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bismi-lLahi-rRahmani-rRahiem
In the Name of Allah, the Compassionate, the Merciful



=== News Update ===

Dark Truths About the Israeli Occupation

By: Daniel Levy, Washington Monthly. Posted
January 29, 2008. on: 29.01.2008 [12:10 ]
Article image

Can Israelis ever recover from the self-inflicted
damage of becoming a brutal
occupier?Unfortunatelly who will never recover is this poor child.VC

Edith Zertal and Akiva Eldar end their exhaustive
study of Israeli settlement policy with a
poignant question: Is it possible, they wonder,
that Israel’s 2005 withdrawal from the Gaza Strip
will become a “first step in Israel’s journey of
liberating itself from the enslavement to the
territories that it occupied in 1967, and which
have occupied <http://www.iraq-war.ru/it>it since
then and have brought it to the verge of
destruction”? Negotiations that have been set in
motion by the Annapolis peace conference in
November will likely provide a partial answer.
Zertal, a leading Israeli historian, and Eldar, a
chief political columnist and a former Washington
correspondent for the Israeli daily Ha’aretz,
have recently published Lords of the Land: The
War for Israel’s Settlements in the Occupied
Territories, 1967-2007. It is a detailed history
of Israel’s nearly forty-year occupation of Gaza
and the West Bank with a painful contention at
its core. The occupation, say Zertal and Eldar,
has wounded Israel’s very psyche, damaging both
its sense of self and its moral standing in the
world. “The prolonged military occupation and the
Jewish settlements that are perpetuating it have
toppled Israeli governments,” write the authors,
“and have brought Israel’s democracy and its
political culture to the brink of an abyss.”

The Hebrew version of this book was a best-seller
in Israel, and sparked a debate there on the
devastating realities and consequences of Israeli
settlement policy. It would be useful to
replicate that debate here in the United States ­
in the belly, as it were, of the enabler. The
book’s unflinchingly provocative title is matched
by a narrative that pulls no punches, and the
cast of villains (there are precious few heroes)
runs the gamut from Jewish militia terrorists and
their supporters in the Rabbinate to Labor Party
apologists for the settlers and feckless judges
who looked the other way as settlers created
illegal outposts within Palestinian territory.

There are two sides to the settlement coin. The
first is the settlers themselves, who are for the
most part religiously inspired, unswervingly
motivated, and highly effective. Religious
Zionism was very much in the backseat of the
Zionist enterprise until 1967, but once Israel
assumed control of Judea and Samaria (as the
settlers refer to the West Bank), the national
religious camp saw its moment to seize the ideological steering wheel of state.

Their method was to create facts on the ground ­
that is, to quickly build settlements ­ and then
get the political system on board by a number of
means. The first step was persuasion (”We are all
Jews surrounded by a sea of enemies”), followed
by integration (the settlers’ tentacles reached
into all branches of government), and then
coercion (the use of intimidation, threats, and
violence). Any dubious action could be “koshered”
by a shared appeal to Jewish history and Zionist
destiny. If all else failed, there was the threat
of Arab terror, which the settlers had a key role
in encouraging. For believers, there was a
religious justification and meaning ­ a theology
of settlement, if you like. The final ingredient
was an approach to the Palestinians that was at
best colonial and at worst murderous. The new
Lords of the West Bank arrogantly dismissed the
region’s indigenous population, and when the
Palestinians showed opposition, settler militias
and terrorist groups were formed (yes, Jewish
terrorist groups). In 2001, an Israeli group
named the Committee for the Defense of the Roads
claimed responsibility for the drive-by killing
of a six-month-old Palestinian baby and her
family. Similar groups carried out additional
attacks, and between 1980 and 1984, before the
First Intifada began, twenty-three Palestinian
civilians were killed in violent attacks by
settlers, mostly involving firearms (often army
issue). American readers might be shocked to
discover that a religiously sanctified cult of
martyrdom and “redemptive death” among elements
of the Israeli settler community even exists at
all, and then horrified at the extent of its destructiveness.

The other side of the settlement coin is the
State of Israel, and the keyword here is
complicity. Nothing would have been possible ­ or
permanent ­ without the cooperation of Israel’s
army, legal system, and government bureaucracy,
and the political leadership of all mainstream
parties. The heroes who have fleetingly appeared
­ former Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Chiefs of
Staff Haim Bar-Lev and Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, Head
of Intelligence Shlomo Gazit, human rights
attorney Talia Sasson, and principled opposition
politicians Yossi Sarid, Dedi Zucker, and Avrum
Burg ­ have been no match for the huge cast of
villains, facilitators, and mute bystanders. The
banality and bureaucracy of the settlement
enterprise carried ­ and continues to carry ­ the day.

There are approximately 460,000 settlers
(including those in East Jerusalem) in the
settlements; they nearly doubled their numbers
during the fifteen-year-long failed peace
process. Given all this, the question for
American peace conference planners is whether the
settlement project can in fact be rolled back.
Despite repeated requests and occasional
assurances, the expansion of the settlement and
control system in the occupied territories has
never been stopped. The settlement advocates have
always had other rabbits to pull from the hat:
distinguish a broadly defined “natural growth”
from overt expansion; call a new settlement an
“outpost”; build a security barrier deep inside Palestinian territory.

During U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s
October visit to the region to plan the peace
summit, Rice suddenly faced media headlines (and
considerable embarrassment) about new Israeli
land confiscations east of Jerusalem. Former
Secretaries of State Kissinger, Baker, and
Albright (among others) would all have sympathized.

As for the Palestinian leadership, they have
never ­ whether from weakness or naivete ­
demanded a settlement freeze as a precondition
for negotiations, and neither has the United States.

Of the three towering figures on the Israeli
political stage for most of the post-1967 era ­
Prime Ministers Yitzhak Rabin, Ariel Sharon, and
Shimon Peres ­ only one emerges with any
credibility, or even decency. If this entire
story has a tragic hero, it is Rabin. He was the
settlers’ nemesis, popularizing opposition to
them in his 1992 election campaign, promising to
divert funds from settlements to education, and
describing their movement, Gush Emunim (”Block of
the Faithful”), as “a cancer in the body of
Israeli democracy.” Rabin fought (and usually
lost to) the settlers’ establishment facilitators
at every turn. Ironically, Lords of the Land
comes out almost exactly a dozen years after
Rabin’s murder, just as right-wing religious
settler groups are mounting their first concerted
campaign for the pardoning of Rabin’s assassin, Yigal Amir.

Predictably, opposite Rabin stood Ariel Sharon.
Sharon was the father of the settlement project
in the army and the Knesset, but most of all in
the various ministries he controlled at different
times. As great facilitator, Sharon allocated
land and water rights to settlements. As
agriculture minister in the Menachem Begin
government from 1977 to 1981 during sensitive
negotiations with Egypt, he authorized new
settlements. As infrastructure minister under
Likud Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, Sharon
defended the Israeli system of control at a time
when new settlements had become a huge diplomatic
headache. And even as Netanyahu was holding talks
with Yasser Arafat at the Wye plantation near
Washington, D.C., Sharon commanded his West Bank
followers to “seize every hilltop” in the Palestinian territories.

As prime minister in 2004-05, when Sharon finally
championed the disengagement from Gaza, Sharon’s
erstwhile supporters turned on him and vilified
him as a Judenrat leader and a Nazi. But in the
historical balance sheet, as Zertal and Eldar
make clear, the 7,000 settlers he evacuated from
Gaza barely register when they’re set alongside
his “accomplishments” in the West Bank.

Perhaps most unexpectedly to an international
audience, Shimon Peres also stood opposite Rabin.
If anyone is still taken in by the heavily
self-concocted image of Peres as visionary
peacemaker, this book will serve as a
myth-shattering antidote. Peres, who became
Israel’s new president on July 15, 2007,
undermined Rabin’s efforts to reign in
settlements. The settlers flattered Peres with
appeals to the timeless Zionist pioneering spirit
­ and, it seems, he could never resist flattery.
(He famously celebrated a tree-planting ceremony
with the settlers of Ofra in 1976, one year after
they illegally established the first settlement
in the heart of a Palestinian population center.)

Zertal and Eldar’s otherwise marvelous book is
sometimes difficult to follow and has a tendency
to be somewhat disjointed thematically and
chronologically. It also examines the territories
from an almost exclusively Israeli perspective:
the Palestinian and American angles are largely
beyond its scope. The international, and
especially American, reader would have benefited
if this book had been edited for a special
American version rather than published as a
straight translation from the Hebrew.

Several themes of interest are teasingly touched
on but not elaborated. We are reminded, for
instance, that Baruch Goldstein, the man who
indiscriminately opened fire on Palestinian
worshippers in Hebron (killing twenty-nine and
wounding more than a hundred) and around whom a
cult of hero worship has developed, was from
Brooklyn, New York. But there is no discussion
here of the overrepresentation of American Jews
among the ideological settler hard core. The
financial and political support from certain U.S.
groups (both Jewish and evangelical) that is
enjoyed by the settlers makes a frustratingly
truncated appearance. The book’s most glaring
problem is the lack of a systematic discussion of
U.S. policy toward the settlements over the last
forty years. (In the run-up to Annapolis, for
instance, a repetitive historical pattern of
Israeli behavior was on show again ­ a pattern
that flits between humiliating provocation and
polite avoidance but never amounts to the
cessation of an activity that contravenes U.S. policy.)

What we do get from Eldar and Zertal is a highly
informative, accurate, and well-sourced account
of Israel’s own March of Folly. We learn that
there are already “two separate states for two
hostile peoples” and that they exist in the West
Bank itself, “<http://www.iraq-war.ru/where>where
the Palestinians and the settlers have separate
systems of roads, services, and laws.” The whole
story is there, from the first act of settlement
just three months after the conclusion of the
1967 war to the most recent construction of
outposts, bypass roads, and separation barrier.

The record of the second Bush administration on
the subject is incredibly inauspicious, with
regard not only to settlement policy but also the
entire Mideast peace process. During George W.
Bush’s tenure, the White House has made several
public plays on the issue, has been snubbed each
time ­ and then has retreated. First, the 2001
Mitchell Report called on Israel to “freeze all
settlement activity.” President Bush’s
much-referenced June 2002 speech repeated the
call. (”Israeli settlement activity in the
occupied territories must stop,” he declared.)
The “Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent
Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian
Conflict,” launched in 2003, defined a settlement
freeze as including natural growth and the
dismantling of outposts. Then, when Bush and
Sharon exchanged letters in 2004, the American
commitment was watered down to “restricting
settlement growth” to within “defined
construction lines” and “removal of unauthorized
outposts.” Coming out of Annapolis, the Bush
administration has shown no signs of getting any
tougher on the settlement issue.

There is one final point, and it should give
Zertal and Eldar’s book an appeal beyond the club
of Israel-Palestine specialists: Lords of the
Land can be read as a “How-Not-To” guide on
counterterrorism. The story of Israel and the
territories shreds the playbook on the global war
on terror, presenting a world in which real
grievances and injustices crucially matter. Far
from any glib division of the world into good and
evil, terrorism has roots, reasons, and a past ­
indeed, there is a direct link between
settlements, military occupation, and terrorism.
Zertal and Eldar explain in great detail why the
Al-Aqsa Intifada (the Second Intifada), launched
in 2000, might also be called the Settlements
War. Massive, disproportionate firepower and
military hubris (using the Israel Defense Forces
as a club against the enemy, apparently against
the wishes of ministerial-level leaders,
including the defense minister’s appointed
ceasefire negotiator) led to an escalation of
violence and the Palestinians’ use of suicide
bombings. Similarly, in 1994, Hamas violated
their own prohibition against using suicide
bombings that indiscriminately target civilians
only after the Goldstein outrage against Muslim
worshippers in Hebron. In 1996, Hamas ended an
ongoing informal truce only following the Israeli
liquidation of a leading militant, Yihye Ayash ­
a sequence that was to tragically repeat itself during the Al-Aqsa Intifada.

By the beginning of the new millennium, many
Israelis began to understand the absurdity of
viewing the occupation as simply a war on
Palestinian terror. They understood the urgent
need to address legitimate Palestinian
grievances. Then along came an angry post-9/11
America, with a stunningly simplistic and
misguided framing of the war on terror. This
framing is a mistake in whose shadow we all continue to live.

<http://www.alternet.org/audits/75213/?page=entire>http://www.alternet.org/audits/75213/?page=entire

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