Re: [GROW] Genart telechat review of draft-ietf-grow-bgp-reject-07

Mon, 22 May 2017 09:20:06 -0700 

On Fri, May 19, 2017 at 11:19:34AM -0700, Dale Worley wrote:
>This paragraph is a good introduction, but it isn't very cohesive.  I
>suggest revising the third sentence to something like:
>
>   This document updates [RFC4271] so that routes are neither imported
>   nor exported unless specifically enabled by configuration, thus
>   reducing the consequences of these problems, and so improving the
>   default level of Internet routing security.

Hi Dale, this paragraphs seems wordy now, so I would suggested splitting
sentences as follows:

This document updates [RFC4271] so that routes are neither imported nor
exported unless specifically enabled by configuration.  The solution
reduces the consequences of these problems, and improves the default level
of Internet routing security.

>You probably want to s/a compliant BGP implementation/compliant BGP
>implementations/, unless you are describing the process for an
>individual operator, not for all operators collectively.

As Job said, this was a transition consideration for BGP implementers.

How about this change for clarity:
- old: It is anticipated that transitioning to a compliant BGP implementation
will require a process thay may take several years.
- new: Transitioning to a compliant BGP implementation may require a software
development and release process that can take implementers several years.

I attached a new -07 -> -08 htmldiff that incorporates my edits and
Job's edits.

Greg

--
Greg Hankins <[email protected]>
Title: Diff: draft-ietf-grow-bgp-reject-07.txt - draft-ietf-grow-bgp-reject-08.txt
 draft-ietf-grow-bgp-reject-07.txt   draft-ietf-grow-bgp-reject-08.txt 
Global Routing Operations J. Mauch Global Routing Operations J. Mauch
Internet-Draft Akamai Internet-Draft Akamai
Updates: 4271 (if approved) J. Snijders Updates: 4271 (if approved) J. Snijders
Intended status: Standards Track NTT Intended status: Standards Track NTT
Expires: November 9, 2017 G. Hankins Expires: November 23, 2017 G. Hankins
Nokia Nokia
May 8, 2017 May 22, 2017
Default EBGP Route Propagation Behavior Without Policies Default EBGP Route Propagation Behavior Without Policies
draft-ietf-grow-bgp-reject-07 draft-ietf-grow-bgp-reject-08
Abstract Abstract
This document updates RFC4271 by defining the default behavior of a This document updates RFC4271 by defining the default behavior of a
BGP speaker when there is no Import or Export Policy associated with BGP speaker when there is no Import or Export Policy associated with
an External BGP session. an External BGP session.
Requirements Language Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
skipping to change at page 1, line 41 skipping to change at page 1, line 41
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on November 9, 2017. This Internet-Draft will expire on November 23, 2017.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
skipping to change at page 2, line 25 skipping to change at page 2, line 25
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Changes to RFC4271 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Changes to RFC4271 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
7. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Appendix A. Transition Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Appendix A. Transition Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
A.1. N+1 N+2 Release Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 A.1. "N+1 N+2" Release Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
BGP routing security issues need to be addressed in order to make the BGP routing security issues need to be addressed in order to make the
Internet more stable. Route leaks [RFC7908] are part of the problem, Internet more stable. Route leaks [RFC7908] are part of the problem,
but software defects or operator misconfiguration can contribute too. but software defects or operator misconfiguration can contribute too.
This document updates [RFC4271] in order to improve the default level This document updates [RFC4271] so that routes are neither imported
of Internet routing security. nor exported unless specifically enabled by configuration. The
solution reduces the consequences of these problems, and improves the
default level of Internet routing security.
Many deployed BGP speakers send and accept any and all route Many deployed BGP speakers send and accept any and all route
announcements between their BGP neighbors by default. This practice announcements between their BGP neighbors by default. This practice
dates back to the early days of the Internet, where operators were dates back to the early days of the Internet, where operators were
permissive in sending routing information to allow all networks to permissive in sending routing information to allow all networks to
reach each other. As the Internet has become more densely reach each other. As the Internet has become more densely
interconnected, the risk of a misbehaving BGP speaker poses interconnected, the risk of a misbehaving BGP speaker poses
significant risks to Internet routing. significant risks to Internet routing.
This specification intends to improve this situation by requiring the This specification intends to improve this situation by requiring the
explicit configuration of both BGP Import and Export Policies for any explicit configuration of both BGP Import and Export Policies for any
External BGP (EBGP) session such as customers, peers, or External BGP (EBGP) session such as customers, peers, or
confederation boundaries for all enabled address families. Through confederation boundaries for all enabled address families. Through
codification of the aforementioned requirement, operators will codification of the aforementioned requirement, operators will
benefit from consistent behaviour across different BGP benefit from consistent behaviour across different BGP
implementations. implementations.
BGP speakers following this specification do not use or send routes BGP speakers following this specification do not use or send routes
on EBGP sessions, unless configured to do otherwise. on EBGP sessions, unless specifically configured to do so.
2. Terminology 2. Terminology
[RFC4271] describes a Policy Information Base (PIB) which contains [RFC4271] describes a Policy Information Base (PIB) which contains
local policies that can be applied to the information in the Routing local policies that can be applied to the information in the Routing
Information Base (RIB). This document distinguishes the type of Information Base (RIB). This document distinguishes the type of a
policy based on its application. policy based on its application.
Import Policy: a local policy to be applied to the information Import Policy: a local policy to be applied to the information
contained in the Adj-RIBs-In. As described in Section 3.2 [RFC4271], contained in the Adj-RIBs-In. As described in Section 3.2 [RFC4271],
the Adj-RIBs-In contain information learned from other BGP speakers, the Adj-RIBs-In contain information learned from other BGP speakers,
and the application of the Import Policy results in the routes that and the application of the Import Policy results in the routes that
will be considered in the Decision Process by the local BGP speaker. will be considered in the Decision Process by the local BGP speaker.
Export Policy: a local policy to be applied in selecting the Export Policy: a local policy to be applied in selecting the
information contained in the Adj-RIBs-Out. As described in information contained in the Adj-RIBs-Out. As described in
Section 3.2 [RFC4271], the Adj-RIBs-Out contain information that has Section 3.2 [RFC4271], the Adj-RIBs-Out contain information that has
been selected for advertisement to other BGP speakers. been selected for advertisement to other BGP speakers.
3. Changes to RFC4271 3. Changes to RFC4271
This section describes the Updates to [RFC4271] that define the This section updates [RFC4271] to specify the default behavior of a
default behavior of a BGP speaker when there are no Import or Export BGP speaker when there are no Import or Export Policies associated
Policies associated with a particular EBGP session. A BGP speaker with a particular EBGP session. A BGP speaker MAY provide a
MAY provide a configuration option to deviate from the following configuration option to deviate from the following updated behaviors.
updated behaviors.
The following paragraph is added to Section 9.1 (Decision Process) The following paragraph is added to Section 9.1 (Decision Process)
after the fifth paragraph ending in "route aggregation and route after the fifth paragraph, which ends in "route aggregation and route
information reduction": information reduction":
Routes contained in an Adj-RIB-In associated with an EBGP peer Routes contained in an Adj-RIB-In associated with an EBGP peer
SHALL NOT be considered eligible in the Decision Process if no SHALL NOT be considered eligible in the Decision Process if no
explicit Import Policy has been applied. explicit Import Policy has been applied.
The following paragraph is added to Section 9.1.3 (Phase 3: Route The following paragraph is added to Section 9.1.3 (Phase 3: Route
Dissemination) after the third paragraph ending in "by means of an Dissemination) after the third paragraph, which ends in "by means of
UPDATE message (see 9.2).": an UPDATE message (see 9.2).":
Routes SHALL NOT be added to an Adj-RIB-Out associated with an Routes SHALL NOT be added to an Adj-RIB-Out associated with an
EBGP peer if no explicit Export Policy has been applied. EBGP peer if no explicit Export Policy has been applied.
4. Acknowledgments 4. Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank the following people for their The authors would like to thank the following people for their
comments, support and review: Shane Amante, Christopher Morrow, comments, support and review: Shane Amante, Christopher Morrow,
Robert Raszuk, Greg Skinner, Adam Chappell, Sriram Kotikalapudi, Robert Raszuk, Greg Skinner, Adam Chappell, Sriram Kotikalapudi,
Brian Dickson, Jeffrey Haas, John Heasley, Ignas Bagdonas, Donald Brian Dickson, Jeffrey Haas, John Heasley, Ignas Bagdonas, Donald
Smith, Dale Worley, Alvaro Retana, and John Scudder. Smith, Dale Worley, Alvaro Retana, John Scudder, and Dale Worley.
5. Security Considerations 5. Security Considerations
Permissive default routing policies can result in inadvertent effects Permissive default routing policies can result in inadvertent effects
such as route leaks [RFC7908], in general resulting in rerouting of such as route leaks [RFC7908], in general resulting in routing of
traffic through an unexpected path. While it is possible for an traffic through an unexpected path. While it is possible for an
operator to use monitoring to detect unexpected flows, there is no operator to use monitoring to detect unexpected flows, there is no
general framework that can be applied. These policies also have the general framework that can be applied. These policies also have the
potential to expose software defects or misconfiguration that could potential to expose software defects or misconfiguration that could
have unforeseen technical and business impacting effects. have unforeseen technical and business impacting effects.
The update to [RFC4271] specified in this document is intended to The update to [RFC4271] specified in this document is intended to
eliminate those inadvertent effects. Operators must explicitly eliminate those inadvertent effects. Operators must explicitly
configure Import and Export Policies to achieve their expected goals. configure Import and Export Policies to achieve their expected goals.
There is of course no protection against a malicious or incorrect There is of course no protection against a malicious or incorrect
skipping to change at page 5, line 34 skipping to change at page 5, line 34
[RFC7908] Sriram, K., Montgomery, D., McPherson, D., Osterweil, E., [RFC7908] Sriram, K., Montgomery, D., McPherson, D., Osterweil, E.,
and B. Dickson, "Problem Definition and Classification of and B. Dickson, "Problem Definition and Classification of
BGP Route Leaks", RFC 7908, DOI 10.17487/RFC7908, June BGP Route Leaks", RFC 7908, DOI 10.17487/RFC7908, June
2016, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7908>. 2016, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7908>.
Appendix A. Transition Considerations Appendix A. Transition Considerations
This appendix is non-normative. This appendix is non-normative.
It is anticipated that transitioning to a compliant BGP Transitioning to a compliant BGP implementation may require a
implementation will require a process thay may take several years. software development and release process that can take implementers
several years.
It is understood and acknowledged that operators who are taking It is understood and acknowledged that operators who are taking
advantage of an undefined behavior will always be surprised by advantage of an undefined behavior will always be surprised by
changes to said behavior. changes to said behavior.
A.1. N+1 N+2 Release Strategy A.1. "N+1 N+2" Release Strategy
An implementer could leverage an approach described as "the N+1 and An implementer could leverage an approach described as the "N+1 and
N+2 release strategy". In release N+1, the implementer introduces a N+2" release strategy. In release N+1, the implementer introduces a
new default configuration parameter to indicate that the BGP speaker new default configuration parameter to indicate that the BGP speaker
is operating in "ebgp insecure-mode". In addition to the is operating in "ebgp insecure-mode". In addition to the
introduction of the new parameter, an implementer could begin to introduction of the new parameter, an implementer could begin to
display informational warnings to the operator that certain parts of display informational warnings to the operator that certain parts of
the configuration are incomplete. In release N+1, operators of the the configuration are incomplete. In release N+1, operators of the
BGP implementation become aware that a configurable default exists in BGP implementation become aware that a configurable default exists in
the implementation, and can prepare accordingly. In release N+2 or the implementation, and can prepare accordingly. In release N+2 or
later, the inverse of the previous default configuration parameter later, the inverse of the previous default configuration parameter
that was introduced in release N+1 becomes the new default. that was introduced in release N+1 becomes the new default.
 End of changes. 16 change blocks. 
24 lines changed or deleted 26 lines changed or added

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