Robert Engels <[email protected]> writes: > The certificate has the domain in it. So, think of the reverse. Someone > highjacks the domain and uses a bogus certificate (valid but not for the > real company) If the two weren’t linked there would be no way to stop > this (as the certificate is still valid)
> By linking the certificate and the domain it is that much harder to > break - both need to be compromised. That's why the goal is to change the hostname used for SNI and certificate verification, not blindly trust any certificate the remote server presents. Explicitly setting the hostname used for SNI and certificate verification instead of implicitly using the hostname given to connect to should not create any new security problems, as long as the hostname passed in is the correct one (the calling application has to figure that out in some way outside the scope of the API). -- Russ Allbery ([email protected]) <http://www.eyrie.org/~eagle/> -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "grpc.io" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/grpc-io. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/grpc-io/87tvkcluaj.fsf%40hope.eyrie.org. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
