a BJP leader who did not use this language. > It was most certainly not inclusive. > > (A comparison with the last Bihar assembly poll would, arguably, be > quite instructive. > In UP, BJP's overall vote share is this time 39.7% as against 42.3% in > 2014. A dip of 2.6% point. (See: <http://www.eciresults.nic.in/>.) > In the last Bihar poll, it was 24.4% as against 29.4% in 2014. A dip > of 5% points. (For details: > <https://groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/india-unity/conversations/messages/57544>.) > So, the dip in Bihar, in terms of proportion was significantly > sharper, and that too from a lower base. > *That, of course, shows the (relative) success of BJP's campaign line.* > But, far more significant is the fact that the poll in Bihar was > essentially bipolar, while in UP it is triangular. > That has made a big difference. > > In UP, this time: > BJP: 39.7% > SP: 21.8% > Congress: 6.2% > (So, SP + Congress: 28%) > BSP: 22.2 > (SP + Congress + BSP = 50.2% as against 39.2% + 1.7% = 40.9% of BJP + 2 > Allies.) > True, in case of actual alliance, things won't exactly follow the > arithmatical model. A (perceived to be) strong alliance would attract > more votes than the sum of the individual parts. On the other, a > socially/politically incompatible alliance would seriously hinder vote > transfers from one ally to another, and thereby would reduce the sum. > Nevertheless, the arithmatical model remains at the core. > > "For the 2017 UP election, the SP and Congress have formed an > alliance. But unlike Bihar, a major third party, the BSP, is not part > of the alliance. Bihar was an “alliance math election”, as UP will > likely turn out to be. This math states that if the 2017 votes are a > replica of the 2014 vote, a Bihar-like MG (SP + BSP + INC) would > result in a resounding victory for the MG — 263 seats. But 2017 is a > three-way fight — BJP+, BSP, and G — and three-way fights should not > be confused with two-way match-ups. Going from MG to G, the “alliance” > is able to win only 78 seats with the BJP winning 317, and the BSP > winning only eight seats." > This is Surjit Bhalla on *March 9* (at > <http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/uttar-pradesh-assembly-elections-2017-samajwadi-party-bjp-congress-no-proof-required-seeking-redemption-in-up-2017-4560884/>). > > Of course, the "political" factors must not be overlooked or > underestimated. > And, one has to keep in mind the following. > In Punjab, the BJP polled 5.4% this time as against 8.7% in 2014. A > dip of 3.3% points, much sharper in terms of proportion. > In Uttarakhand, 39.7% as against 55.3%. Again, quite a dip. > In Manipur, 36.3% as against 11.9%. The vote share has more than trebled. > In Goa, 32.5% as against 53.4%. Again, quite a sharp dip. > > So, things are far from uniform. > Of course, UP has a far hiher weightage and much greater practical > implications. > No doubt about that.)] > > ASSEMBLY ELECTION RESULTS > > Uttar Pradesh 2017: How Modi and the BJP beat the politics of social > justice at its own game > The verdict in Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand is definitely a decisive > victory of the ideology of the saffron party. > > 3 hours ago. > > Apoorvanand > > Indian parliamentary politics has moved away from the concerns of its > minorities. This is the essence of the statement of Rashtriya > Swayamsevak Sangh intellectual Rakesh Sinha who, celebrating the > massive mandate given to the Bharatiya Janata Party by the people in > Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand, said: “A Muslim veto institutionalised > as an extra-secular mechanism has been demolished. The Sangh’s > meta-narrative on nationalism and Hindutva has emerged as a hegemonic > ideology.” > > BJP leaders use the phrase “end of caste politics” to explain the > unprecedented vote percentage that the saffron party has gained in the > state elections this time. Other observers see a new voter emerging in > these elections, one who is weary of instability, is tired of > coalition politics and wants to see decisive governance. This view > looks at the mandate to the BJP as a continuation of the trend, over > the last decade, in Uttar Pradesh that had put Mayawati and Akhilesh > Yadav in power with an unambiguous majority in the past. > > BJP expansion > What is evident from the recent poll results is that the BJP has > established its pan-Indian dominance decisively. Many see the BJP’s > determination to capture India with admiration. Some others see it > with fear. Four years ago, when the BJP announced that its focus was > on the North East and East, including Bihar, West Bengal and Odisha, > it was not taken very seriously. But the consistent work by the RSS, > its mother organisation, was to serve as the springboard for the BJP. > The time was ripe. The power it got at the Centre gave it the leverage > it needed in these areas. Its expansion in Odisha, as is evident in > the results of the panchayat elections in February, is just an example > of how the party can rebound in a place from where it was effectively > pushed out only a few years ago. > > The emergence of the BJP in Odisha, where the Biju Janata Dal had > unceremoniously showed it the door a few years ago, needs to be > understood in the light of what has happened in Uttar Pradesh. The > saffron party has been out of power in Uttar Pradesh for the last 14 > years. > > There were theoretical explanations for this. It was believed that the > politics of social justice had made it impossible for the political > language of Hindutva to define politics. However, the politics of > social justice was reduced to, or remained limited to, giving > representation to some sections of the erstwhile marginalised social > groups. This meant that all one had to do was to give these > marginalised social groups a sense of participation in the affairs of > politics. If one could bring them around by only doing this much, what > prevented the BJP from attempting this formula too? > > Thus, the last 10 years have shown the BJP turning the politics of > social justice on its head. While political scientists kept calling it > the party of upper caste Hindu males, it slowly co-opted the Other > Backward Classes and Dalits into its Hindu fold. > > Social justice fell short > This is also a moment for ideologues to ponder over the rhetoric of > Ambedkarism, which failed to anticipate that it was not at all > difficult for Dalits to accept a party that is run along Manuwadi > (casteist) ideological lines. Is it difficult to see how the suicide > of Dalit scholar Rohith Vemula in Hyderabad or the lynching of Dalits > by the protectors of cows in Gujarat could not stir the Dalits of > Uttar Pradesh to spurn the saffron party? What prevented democratic > parties from talking about these issues and making them central in > their campaign? The fear that they would be seen as practising a > partisan political language? > > There have been many reports of how the BJP worked on the non-Yadav > castes to carry them along. It was done in many ways, by pulling caste > groups like the Kurmis, Rajbhars, Nishads and Mauryas and non-Jatav > Dalits into its fold. Cultural modes were used effectively. The BJP’s > symbolic campaign in the name of Suheldev, a little-known 11th-century > Pasi king, to dislodge the warrior saint Ghazi Miyan from the popular > imagination as the hero of both Hindus and Muslims in eastern Uttar > Pradesh, is only one example. > > While the leaders of the social justice plank got complacent with the > assurance of continued support from their sub-caste group, they failed > to anticipate the aspirations that this would generate in other > sub-caste groups within the wider category of Dalits or Backwards. > That this would ultimately generate resentment among these groups > against the dominant ruling caste group, which in the case of Bihar > and Uttar Pradesh were Yadavs among the Backwards and Jatavs among > Dalits. To think that with these dominant caste groups as the nuclei, > other sub-caste groups would keep hovering around them was lazy > politics. Also, as we can now see, the journey of the politics of > social justice was devoid of democratic content. A politics that was > only the language of negotiation with power could only lead to where > it stands now. Bahujan Samaj Party leader Mayawati has been reduced to > the status of a leader of Jatavs, and Akhilesh Yadav does not have > appeal beyond Yadavs. Their failure to fashion a universal language > that could compete with the Hindutva universal is stark. > > Reverse identity politics > No human being likes to remain confined within the identity assigned > to them. We are programmed to be transcendental beings. What was the > promise of the slogan of social justice in this regard? It asked > Yadavs to remain Yadavs and Jatavs to remain Jatavs forever. Contrary > to this brand of politics, the RSS at least promised them an opening > in the wider Hindu fold, and more recently, pride in being part of a > more universal national project. Thus, an ambitionless, narrow > identity politics was defeated by a reverse identity politics, which > just reprogrammed these groups, and assured them of being part of a > larger Hindu nationalist solidarity project. > > It is also interesting that the only party that spoke in a cultural > language during the election campaign was the BJP. Neither the > Congress-Samajwadi Party alliance nor the Bahujan Samaj Party moved an > inch away from their economic rhetoric. Their attempt to appeal to the > economic insecurities of people did not cut ice as people knew that > both camps barely differ with regard to their economic policies. So, > the only thing to make a difference was culture. However, the > hesitation of the so-called secular parties in talking about their > cultural platform meant that they had utter disdain for the people’s > striving to find their definition of what a good life would be. A good > life is one that goes beyond economic compulsions. To not talk about > it is having a dim view of people. > > ***Analysts have started talking about the 2017 election results the > way they did with the 2014 results of the general election. They call > it inclusive and a mandate beyond caste. They seem embarrassed by the > BJP’s campaign, which was brazenly anti-Muslim, casteist and divisive. > The references to the Ram Mandir, anti-Romeo squads, displacement of > Hindus, appeasement of Muslims at the cost of Dalits and backward > castes were raised at the beginning of the campaign and remained till > the end. There was hardly a BJP leader who did not use this language. > It was most certainly not inclusive.*** [Emphasis added.] > > The verdict in Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand is definitely a decisive > victory of the ideology of the BJP. The party’s opponents must first > accept this fact if they are to think about ways to deal with it. > > > -- > Peace Is Doable > -- Peace Is Doable -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Green Youth Movement" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send an email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/greenyouth. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
