On Wed, Aug 3, 2016 at 1:45 PM, heasley <[email protected]> wrote: > Wed, Aug 03, 2016 at 12:02:36PM -0400, Christopher Morrow: > > > (2) IIUC, this proposal envisages BGP speakers commonly > > > telling others to blackhole specific /32's or /128's. And > > > of course as the draft says BGP doesn't provide us with a > > > way to "prevent the unauthorized modification of > > > information by the forwarding agent." Given those two > > > > > > > err, there is MD5 auth for tcp... which SHOULD prevent modification > > in-flight. > > of course (ha!) there's notionally tcp-AO which should do the same thing, > > perhaps in the 'year 2000' (say with proper gravitas) when we... wait, > > darn! no implementations of AO exist. > > I do not believe that is the intended meaning; I think it is reference > to a device's route policy, intentional or accidental. >
interesting, I didn't read/take-in the 'agent' part... (perhaps I read 'forwarding path' :( ) If 'agent' is to mean 'route server' then sure, neither md5/ao/gtsm will help... and yes, that 'agent' can mangle routes as it sees fit. thanks! -chris
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